Labour movements in transitions to democracy : the role of workers in democratisation by Novic, Danijela
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY 
Faculty of Arts, School of Social Sciences
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of the 
Australian National University
Labour Movements in Transitions to Democracy: 
The role of workers in democratisation
By
Danijela Novic
January 2009
I declare that this thesis is my own original work.
r?... Date: &&.Q3j.&QP°\
ignature
Contents
List of acronyms iv
Acknowledgements vii
Abstract viii
Chapter 1 -  Elite-led Transitology: A Top Down View of Democratic 1
Change
Chapter 2 -  The Mexican Transition: The Slow Decline of the ‘Perfect * 21
Dictatorship’
Chapter 3 -  The Mexican Labour Movement 52
Chapter 4 -  The Brazilian Transition: Breaking the Rules 77
Chapter 5 -  The Brazilian Labour Movement 118
Chapter 6 -  The South Korean Transition: Stemming the Democratic Tide 147 
Chapter 7 -  The South Korean Labour Movement 177
Chapter 8 -  Synthesis and Conclusion: Workers and Democratic Change 202
Bibliography 222
List of Acronyms
General
EOI Export-Oriented Industrialisation
GNP Gross National Product
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISI Import Substitution Industrialisation
Mexico
AHMSA
CNC
CNOP
CNT
COM
CROC
CT
CTM
CUT
DINA
EZLN
FAT
FNAP
FRD
IFE
FFOPPE
EFT
UP
OAB
PAN
PARM
PCM
PDM
PNR
PPS
PRD
PRI
PRM
PRONASOF
SINTIHA
SME
SNE
SNTMMSRM
STERM
STFRM
Altos Hornos de Mexico
Confederaciön Nacional Campesina
Confederation Nacional de Organizaciones Populäres
Central Nacional de Trabajadores
Casa del Obrero Mundial
Confederaciön Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinas
Congreso del Trabajo
Confederaciön de Trabajadores de Mexico
Confederaciön Ünica de Trabajadores
Diesel Nacional
Ejercito Zapatista de Liberaciön Nacional 
Frente Autentico Del Trabajo 
Frente Nacional Acciön Popular 
Frente Democrätico Nacional 
Instituto Federal Electoral
Federal Faw on Political Organisations and Electoral Processes 
Fey de Trabajo 
Linea Proletaria
Ordern dos Advogados do Brasil
Partido Acciön Nacional
Partido Autentico de la Revoluciön Mexicana
Partido Comunista Mexicano
Partido Demöcrata Mexicano
Partido Nacional Revolucionario
Partido Popular Socialista
Partido de la Revoluciön Democrätica
Partido Revolucionario Institucional
Partido de la Revoluciön Mexicana
Programa Nacional de Solidaridad
Sindicato Independiente Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria de Hierro 
y Acero
Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas 
Sindicato Nacional de Electricistas Federales
Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Minero-Metalürgicos y Similares de la 
Repüblica Mexicana
Sindicato de Trabajadores Electricistas de la Repüblica Mexicana 
Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la Repüblica Mexicana
STRM
SUTERM
TD
UGOCM
UNAM
UOI
UNT
Sindicato de Telefonistas de la Republica Mexicana
Sindicato Unica de Trabajadores Electricistas de la Republica de Mexico
Tendencia Democrätica
Union General de Obreros y Campesinos de Mexico 
Universidad Nacional Autönoma de Mexico 
Union Obrera Independiente 
Union Nacional de Trabajadores
Brazil
ABI
ARENA
BNDES
BOC
CDP
CEB
CGT
CLT
CNBB
CNTI
COB
CPOS
CRVD
DIEESE
DL-898
DL-1632
DL-4330
DOI-CODI
FORJ
IAP
MDB
PCB
PDS
PFL
PMDB
PRN
PSD
PT
PTB
PUA
SNI
UDN
Associacao Brasileira de Imprensa 
Alianga Renovadora Nacional
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social
Bloco Operärio e Compones
Comite de Defesa Proletäria
Christian Base Community
Comando Geral dos Trabalhadores
Consolidagäo das Leis do Trabalho
National Conference of Brazilian Bishops
Confederagäo Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Industria
Confederagäo Operäria Brasileira
Comite Permanente das Organizagöes Sindicais
Compania Vale do Rio Doce
Departamento Inter-sindical de Estudos Estatisticos e Socio-Economicos 
Decree-Law Number 898 
Decree Law number 1632 
Decree-Law Number 4330
Destacamento de Operagöes e Informagöes de Defesa Interna
Federagäo Operäria do Rio de Janeiro
Instituto de Aposentadoria e Pensöes
Movimento Democrätico Brasileiro
Partido Comunista do Brazil
Partido Democrätico Social
Partido Frente Liberal
Partido do Movimento Democrätico Brasileiro
Partido da Reconstrugao Nacional
Partido Social Democrätico
Partido dos Trabalhadores
Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro
Pacto de Unidade e Agäo
Servigo Nacional de Informagöes
Uniäo Democrätica Nacional
South Korea
CGWU Chonggye Garment Workers Union
CKTU Confederation of Korean Trade Unions
DJP Democratic Justice Party
D L P
D R P
E P B
F K T U
H C I
J O C
K C I A
K C L W
K P R
K W A U
K W W A
M F E Z
N A D
N C D C
N C P C R J
N C T U
N D P
N D R P
N M H D C
N K D P
N T E W U
P M C D R
P P D
R D P
U I M
U N P
U S A M G I K
D e m o c r a t i c  F ib e ra l  P a r ty
D e m o c r a t i c  R e p u b l ic a n  P a r ty
E c o n o m ic  P la n n in g  B o a r d
F e d e r a t io n  o f  K o re a n  T r a d e  U n io n s
H e a v y  C h e m ic a l  I n d u s t r ie s
Y o u n g  C a th o l i c  W o r k e r s ’ O r g a n i s a t io n
K o r e a n  C e n t r a l  In te l l ig e n c e  A g e n c y
K o re a n  C o u n c i l  fo r  L a b o u r  W e l f a r e
K o re a n  P e o p l e ’s R e p u b l ic
K o re a n  W o m e n ’s A s s o c i a t i o n s  U n i te d
K o re a n  W o m e n  W o r k e r s  A s s o c i a t i o n s
M a s a n  F re e  E x p o r t  Z o n e
N a t io n a l  A l l i a n c e  f o r  D e m o c r a c y
N a t io n a l  C o a l i t io n  fo r  a  D e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n
N a t io n a l  C a th o l i c  P r i e s t s ’ C o r p s  f o r  th e  R e a l i s a t io n  o f  J u s t i c e
N a t io n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  T r a d e  U n i o n s
N e w  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r ty
N e w  D e m o c r a t i c  R e p u b l i c a n  P a r ty
N a t io n a l  M o v e m e n t  H e a d q u a r t e r  f o r  D e m o c r a t i c  C o n s t i t u t i o n  
N e w  K o r e a  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r ty
N a t io n a l  T e a c h e r s ’ a n d  E d u c a t io n a l  W o r k e r s ’ U n i o n s
P e o p l e ’s M o v e m e n t  C o a l i t io n  fo r  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  R e u n i f i c a t i o n
P a r ty  fo r  P e a c e  a n d  D e m o c r a c y
R e u n i f i c a t io n  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r ty
U r b a n  In d u s t r ia l  M is s io n
U n i f i c a t io n  N a t io n a l  P a r ty
U S  A r m y  M i l i t a r y  G o v e r n m e n t  in K o r e a
Acknowledgments
Writing and researching this thesis has taken several years and as a result, there are several 
people who I need to thank. Many thanks to my supervisor, Dr John Minns whose 
guidance, patience and extensive knowledge has been invaluable. Throughout numerous 
edits, he was always willing to provide insightful suggestions and criticisms, as well as 
much-needed support for which I am deeply grateful.
My family also deserve credit for their love and support. My parents Cane and Tasa, as well 
as my brother, Michael, for their belief in me and my amazing sister Kristina, for just being 
my sister and for keeping my feet on the ground. They all provided a welcome escape from 
some of the more difficult periods while writing this thesis.
Most importantly, I owe a special thanks to my husband Igor who has been there for me 
every step of the way and never doubted that I could do it. His love and encouragement 
have been my rock throughout the whole process.
Abstract
Transitions to democracy have generated an extensive body of literature which seeks to 
explain how authoritarian regimes become democracies. One body of thought, known as 
‘transitology’, adopts an elite-centric view of democratic change. In particular, "elite-led 
transitology’ argues that democracy is brought about by the decisions and actions of those 
in the higher echelons of government, that is, the political elite. Elite-led transitology’s 
focus remains at the higher-level of politics and as such, a particular type of transition to 
democracy is advocated -  one which leads to the installation of a conservative democratic 
government. This thesis argues that democratisation was also the result of extensive 
popular opposition to authoritarian regimes. In the three case studies, Mexico, Brazil and 
South Korea, the labour movement in particular played an important role in propelling the 
transition to democracy forward.
Government repression of the labour movement resulted in a potentially explosive situation 
for authoritarian regimes. Industrialisation was predicated on low wage labour combined 
with brutal working conditions and particularly harsh treatment on the shop-floor. Because 
of the strict system of worker control in each country and the importance of economic 
development for political legitimacy, any disruption was dangerous for the status quo. The 
containment of pent-up worker grievances however, could not continue indefinitely. 
Workers had the potential (and indeed utilised this potential) to mount systematic 
opposition to governments. The manner in which this occurred was different in the three 
case studies and it influenced the type of transitions which each underwent. In all of the 
case studies, the labour movement led protests calling for installation of democratic 
government. Labour sparked off extensive demonstrations -  large sections of the middle 
class also voiced their frustrations towards repressive governments. Such opposition placed 
considerable strain on the government’s ability to maintain its grip on political 
mobilisation. By placing tremendous pressure on the government, the labour movement 
played a crucial role in initiating democratic transitions. This thesis, therefore, is revisionist 
-  it is a bottom-up perspective rather than the top-down approach. It argues for a more 
balanced model which not only takes into account higher-level political processes, but also, 
acknowledges the importance of popular mobilisation and in particular, the labour 
movement, in bringing down authoritarian governments.
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CHAPTER 1: REVIEW OF DEMOCRATISATION THEORY - 
‘ELITE-LED TRANSITOLOGY’
TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: A BACKGROUND
The study of democratisation has generated a wealth of literature in the past twenty years 
which seeks to account for the processes which foster democracy and lead to the demise of 
authoritarian regimes. ‘Transitology’ is the school of thought associated with ‘transitions to 
democracy’. Interest in how authoritarian regimes develop into democracies is not a recent 
phenomenon. Scholars and policy analysts have been theorising about democratisation for 
decades, from Seymour Martin Lipset’s concern with the importance of economic 
development for promoting and sustaining democracy, to Samuel Huntington’s 
classification of ‘waves of democracy’ through different periods.1 23 Huntington dated the 
first wave as beginning in the United States in the early nineteenth century and reaching its 
peak at the end of World War I with 30 countries which were classified as democratic. The 
second wave occurred after World War II and continued into the early 1960s, with 36 
countries becoming democracies.' Democracy’s third wave began in 1974 and by the early 
1990s, another 30 countries had adopted democratic forms of government.4
The field of ‘transitology’ has become the dominant paradigm in the social sciences for 
conceptualising the processes of democratisation. Transitions to democracy literature 
emerged as a school of thought in the 1970s, with seminal texts which sought to explain the 
breakdown of authoritarianism in Spain, Portugal and Greece. This was followed by 
transitions in Latin America and Africa in the 1980s and 1990s and Eastern Europe in the 
1990s. With each of these decades however, the theory underwent some slight changes in 
order to account for the differences between regions -  the experiences of Eastern Europe 
were seen as particularly urgent reasons for modifying the theory. Nevertheless, a 
continued assumption in the literature was that certain common features could be found in
1 Lipset, Seymour Martin, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 53, No. 1, March 1959
2 Huntington, Samuel, ‘How Countries Democratise’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 4, Winter 
1991-1992, p.579.
3 ibid.
4 Huntington, Samuel, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman and London: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1993, p. 12.
each of these countries. Although there is disagreement over the nature and significance of 
these commonalities, the basic premise remains the same -  democracy is essentially an elite 
affair in which ordinary people are conspicuously absent.
While earlier theorists such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Barrington Moore saw 
democratisation as the result of the modernisation of social structures, some transitologists 
shifted the focus on elite actors and top-level processes of political change. Referred to as 
‘strategic choice’, this approach focuses on the decisions (or choices) of individual actors, 
their interactions with other elite actors, as well as their interactions with the formal rules of 
politics.5 The theoretical roots of the ‘strategic choice’ perspective are pioneered in 
Dankwart Rustow’s work and especially his 1970 article ‘Transitions to Democracy: 
Toward a Dynamic Model’.6 Rustow proposes that transitions must follow a certain pattern: 
background conditions, preparatory phase, decision phase, and a habituation phase. The 
role of elites is emphasised in the ‘decision phase’ where a small group of leaders is likely 
to play a “disproportionate role” in deciding the nature of the democratic regime which will 
emerge.7 Rustow broke with the earlier tradition which explained the rise of democracy 
largely as a function of certain ‘social correlates’ of modernisation -  for example, 
urbanisation and the spread of literacy.8 Instead, Rustow directed attention toward the 
political conflicts and dynamic interaction through which a democratic compromise, or 
political ‘pacts’ might emerge.9
During the 1970s and 1980s, the ‘strategic choice’ perspective became influential in 
democratisation studies, and analysts turned their attention to the choices, preferences and 
bargains of elite political actors in the transition.10 While earlier explanations had been 
concerned with long-term developments of socio-economic structures, the ‘strategic choice’
5 Whitehead, Laurence, ‘Democratic Transitions’, The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, 2nd ed., 
Krieger, Joel (ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford Reference Online, 2001. Accessed 25 April, 2004. 
http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.htinl?subview-Main&entry-t 121 .e0184
6 Rustow, Dankwart A., ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model’, Comparative Politics, Vol.
3, April 1970.
7 Pridham, Geoffrey, ‘Democratic Transitions in Theory and Practice: Southern European Lessons for Eastern 
Europe?’ in Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (eds), Democratisation in Eastern Europe: Domestic and 
International Perspectives, London: Routledge, 1993, p.78.
s Whitehead, ‘Democratic Transitions’, in Krieger, op.cit.
9 ibid.
10 Anderson, Lisa, ‘Introduction’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, April 1997, pps.255-256.
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view gave priority to short-term determinants of the actual transition process." It also 
tended to define actors strategically (e.g. hardliners and softliners) with respect to their 
position in the ‘transition game’. Some of the more prominent scholars of this position 
include Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, Adam Przeworski, Scott Mainwaring, 
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Laurence Whitehead, among others. ‘Transitology’ is a 
broad school of thought and there are many differences between the dominant 
transitologists -  they cannot all be lumped into single, unified category. However, a theme 
which runs throughout the literature is the notion that democracy emerges as a result of 
complex negotiations and bargaining at the highest levels of government. As such, the main 
focus in this thesis is centred on the transitologists who argue that transitions to democracy 
are led by elite actors -  ‘elite-led’ transitologists. For O’Donnell, Schmitter, Przeworski, 
Mainwaring, Diamond, Linz and Whitehead, the important political choices and designs are 
those taken or crafted by top policymakers. In such a formulation, there is little room for 
the popular classes in bringing about democratic change -  their role is relegated to the 
margins of formal politics.
The term ‘transitions to democracy’ incorporates several features. For two leading 
transitologists, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, the transition is “the 
interval between one political regime and another ... our efforts generally stop at the 
moment that a new regime is installed. . . ” . 14 The focus here, and what is seen as preferable 
by O’Donnell and Schmitter, are democratic transitions. As an interval, the transition is 
seen as a relatively short space of time in which the rules of the political game remain 
undefined. 15 This is an interval where ‘uncertainty’ dominates, where the rules of the game 
are constantly in flux and where there is intense struggle between actors regarding the type
11 Pridham, Geoffrey and Tatu Vanhanen, ‘Introduction’, in Pridham and Vanhanen, Democratisation in 
Eastern Europe, op.cit., p.2.
12 Berins Collier, Ruth and James Mahoney, ‘Adding Collective Actors to Collective Outcomes: Labour and 
Recent Democratisation in South America and Southern Europe’, in Lisa Anderson (ed), Transitions to 
Democracy, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p.98.
n Fish, M. Steven, ‘Postcommunist Subversion: Social Science and Democratisation in East Europe and 
Eurasia’, Slavic Review, Vol. 58, No. 4, Winter 1999, p.811.
14 O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Vol. 4, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 
p.6.
15 ibid.
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of regime which will be established. 16 A detailed definition of ‘democratic transition’ is 
provided by Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen:
By democratic transition we refer to a stage of regime change commencing 
at the point when the previous totalitarian/authoritarian system begins to 
collapse, leading to the situation when, with a new constitution in place, the 
democratic structures become routinised and the political elites adjust their 
behaviour to liberal democratic norms. Transition tasks involve, above all, 
negotiating the constitutional settlement and settling the rules of procedure 
for competition...17.
A number of features emerge from this definition which are central to transitology. One 
major premise is that the ‘transition’ is one towards liberal democracy -  hence, there is a 
normative dimension in the concept. O’Donnell explicitly makes the point that one of the 
general themes in Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, is that the authors “had from the 
outset a normative bias, coupled and reinforced by an empirical generalisation. We have 
considered political democracy as desirable per se”.1K There is also a general consensus 
about the type of democracy which countries are moving toward, that is, the establishment 
of a ‘procedural minimum’ in which actors agree upon necessary elements of political 
democracy. 19 These include secret balloting, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, 
partisan competition, associational recognition and access and executive accountability.20 
Transition tasks involve, above all, negotiating the constitutional settlement and finalising 
the rules of procedure for political competition, but also dismantling authoritarian agencies 
and abolishing laws unsuitable for democratic politics. The transition model promoted by 
transitologists, therefore, is a ‘liberal’ model.22
16 ibid.
17 Pridham and Vanhanen, ‘Introduction’, in Pridham and Vanhanen, op.cit., p.2.
IX O’Donnell, Guillermo, ‘Introduction to the Latin American Cases’, in O’Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. 
Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Vol. 2, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p.10.
19 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.8.
20 ibid.
21 Agh, Attila, The Politics of Central Europe, London: Sage Publications, 1998, p.17.
22 Lievesley, Geraldine, Democracy in Latin America: Mobilisation, Power and the Search for a New Politics, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 11.
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The transition process remains primarily an affair between the outgoing regime elites, and 
the leaders of the opposition movement. For transitologists, the stages of transition are 
largely characterised by four political actors: hardliners and reformers (or softliners) inside 
the authoritarian bloc, and moderates and radicals in the opposition. ' O’Donnell argues 
that the transition unfolds as the main political actors, the softliners and hardliners within 
the regime, and the opposition, play a game of “coup poker” .24 The threat of a coup from 
the hardliners within the regime is what forces the softliners and the opposition to 
compromise and this helps to explain the moderation of the democratic opposition in 
successful transitions.23 Mobilisation of civil society and mass unrest, combined with the 
prospects of having to overthrow the softliners within its ranks, means that to hardliners, 
the costs of repressing the regime’s opponents are too high.26 The factionalism of the 
regime, according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, is likely to increase to the point that the 
soft-liners come to recognise the interest they share with the opposition in avoiding a return 
to full-fledged authoritarian rule.27 These factors then influence the establishment of ‘pacts’
or agreements between softliners and other actors who have interests in installing a liberal
28democracy.
The eventual outcome of transitions, therefore, is a complex process of negotiations, 
compromise, deliberations, agreements and concessions among the four main political 
actors. Negotiation and deliberation continue until the last stage is reached: elections. Once 
elections have been called, it is parties that dominate the political scene. Parties are seen as 
important by transitologists for several reasons, they generate symbols of political identity 
that bridge many of the gaps that otherwise divide major sectors of society such as class, 
status, family, gender, religion, region, ethnicity and language. Parties also play an 
important role at this juncture because they have a stake in determining the definition of 
rules under which the contest will take place.
23 Przeworski, Adam, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.67.
24 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.24.
2:1 O’Donnell, Guillermo, Transitions to Democracy’: Some Navigation Instruments’, in Robert Pastor (ed), 
Democracy in the Americas: Stopping the Pendulum, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1989, p.68.
26 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.24.
27 ibid, pps.24-25.
~x ibid, p.25.
29 O’Donnell, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, in Pastor, op.cit., p.70.
O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.59.
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The elite focus is maintained by several transitologists throughout the succeeding stages of 
the transition. At the stage when elections are scheduled, opponents of the authoritarian 
regime have an incentive to cooperate with softliners in the regime in order to ensure that 
the elections will not be cancelled by a coup. ' 1 This phase involves compromise and deals 
between the transitional regime and political parties in order to institute a particular type of 
democracy -  liberal democracy. ' 2 The interest that parties have in defining the democracy 
that will emerge also propels them, according to O’Donnell, into converging with the 
softliners in detailed negotiations." The transition process is formulated as a series of 
improvisations under pressure through which the composition and objectives of the 
authoritarian coalition are shifted toward cooperation and convergence with the more 
temperate elements of the opposition.34 This leads to another shared concern of elite-led 
transitologists: the critical role of pacts.
A basic typology of transitions is presented by Terry Lynn Karl and Schmitter in which 
pacts form the foundations of a successful transition to democracy. This typology 
highlights transitology’s predilection for elite control over the course of the transition. For 
Karl and Schmitter, there are four types of regime transition.^ The first is ‘transition by 
pact’, whereby elites agree upon a multilateral compromise among themselves. The second 
is ‘transition by imposition’, when elites use force unilaterally and effectively to bring 
about a regime change against the resistance of incumbents. The third is ‘transition by 
reform’, when masses mobilise from below and impose a compromised outcome without 
resorting to violence. The final mode is ‘transition by revolution’, where the masses rise up 
in arms and defeat the previous authoritarian rulers militarily.' For example, Brazil is 
classified by Karl and Schmitter as a transition by imposition, as the military utilised its 
dominant position in society in order to establish unilaterally the rules for civilian 
government. ' 7
31 O’Donnell, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, in Pastor, op.cit., p.70.
l2 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.59.
33 O’Donnell, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, in Pastor, op.cit., p.70.
34 Whitehead, ‘Democratic Transitions’, in Krieger, op.cit.
^ Karl, Terry Lynn and Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern 
Europe’, International Social Science Journal, Vol. 128, 1991, pps.274-276.
36 Karl and Schmitter, ‘Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe’, op.cit., p.275.
37 ibid., p.280.
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Karl argues that in Latin America, the most frequently encountered types of transition, and 
the ones which have most often resulted in the implantation of a political democracy, are 
‘transitions from above’. These are transitions where traditional rulers remain in control, 
even if pressured from below, and successfully use strategies of either compromise or 
force, or a mixture of both, to retain part of their power. ’8 0 ‘Donnell and Schmitter share 
similar reservations regarding transitions through mass struggle:
A ‘transfer of power’, in which incumbents hand over control of the state to 
some faction of their supporters, or a ‘surrender of power’, where they 
negotiate the transition with some of their nonmaximalist [non-radical] 
opponents, seems more propitious for the installation and consolidation of 
democracy than an ‘overthrow of power’ by implacable antagonists.39
Karl and Schmitter argue that stable democracy does not result from transition through 
reform in which (non-violent) mass mobilisation is a primary feature.40 Stable democracy 
also does not result from a revolution of the masses. The most successful transitions and the 
ones which are more likely to result in stability are ‘transitions by pact’ and ‘transitions by 
imposition’.41 Karl and Schmitter’s typology highlights a common recurring feature of 
elite-led transitology: distaste for mass mobilisation and popular participation in transition 
politics. By placing such a heavy emphasis on transitions controlled from above, elite-led 
transitology not only overlooks the role of social movements in the transition, but where it 
does acknowledge an expanded role for mass involvement -  ‘transition by reform’ and 
‘transition by revolution’ -  it is viewed as dangerous and undesirable.
For elite-led transitologists, negotiated pacts are the most favourable and desirable way of 
instituting a successful transition to democracy. These are agreements between regime and 
opposition elites that establish the rules of the new democratic game.42 They institute 
formulas for sharing or alternating in office, distributing the rewards of office and
3S Karl, Terry Lynn, ‘Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 1, 
Oct 1990, pps.8-9.
39 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.l 1.
40 Karl and Schmitter, ‘Modes of Transition in Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe’, op.cit., p.282.
4 ‘ i b i d -
42 Geddes, Barbara, ‘What Do We Know about Democratisation after Twenty Years?’ Annual Review of 
Political Science, Vol. 2, 1999, p .l20.
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constraining policy choice in areas of high salience to the elite groups involved, while 
excluding other groups from office and influence over policy.43 Pacts are viewed as 
ensuring the survival of the newly emerging democratic regime by making the rules of 
democratic politics acceptable to the largest proportion of the elite population.44 The 
competitive elections which are then held are intended (as a result of the pacts negotiated), 
to produce a government that is broadly representative of both authoritarians and 
democrats.45 These pacts are restrictive, as they seek to limit the scope of popular 
representation in order to assure the traditional dominant classes that their interests will be 
protected.46
In essence, pacts are “antidemocratic mechanisms”, as they are negotiated by elite actors 
who seek to construct a deliberate socioeconomic and political contract which will restrict 
mass mobilisation during the transition and limit its ability to access political power in the 
long-term.47 Despite this anti-democratic aspect, O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that where 
pacts are a feature of transitions, they are desirable because they “enhance the probability 
that the process will lead to a viable political democracy”. This is because pacts are seen 
by O’Donnell, Schmitter and other elite-led transitologists as removing from the political 
agenda sources of “potentially destabilising conflict” / 9 That potentially destabilising force 
consists of the popular sector and mass movements in general.
The emphasis on pacts reinforces the predominantly top-down focus of elite-led 
transitology. One of the major problems is that democratic actors in the transition are 
outnumbered by non-democratic actors in ‘transitions by pact’ and ‘transitions by 
imposition’ .50 This is acknowledged by O’Donnell, where he observes that such transitions 
create a paradoxical situation: “A minority of actors must advance the country toward the
43 ibid.
44 Shin, Doh Chull, ‘On the Third Wave of Democratisation: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory’, 
World Politics, Vol. 47, No. 1, October 1994, p. 167.
45 Bunce, Valerie, ‘Rethinking Recent Democratisation: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience’, World 
Politics, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2003, p. 171.
4fl Karl, ‘Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America’, op.cit., p.l 1.
47 ibid., pps.l 1-12.
4S O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.39.
44 Hagopian, Francis, “'Democracy by Undemocratic Means?” Elites, Political Pacts and Regime Transition 
in Brazil’, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2, July 1990, p. 149.
30 Shin, op.cit., p .l68.
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consolidation of a political regime based on the principle of majority rule”.51 The 
contradiction between using undemocratic means to install a democratic government can be 
seen in the Brazilian case. A secretive pact was negotiated in 1985 by the leader of the 
opposition party, Tancredo Neves and the outgoing military which guaranteed the armed 
forces that there would be no ‘revision of the past’ and ensured them an extensive role in 
the future government. " Such measures are seen as necessary in order to ensure security in 
the newly emerging democratic system. O’Donnell and Schmitter acknowledge the 
uncertain nature of the transition when they argue that transitions are not a linear or rational 
process because there is too much uncertainty about capabilities and “too much suspicion”
c - i
about intentions for such outcomes. ‘ Pacts are viewed as a central way of reducing the 
uncertainty of a transition to democracy and guaranteeing a level of stability, despite their 
undemocratic nature.
POLITICAL ELITES: TRANSITOLOGY’S MAIN FOCUS
For elite-led transitologists, the starting point in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes is 
within the ranks of the regime elite, as a result of splits within it. O’Donnell and Schmitter 
state that “there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence -  direct or indirect 
-  of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the 
fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners”.54 This leads to their conclusion 
that the factors which lead to transition can be located overwhelmingly in domestic, internal 
causes.55 Schisms within the military-authoritarian regime are seen as occurring either 
because of the failures of authoritarian regimes, or due to a “paradox of success”, according 
to Scott Mainwaring.56 Economic success is defined as having achieved high levels of 
economic growth, and political success is regarded as having crushed the most serious
51 O’Donnell, Guillermo, ‘Challenges to Democratisation in Brazil’, World Policy Journal, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
Spring 1988, pps.283-284.
52 ibid., p.286.
53 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.72.
54 ibid, p. 19.
55 ibid., p. 18.
56 Mainwaring, Scott, ‘Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation: Theoretical and 
Comparative Issues’, in Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O’Donnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (eds), Issues in 
Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective, Indiana, 
Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, p.299.
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threats to the regime. These successes, according to Mainwaring, convince authoritarian 
elites that they have little to lose by opening the political system and a lot to gain, including 
domestic legitimacy/7
Liberalisation however, is a phenomenon which is distinguished from democratisation. 
Mainwaring defines liberalisation as “an easing of repression and extension of civil liberties 
within an authoritarian regime, whereas a transition to democracy implies a change of 
regimes”.58 Przeworski puts forward several factors which explain why liberalisation 
occurs. Two of these factors are common in all shades of transitology -  either liberalisation 
as a result of the regime’s loss of legitimacy or conflicts within the ruling bloc, particularly 
within the military.59 For transitologists Eduardo Viola and Mainwaring, the Brazilian 
transition commenced around 1974 at the initiative of regime elites, who considered the 
moment favourable for a political opening (abertura).60 It was favourable, according to 
Mainwaring and Viola, because the guerrilla left had been repressed by the military, 
popular movements were under control, the government did not face any radical opposition 
and it had significant support in civil society. The economic situation was also an important 
factor in the decision to liberalise, as economic recovery not only bolstered regime support, 
it also “led to a feeling that the economy was in good hands and could withstand minor 
changes in the political system”.61 Within the military ranks, it was also a concern that 
opening the political system might reduce some of the tensions created by the years of 
tighter authoritarian control, and ameliorate tensions within the armed forces.62 One of the 
pressures on the military regime was the partial erosion of support for it within leading 
sectors of the industrial bourgeoisie, which began to favour a more open and less statist 
form of government in 1974.63 The military was forced into the position of making a choice 
between beginning the long-term institutionalisation of its power or conversely, 
commencing the liberalisation process.64
57 ibid.
author’s italics, ibid., p.298.
59 Przeworski, Adam, ‘Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy’, in O’Donnell,
Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: 
Comparative Perspectives, Vol. 3, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p.50.
6(1 Viola, Eduardo and Scott Mainwaring, ‘Transitions to Democracy: Brazil and Argentina in the 1980s’, 
Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 2, Winter 1985, p.202.
61 ibid.
62 ibid.
63 ibid.
64 ibid., p.203.
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The processes that caused the split in the first place are largely confined to an analysis of 
actors in the higher echelons of government. This is a general feature of elite-led 
transitology: apart from brief explanations about how the popular classes withdraw their 
support for authoritarian governments, there is a lack of information as to how the popular 
classes influence liberalisation and democratisation in the first place. Indeed, popular 
pressure has been a contributing factor leading to splits in the ruling elite and this pressure 
has also been responsible for maintaining the move towards democratisation. By focusing 
exclusively on the elite level of politics, transitology and in particular elite-led transitology, 
fails to take into consideration the impact of subaltern actors, resulting in substantial gaps 
in the democratisation literature.
FILLING THE GAPS: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE TRANSITION
As we have seen, in elite-led transitology, social movements or mass opposition in general 
are relatively unimportant in ‘transitions to democracy’. Social movements by definition 
are “forms of collective action with a high degree of popular participation, which use non- 
institutional channels and which formulate their demands while simultaneously finding 
forms of action to express them, thus establishing themselves as collective actors” .65 One 
important collective actor in the transition to democracy is the labour movement. Labour’s 
importance lies not only in its particular role as defender of workers’ rights, but in the 
broader role of champion for democratisation and an end to authoritarianism. Its ability to 
organise on a massive scale and present a formidable opposition to authoritarian rule 
however, has not been dealt with extensively by elite-led transitologists. Social movements 
in general are either seen as playing a secondary role or as maintaining the momentum for 
democratic change, but they are rarely considered as occupying a place of primary 
importance -  the labour movement is no exception. Civil society’s main function, 
according to O’Donnell is to strengthen the position of the democratic opposition.66 It
fo Jelin, Elizabeth, in Escobar, Arturo and Sonia E. Alvarez (eds), The Making of Social Movements in Latin 
America: Identity, Strategy and Democracy, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992, p. 15.
66 O’Donnell, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, in Pastor, op.cit., p.67.
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strengthens the opposition as a result of the intense demands it places on all actors involved 
in the transition.67
Elite-led transitology has tended to emphasise the importance of electoral arrangements, 
competition between political parties and elite interactions.68 For this school of 
transitology, political structures and institutions are shaped by the actions and options of 
political leaders.69 Democracy therefore, is dependent on the institutional rules for 
competition between elites. The broader populace is excluded from negotiations which 
will determine the type of democracy which will emerge. Geraldine Lievesley, a strong 
critic of elite-led transitology, argues that the underlying assumption of O’Donnell and 
Schmitter is that the pacts negotiated will be with civilian elements on the centre and 
centre-right of the political spectrum. ' 1 Representatives of the political left are excluded 
unless they are willing to accept the parameters chosen -  pacts are then predicated upon the 
attempted systematic exclusion of mass movements, which in these periods tend to consist 
of the left, from political influence.72 The exclusion of the ‘revolutionary left’ is seen as 
particularly important following the transition. Elite-led transitologist Laurence Whitehead 
argues in unequivocal terms:
If democratic consolidation is to be kept on track, the revolutionary left must 
be either reabsorbed into democratic life or isolated and defeated. All 
democrats, including those on the radical left, will therefore be required to 
opt for defense of the regime against a continuing revolutionary challenge.73
67 ibid.
6S Lievesley, op.cit., p. 197.
69 Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Introduction: Comparing Experiences with 
Democracy’, in Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Politics in Developing 
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990, 
p.15.
7(1 Avritzer, Leonardo, Democracy and the Public Space in Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002, p.28.
71 Lievesley, op.cit., p.12.
72 ibid.
77 Whitehead, Laurence, ‘The Consolidation of Fragile Democracies: A Discussion with Illustrations’, in 
Pastor, op.cit., p.89.
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Following the schism between hardliners and softliners within the regime, the transition is 
seen to advance through a series of bargains between state and opposition elites.74 This 
formulation sets the terms for the subsequent debate which centres on the relative 
contribution of factors within the regime and the opposition.7^  Several elite-led 
transitologists see this as desirable, including Karl, who maintains that successful 
transitions are necessarily characterised by accommodation and compromise.76 O’Donnell 
and Schmitter’s conception of democratisation calls for gradualism, caution and 
compromise.77 Transitions, therefore, are all about moderation.78
O’Donnell and Schmitter, however, do not completely deny all importance to mass 
movements. They are seen as significant in reinvigorating popular participation and in 
stimulating an interest in politics. But they are essentially, a consequence or a feature of the 
transition phase:
The dynamics of the transition from authoritarian rule are not just a matter 
of elite dispositions, calculations and pacts. If we have emphasised these 
aspects up to now it is because they largely determine whether or not an 
opening will occur at all and because they set important parameters on the 
extent of possible liberalisation and eventual democratisation. Once 
something has happened -  once the soft-liners have prevailed over the hard­
liners, begun to extend guarantees for individuals and some rights of 
contestation ... a generalised mobilisation is likely to occur, which we 
choose to describe as the ‘resurrection of civil society’ .79
So while O’Donnell and Schmitter do recognise the importance of ferment and mobilisation 
in civil society, they locate its contribution exclusively during the period after the 
authoritarian regime has split and after the soft-liners have begun to open and liberalise the 
regime -  at this point, an “upsurge” of popular mobilisation pushes the transition forward,
74 Munck, Geraldo, ‘Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 26, No. 
3, April 1994, p.358.
75 ibid.
76 Karl, ‘Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America’, op.cit., pps.16-17.
77 Shin, op.cit., p. 162.
7X Bermeo, Nancy, ‘Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions’, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 29, No. 3, April 1997, p.305.
79 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.48.
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80keeping it on track through its now-demonstrated potential for eruption. O’Donnell
classifies the ‘resurrection of civil society’ as being a broad, multiclass movement -  it
consists of business leaders, middle class associations, human rights organisations, church
81groups, workers, intellectuals and leaders in the popular arts.
In any case, O’Donnell and Schmitter argue that regardless of its intensity and of the
background from which it emerges, the popular upsurge is “always ephemeral” and it
82performs the role of pushing the transition further than it would otherwise have gone. 
Various elite-led transitologists do make allowances for the influence of popular 
mobilisation as opposition to the authoritarian regime. Mainwaring, for example, argues 
that exclusive attention to internal tensions can lead to neglecting the impact of opposition 
actors in general, including mass mobilisation.83 Mainwaring also concedes that many 
transitions involve complex interactions between regime and opposition forces from an 
early stage.84 He also argues that although transitions usually begin with splits in the 
authoritarian regime, over time more and more actors become involved so it is not viable to 
maintain exclusive focus on elite actors because the efforts of popular sectors to redefine 
the political scene are also considered important.85 Nevertheless, the popular classes have a 
minimal role in the negotiations which will determine the type of democracy that will 
emerge and the emphasis on interactions between elites as the ‘main game’ in the transition 
remains.
One of the main preoccupations of elite-led transitology is the possibility of a coup, or an 
authoritarian reversal during the transition. For O’Donnell, this represents one of the 
“archetypal dramas” of a transition because it determines the actions of elite actors.86 
Although the role of the popular sector is acknowledged, it is principally to highlight the 
dangers of excessive involvement in the transition process. Transitologists argues that too 
much pressure from below can spoil the chances for democracy. Critic Nancy Bermeo
811 Diamond, Larry, ‘The Globalisation of Democracy’, in Slater, Robert O., Barry M. Schutz and Steven R. 
Dorr (eds), Global Transformation and the Third World, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p.45.
81 O’Donnell, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, in Pastor, op.cit., pps.66,67.
8" O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., pps.55,56.
83 Mainwaring, ‘Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation’, in Mainwaring, O’Donnell and 
Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic Consolidation, op.cit., p.299.
84 ibid.
85 ibid., p.303.
86 O’Donnell, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, in Pastor, op.cit., p.68.
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believes that this stems from the suggestion that while citizen mobilisation is essential, it is
07
ultimately dangerous if it continues too long or with too much intensity. O’Donnell 
argues that:
all attempts at revolutionary transformation have not merely failed; they 
have been a powerful factor leading to the emergence of authoritarian rule 
... any such attempt in the foreseeable future will be much more likely to 
induce similar authoritarian reversals than to achieve whatever egalitarian
00
goals may be claimed by revolutionary movements.
There is considerable emphasis on the dangers of ‘authoritarian reversals’ as a result of 
mass mobilisation. Arthur MacEwan argues that this is part of the overall effort to limit the 
definition of the transition process. The narrow definition places social and economic 
changes and the struggles directed toward such changes in opposition to the transition 
process because they threaten reversal.90 As a result, elite-led transitologists argue that 
restrained social mobilisation is necessary:
Nothing is more destructive of democracy than frequent confrontations in 
the streets, the legislature, the state administration, and elsewhere between 
groups who view themselves as engaged in zero-sum conflict. The lifting of 
authoritarian repression and the return of democratic liberties to organise, 
petition, and demonstrate should not lead to widespread disorder and 
violence.91
The emphasis of elite-led transitology remains on legal avenues of opposition, as the 
popular sector and their oppositional activities are considered as occupying a place of 
secondary importance. Jean Grugel argues that there is a tendency in the transitions
x7 Bermeo, ‘Myths of Moderation’, op.cit., pps.305,307.
xx O’Donnell, ‘Introduction to the Latin American Cases’, in O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Vol. 2, op.cit., p.10.
x9 MacEwan, Arthur, ‘Transitions from Authoritarian Rule’, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 3, 
Summer 1988, p. 122.
90 ibid.
1,1 Valenzuela, J. Samuel, ‘Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and 
Facilitating Conditions’, in Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic Consolidation, 
op.cit., p.82.
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literature to focus too heavily on formal opposition from parties and these models of 
democratisation make it hard to assess the strength of popular organisations and protest.92 
Grugel maintains that by seeing parties or political elites as the main agents of the 
transition, theories which focus on top-down factors inevitably tend to downplay or even 
miss the role of popular organisations. MacEwan points out that ‘popular upsurges’ do 
receive attention in the O’Donnell et al Transitions volumes, however, they are steps in a 
limited process of political change.94 By focusing attention on the manipulation of the 
levers of political power, MacEwan argues that the Transitions volumes provide hardly any 
analysis of the struggles of the popular classes or of the activities of the radical left outside 
of the formal liberalisation process and electoral arena.95 This is partly explained by the fact 
that popular mobilisation is deemed as temporary and therefore, ineffective in achieving 
any long-term, meaningful political change. O’Donnell states that:
When the announcement of elections begins to channel the main processes 
of the transition toward parties as the main interlocutors of the government, 
the mobilisation of society tends to decrease in scope and intensity. This is 
regrettable in many ways, but it helps the successful completion of the 
transition 96
It can be seen, therefore, that the importance of mass mobilisation and the popular sectors 
passes once the transition is completed. The ‘demobilisation’ of civil society is seen as 
inevitable by O’Donnell and Schmitten
This wave [of mobilisation] crests sooner or later, depending on the case. A 
certain normality is subsequently reasserted as some individuals and groups 
depoliticise themselves again, having run out of resources or become 
disillusioned, and as others deradicalise themselves, having recognised that 
their maximal hopes will not be achieved. Still others simply become tired
92 Grugel, Jean, ‘Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Lessons from Latin America’, Political Studies, Vol. 
39, No. 2, June 1991, p.364.
93 ibid.
4 MacEwan, op.cit., p 121.
95 ibid.
96 O’Donnell, ‘Transitions to Democracy’, in Pastor, op.cit., p.72.
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of constant mobilisation and its intrusion into their private lives ... and later 
on ... return to some form of relatively demobilised citizenship.97
This highlights, according to Avritzer, the ambiguous approach that elite-led transitologists 
adopt to mass mobilisation.98 On the one hand, they note that collective action might 
strengthen democratic values, but on the other hand, they still conceive mass mobilisation 
within the broader framework of an elite-masses relationship -  mass mobilisations do not 
play a democratising role per se, but rather a facilitative role in the internal process of 
negotiation among elites.99 Thus, social movements are considered supplementary at best, 
and counter-productive at worst.
What emerges out of elite-led transitology then, is a narrow conception of the processes 
which drive democracy -  indeed, the notion of ‘transition’ is misleading. The ‘transition to 
democracy’ is a highly conservative and exclusionary process which obscures the nature of 
political, social and economic change (or continuity) more than it explains. Elite-led 
transitologists view democracy as unfolding through a series of sequences and patterns 
which are driven from the top-down, rather than bottom-up. For the next phase to be 
successfully completed -  consolidation of democracy -  the transition needs to be 
successfully managed. Pacts are the principal mechanism for guaranteeing successful 
consolidation. This is the main reason for the important role ascribed to elite political 
figures in negotiating and bargaining the crucial terms of the ‘transition to democracy’. The 
discussion of political systems is reduced by elite-led transitologists to analyses of regime 
changes and electoral procedures -  this reduces their discussion to little more than a 
“journalistic commentary on political personalities, rules and events” . 100 Elite-led 
transitologist Scott Mainwaring acknowledges that the transitions literature has furthered 
the analysis of democracy as a product of elite interactions. 101
97 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.26.
9S Avritzer, op.cit., p.29.
99 ibid.
1(111 Petras, James and Morris Morley, Latin America in the Time of Cholera: Electoral Politics, Market 
Economics and Permanent Crisis, New York: Routledge, 1992, pps.164,166.
1111 Mainwaring, ‘Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation’, in Mainwaring, O’Donnell and 
Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic Consolidation, op.cit., p.302.
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The notion of a ‘transition’ is also highly circumscribed since political activity is restricted 
to formal arenas through which the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of the actors involved in the 
transition process can be easily judged -  in this formulation, power depends on elite and 
mass influence and control over the machinery of the state. Social movements and the 
masses in general are viewed with suspicion because they are seen as potentially 
destabilising factors in the transition. Their exclusion is not laudable perhaps, but certainly 
necessary. Elite-led transitology understates the complexity of regime change because it 
neglects the various forces at play apart from elite actors.
In particular, labour movements in the three case studies -  Mexico, Brazil and South Korea 
-  were important in the transitional politics of each country. Rather than explaining 
divisions in the ruling elite as the result of the decisions and strategies of individual elites 
(or a small section of the elite), this thesis will highlight the significance of the labour 
movement in pressuring regimes for democratic change. The differences between the 
labour movements in each country are also important in explaining the varied nature of the 
transitions. Not only are the masses key actors in pushing for an end to authoritarianism, 
but the case studies will demonstrate there is no single type or mode of transition that 
occurs. The notion of 'transitions to democracy’ will be assessed in the following chapters 
where the failings of the concept will be underscored by analysing the experiences of 
Mexico, Brazil and South Korea.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CASE STUDIES: MEXICO , BRAZIL & SOUTH KOREA
There are several reasons as to why Mexico, Brazil and South Korea have been selected as 
case studies. Mexico and Brazil are both important countries in Latin America. They are 
large in terms of geography and population. Among the 20 countries which make up Latin 
America, Brazil has roughly 35 per cent of the population and Mexico has 20 per cent. ' In 
East Asia, South Korea also has a substantial population and it is an industrial, 
technological and economic powerhouse in the region. The transitions that occurred in
102 Pinkney, Robert, Democracy in the Third World, 2IU| ed., Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2003, p. 164.
103 Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labour 
Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991, p. 12.
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Mexico and Brazil are significant because they occurred over several decades. In Mexico, 
the period of transition spans more than 30 years beginning from 1968 to 2000. Brazil’s 
move towards democracy begins in the mid to-late 1970s and culminates with the election 
of a civilian president in 1989. South Korea’s transition occurred over a shorter period 
starting in the early 1980s and concluding with elections in 1992 which resulted in the first 
civilian president in more than 30 years. This thesis therefore, will be examining significant 
chunks of history rather than a few years. The duration of each of the transitions highlights 
numerous features neglected by transitology such as the way in which popular forces 
influence the processes of democratic change. In this way, we can ascertain a broader 
picture of just how transitions take place and how ordinary people form an integral aspect 
of the transition story. This thesis will fill gaps in the literature where they exist and 
complement mainstream understandings of transitions.
Rapid industrialisation in all three countries resulted in immense changes in economic, 
political, social, industrial and class structures. Mexico, Brazil and South Korea all 
experienced periods of spectacular economic growth and were commonly referred to as 
‘miracle’ economies. Growth rates of more than 10 per cent per year in the 1960s and 
1970s were all the more remarkable considering that within a few short decades, the three 
countries shifted from largely agricultural to industrial-based economies. The changes 
brought about as a result of economic development are important for the purposes of this 
thesis because of the way in which they affected class structures. The growth of an 
industrial, urban-based working class is directly related to economic expansion directed and 
controlled by an authoritarian state. Economic development created a larger and more 
powerful labour force which began to assert its strength in order to end oppressive working 
conditions and most importantly, to push for the downfall of authoritarianism. Thus, the 
relationship between politics and economics is linked to the different way in which 
transitions unfold -  this is useful for comparative purposes and highlights the uniqueness of 
each case.
The three case studies have been chosen because they highlight crucial features which have 
been overlooked by elite-led transitologists. Mexico, Brazil and South Korea provide 
important details about the complex nature of transitions to democracy -  the most 
significant is the role of popular forces in influencing the transition. All three countries
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have a history o f combative and rebellious popular forces. In particular, labour movements 
are the specific focus o f this thesis. The three case studies have historically powerful and 
politically active labour movements and they have been key contributors to 
democratisation. Focusing on the labour movement is important for numerous reasons. The 
collective strength o f the working class is located in its concentration in the industries 
central to economic growth that is, in the strategic sectors o f the economy. Their ability to 
organise and disrupt the capitalist system of economic production presents a formidable 
challenge to the regime. Labour is crucial because of the leadership role it played in 
resisting authoritarianism and calling for democratisation. Worker demonstrations 
galvanised a broader opposition movement to authoritarianism, spreading to include not 
only white collar workers, but also the middle classes. Particularly in Brazil and South 
Korea, large sectors o f the middle class joined massive protests which were instigated and 
led by workers. In addition, all three have received substantial attention in previous 
research on the political economy of industrialisation, trade unions and regime 
transformation, therefore, this study can build on an important body o f work . 104 Moreover, 
the lessons that can be drawn from these three cases have far-reaching implications for 
transitions occurring elsewhere today, giving this thesis contemporary relevance.
104 ibid.
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CHAPTER 2: THE MEXICAN TRANSITION
INTRODUCTION
Mexican politics was dominated for 70 years by one party, the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (Partido Revolucionario Institutional -  PRI). From 1929 to 2000, the PRI was the 
only party to hold power at the national level. In order to understand how the Mexican state 
began to unravel in the late 1960s, it is important to look at the complex forces which were 
crucial in the construction of the PRI regime. This requires an analysis of the central 
features of the regime which were constructed in the aftermath of the Mexican revolution. 
What emerged out of the Mexican revolution beginning in 1910 was an elite consensus that 
the popular classes needed to be restrained -  workers and peasants had demonstrated their 
capacity to overthrow governments and instigate widespread rebellion. The ruling party 
created mass organisations which were crucial to maintaining a reliable base of support 
throughout the decades of stable PRI rule between 1929 and 1968.' These organisations, 
however, began to contest government power on a large scale in 1968, and especially in the 
1970s, when labour insurgency erupted onto the political scene and severely weakened the 
structures of PRI rule.
From 1968 onwards, the PRI was forced to respond to widespread demands for political 
change. Mexico’s transition to democracy began after the 1968 pro-democracy 
demonstrations and the Tlatelolco massacre, in which hundreds of protestors were 
slaughtered by the state. Mass pressure forced the government to institute reforms, 
particularly in the electoral arena. Political liberalisation however, was not designed to 
genuinely democratise the system rather, it was intended to appease the disaffected sectors 
of society while the ruling party remained dominant.
Economic downturn beginning in the 1970s also left the PRI with limited room for 
maneuver, reducing the resources available to sustain hegemony over its sectoral 
organisations and the electorate. Increased government spending was an important way in
1 Middlebrook, Kevin J., The Paradox of Revolution: Labour, The State and Authoritarianism in Mexico, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, p.15.
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which the regime desperately sought to maintain social stability in the face of widespread 
dissent. This had severe repercussions for the PRI. It resulted in an economic crisis of the 
early 1980s and also led to the withdrawal of private sector support from the PRI to another 
party -  the National Action Party (Partido Action National -  PAN), which was the main 
beneficiary of electoral reform. The steady erosion of the PRI’s pillars of support from the 
late 1960s eventually led, in 2000, to a PAN victory and the end of 70 years of 
uninterrupted PRI rule. Mexico’s transition to democracy did not occur as a result of secret 
negotiations between a handful of political elites, as suggested by elite-led transitology. The 
transition was initiated by popular forces and pushed forward by the labour movement -  
their actions led to the regime’s loss of legitimacy and a crisis of confidence amongst the 
bourgeoisie who threw its weight behind the PAN once they felt that the PRI could no 
longer protect its interests.
ORIGINS OF THE MEXICAN STATE: THE REVOLUTION & THE SUBORDINATION 
OF POPULAR FORCES
The Mexican nation was forged in the violence and immense political, social and economic 
upheaval of the Mexican revolution beginning in 1910. The dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz 
(1876-1910) served the interests of a narrow elite and over time, Diaz alienated most social 
classes. Modernisation and liberalism concentrated land and wealth at an unprecedented 
level.* 2 By 1910, the ‘Porfiriato’ (as the Diaz dictatorship was referred to) had antagonised 
significant elements of the bourgeoisie, peasantry and the working classes. Uprisings in the 
countryside and worker mobilisation in the cities reflected widespread discontent with the 
regime’s repression and absence of political liberties. The phrase ‘pan o palo’ (bread or the 
club) -  reflected Diaz’ method of governing -  a loaf of bread for those who co-operated 
and a beating with the club for those who refused to do so.3 Mexico’s bourgeoisie resented 
the preference given to foreign investors (particularly U.S. and British) who controlled a 
large percentage of the total capital invested. Although the Porfiriato was responsible for
2 Meyer, Lorenzo, ‘Mexico: Economic Liberalism in an Authoritarian Polity’, in Lindau, Juan J. and Timothy 
Cheek (eds), Market Economics and Political Change: Comparing China and Mexico, Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998, p. 138.
2 La Botz, Dan, Democracy in Mexico: Peasant Rebellion and Political Reform, Boston: South End Press,
1995, p.44.
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bringing about some economic growth, this was limited and in any case, economic 
depression in the first decade of the twentieth century led to mass destitution for the lower 
classes. Diaz’ rule was also a source of resentment amongst the middle classes -  the lack of 
opportunity for upward political and social mobility fostered increasing demands for 
change.* 4 5 The origins of the Mexican revolution can be found in the high levels of 
inequality, poverty and economic backwardness of Porfirian Mexico.
The most significant aspect of the Mexican revolution was the widespread involvement of 
workers and peasants in national politics. During this turbulent period, a mix of ideologies 
emerged, each competing for dominance. The end of the Porfiriato initiated a protracted 
and violent struggle for political power among rival factions with different capabilities and 
disparate, often conflicting goals -  provincial merchants and landowners, unemployed 
miners, railroad workers, peasants, sharecroppers and bandits were among some of the 
competing forces.6 Elections were scheduled in 1910 and Diaz’ main challenge was 
presented by Francisco Madero, a liberal reformer who came from a family of wealthy 
landowners in northern Mexico and advocated mild social reforms and the basic principles 
of political liberty.6 Diaz however, cancelled the elections and had Madero arrested. Upon 
his escape from prison, Madero called on the Mexican masses to rise in revolt. Within a 
matter of weeks, pent-up grievances exploded in rural and industrial areas and peasant and 
worker rebellion reached all corners of the country. The Mexican revolution had begun.
Madero’s call to arms introduced a recurring feature of the revolutionary years -  it led to 
insurrections throughout Mexico, spearheaded by popular forces. In the southern state of 
Morelos, Emiliano Zapata emerged as the leader of peasant revolts for ownership of land 
and land reform in general.7 In the northern states, Francisco ‘Pancho’ Villa led a revolt. 
Faced with large-scale disorder and violence, Diaz was forced to resign and in October 
1911, Madero was elected president -  the situation was far from stable, indeed, it was even
o
more precarious, as Madero’s victory did not put an end to armed insurrections. In 1911,
1 Ai Camp, Roderic, Politics in Mexico: The Decline of Authoritarianism, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999, pps.38,39.
5 Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution, op.cit., p. 14.
6 Ai Camp, Politics in Mexico, 3rd ed., op.cit., p.38.
7 Levy, Daniel C. and Kathleen Bruhn, Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001, p.45.
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there were fresh peasant uprisings in the state of Chihuahua and mobilisation among 
industrial workers who took advantage of democratic freedoms to organise trade unions and 
call strikes.9 In the years that followed, successive leaders were confronted by a rising tide 
of revolt in the countryside and violent labour-organising efforts in the urban areas.10
The entry of peasants and workers into national politics posed a significant challenge for 
revolutionary leaders who were forced to establish alliances with the popular classes. 
Between 1914 and 1917, a civil war ensued between the Constitutionalist army under 
Venustiano Carranza and his commander, General Alvaro Obregon, and the forces of 
Zapata and Villa.* 11 During this period, Carranza succeeded in obtaining working-class 
support against the peasant armies with the workers of the House of the World Worker 
(Casa del Obrero Mundial - COM), who agreed to fight with the Constitutionalist army in 
return for concessions to labour.12
The most important aspect of these fights over presidential power was the role of the 
peasants and workers. During the revolutionary years, different sides of the political 
spectrum mobilised workers and peasants to fight for their causes. The peasantry 
demonstrated their awesome potential for disruption in 1914 when the armies of Villa and 
Zapata gained control of Mexico City, as well as two-thirds of Mexico’s territory.13 
However, Villa and Zapata’s peasant armies were unable to follow up their military 
domination with a national program. They lost political control of the revolution and 
eventually were militarily defeated by the Constitutionalist army. Such events demonstrated 
the power of workers and peasants and their enormous capacity for destabilising and 
overthrowing governments. Every corner of society was affected by this highly destructive 
revolution. It left more than a million dead -  nearly 10 per cent of the Mexican 
population.14 Peasant communities, workers, an emerging middle class, and a set of popular
9 ibid., p.383.
10 Hart, John Mason, Revolutionary; Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987, p. 13.
11 Hamilton, Nora, The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1982, p.59.
12 ibid.
13 ibid., p.60.
14 Bailey, John, Governing Mexico: The Statecraft of Crisis Management, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1988, p.13.
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armies were all actors in the revolutionary drama.15 Their mass mobilisation was dangerous 
for the regime which could not afford to ignore the interests of the lower classes.
In an attempt to reconcile the various interests, a Constitutional Convention was held in 
1917. After years of civil war, the competing revolutionary leaders and their followers 
came to an agreement and a division of their spoils that reflected the balance of power 
among them.16 Recognising the need to pacify mass unrest, the Constitution which emerged 
out of the Convention made several concessions to the popular classes, including a 
minimum wage, an 8-hour work day, worker’s compensation and land reform.17 The 
Constitution also guaranteed a mix of liberal-democratic features such as popular 
sovereignty, free elections, guarantees for individual rights, federalism and the separation 
of powers.18 Its nationalist implications were also clear -  it reserved for the state the 
exclusive rights of ownership and exploitation of underground natural resources.19
The need to pacify the popular classes was the overriding concern for post-revolutionary 
governments. Nevertheless, between 1917 and 1929, the Mexican political system 
continued to be characterised by instability and continuing internecine struggles.20 In the 
1920s and 1930s, the government violently co-opted dissident agrarian and labour groups. 
Peasant and worker organisations became bureaucratic arms of the state. The military was 
sidelined from national politics, while business interests and Church groups were tolerated 
but excluded from the ruling alliance. Revolutionary or dissenting tendencies were 
removed.21 Effective power during this period was kept within the small circle of 
revolutionary generals and the leaders of mass organisations. The regime’s basic source 
of legitimacy was not party competition in the electoral arena, but the capacity of the
15 Meyer, ‘Mexico’, in Lindau and Cheek, op.cit., p. 138.
16 Purcell, Susan Kaufman and John F.H. Purcell, ‘State and Society in Mexico: Must a Stable Polity be 
Institutionalised?’ World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 2, January 1980, p. 198.
17 Levy, Daniel C., ‘Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule Without Democracy’, in Diamond, Larry, Juan J. Linz 
and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences With 
Democracy, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990, p.140.
18 ibid.
19 Levy, Daniel and Gabriel Szekely, Mexico: Paradoxes of Stability and Change, Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1983, p.62.
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leadership to respond to the demands o f key constituencies, including organised peasants 
and workers. '
An important pillar o f the newly emerging Mexican political system was the creation o f a 
national party. This was intended to regulate the succession o f presidential power, and as 
such, the emphasis was on stability. Securing the transfer o f power from one president to 
another without the violence and political upheaval of the revolutionary years was one of 
the chief concerns o f President Plutarco Elias Calles. In March 1929, Calles created the 
National Revolutionary Party (Partido National R evo lu tionär -  PNR) in response to a 
series of economic and political crises which not only led to increased factionalism and 
tensions among the revolutionary leaders, but also threatened to erupt into armed conflict 
once again.24
The turbulence o f the revolutionary period created the blueprint for the authoritarian state 
which would emerge under President Läzaro Cardenas in the 1930s. The establishment of 
an official party which would regulate social conflict and contain mass discontent was the 
key feature in the emerging Mexican state. Such a political system helped provide an 
answer to the continuing disorder in the 1920s that followed the revolution. Post­
revolutionary governments were primarily concerned with controlling the potentially 
destabilising tendencies of popular forces. In particular, the working classes and the 
peasantry had continually demonstrated their capacity for disruption on a large scale 
throughout the revolutionary years. During the 1920s and particularly the 1930s, the state 
developed not only the coercive apparatus to contain dissent, but also the co-optative means 
of doing so. The creation of a strong state therefore, was necessary in order to rein in and 
pacify the very social classes which were capable o f disrupting the newly emerging 
economic and political order.
23 ibid.
"4 La Botz, Democracy in Mexico, op.cit., p.53.
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INSTITUTIONALISING AUTHORITARIANISM: THE BIRTH OF ‘THE PERFECT 
DICTATORSHIP'
The unique brand of Mexican authoritarianism which emerged in the decades following the 
revolution was constructed around a number of structural, institutional and strategic pillars. 
In order to successfully grasp how and why the PRI lost its hegemonic grip on Mexican 
society, it is necessary to examine the gradual erosion of those supports.
The presidency of Läzaro Cardenas (1934-40) was responsible for laying the groundwork 
which would form the model of PRI government for the next 70 years. The official party 
was institutionalised, now renamed the Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido de la 
Revoluciön Mexicana -  PRM), finally becoming the Institutional Revolutionary Party 
(Partido Revolucionario Institucional -  PRI) in 1946. For Mexico’s political elite, there 
was a need for stable consensus and a balance among the various class forces in order to 
prevent the mass politicisation and violence witnessed during the tumultuous years of the 
revolution. Under Cardenas, the institutionalisation of such a balance was a paramount 
factor. Organised along bureaucratic lines, the official party became synonymous with the 
state -  Mexico’s political system came to be characterised as a “state-party regime”.20 The 
subordination of the armed forces was part of the Cardenas plan to reform and reorganise a 
potentially troublesome force and bring it under civilian control.
From the 1930s onwards, the corporatist structure of the party served to mitigate and 
channel dissent into officially sanctioned outlets. In 1936, Cardenas established sectors 
which were the basis for stability until the 1970s and 1980s. The system was organised 
around federations that represented both labour and peasants. These were created not only 
because peasants and labour had played a critical role in the revolution, but more 
importantly, they had the potential to hinder the course of rapid industrialisation and 
economic development pursued by the PRI. The National Confederation of Peasants
2> Shirk, David A., Mexico’s New Politics: The PAN and Democratic Change, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2005, p.31.
26 Hamilton, Nora and Eun Mee Kim, ‘Economic and Political Liberalisation in South Korea and Mexico’, 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1993, p.122.
27 Davis, Diane E., ‘Urban Social Movements, Intrastate Conflicts over Urban Policy and Political Change in 
Mexico’, in Smith, Michael Peter (ed), Breaking Chains: Social Movements and Collective Action, New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991, p. 135.
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(Confederation National Campesina -  CNC), and the National Confederation of Mexican 
Workers (Confederation de Trabajadores de Mexico -  CTM), were established in 1935 
and 1936 respectively. In 1943, a third representative federation known as the National 
Confederation of Popular Organisations (Confederation National de Organizations 
Populäres -  CNOP) was also established. This category was created to include Mexico’s 
‘popular middle classes’, such as teachers, doctors, shopkeepers lawyers and street vendors. 
The CNOP was made up of those who did not fit into the other two categories. Business 
was not officially represented in the party, but the PRI’s subsequent economic and 
developmentalist policies resulted in a tacit alliance. Business interests had strong ties with
the government and their collaboration was essential for economic growth and stability,
28although they were not formally part of the PRI.
This structure was deliberately multi-layered and pervasive, extending to most areas of 
political and social life and serving as an apparatus of control. By constructing a 
monolithic state apparatus with the institutional capacity to mediate mass participation, 
successive presidential administrations were able to direct the parameters of socio-political 
organisation and mobilisation. The strengthening of government structures under 
Cardenas was a successful mechanism of elite control over historically restless and
o 1
revolutionary segments of society.' Mobilisation and dissent was tolerated and even 
encouraged, as long as the PRI controlled the extent of opposition to the regime. 
Institutional channels, therefore, were created in order to limit the level and impact of 
dissent and its harmful effects on the status quo. It was not a system which completely 
banned opposition, rather, the PRI state sought to direct conflict in order to render it 
harmless to the alliance forged in the revolutionary aftermath.
The PRI’s sectoral organisations not only served to moderate popular demands, but were 
also structured so that “everyone who played the game got at least small rewards”.32 The 
unique nature of the system was such that the regime did not have to meet the social
2X Bailey, John and Leopoldo Gomez, ‘The PRI and Political Liberalisation’, Journal of International Affairs, 
Vol. 43, No. 2, Winter 1990, p.293.
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demands of entire classes but instead, delivered needed services on a discretionary basis.3' 
Leaders of the mass organisations were expected to curb the demands of their members in 
order to rise through the ranks of political power. Through the PRI, bureaucratic leaders of 
organised labour and the peasantry were made principal partners in the ruling coalition. Co­
optation measures, such as the distribution of rewards, served to dampen dissent and 
therefore, were highly important for stability.
Mexican scholars have used various labels to highlight the unique and specific nature of the 
Mexican system. Some examples include “civilian-authoritarian” ,34 “electoral
o r  o r  o o
authoritarianism”," “selective democracy”,' and “democracy within reason”.' These 
descriptions underline the hybrid nature of the regime. One of the major differences of 
Mexico from other authoritarian systems is that it was an inclusive system which 
maintained its legitimacy by co-opting dissenters into its ranks while allowing different 
factions to vie for power and share the spoils within the confines of the PRI regime.' 
Mexican authoritarianism enabled people to gain positions in government where they 
would receive certain benefits, as there were many perks associated with institutional 
linkage. Unionised workers, for example, received better wages than the non-unionised, as 
well as better access to subsidised credit and housing, health care, basic consumer goods 
and technical training. Those who were members of the CTM, CNC or CNOP received 
benefits such as subsidies and wage agreements.40 For these reasons, Peruvian author Mario 
Vargas Llosa characterised Mexico as ‘the perfect dictatorship’ because even though it was 
authoritarian, it had the flexibility to respond to the demands of various sectors of society 
and thus to employ a minimum of repressive force.41
33 Langston, Joy, ‘Breaking Out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico’s One-Party Hegemonic 
Regime’, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 44, No. 3, Fall 2002, p.64.
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35 Schedler, Andreas, ‘Mexico’s Victory: The Democratic Revelation’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 11, No. 4, 
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Connecticut: Praeger, 1994, p.231.
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The Mexican state which emerged under Cardenas and was consolidated by successive 
presidents had effective control over the means of coercion, channels of political mobility 
and the distribution of economic benefits. Post-revolutionary governments successfully 
enforced a series of bargains among major socio-economic and political actors.42 This state 
of affairs came under increasing strain following the democratic demands placed on the 
PRI in 1968. A central feature in the maintenance of a stable consensus was the need for 
continued economic growth. Economic downturn, combined with strong social dissent, 
placed the PRI on the path to its eventual downfall.
THE MEXICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM: BASIS OF POLITICAL STABILITY
The Mexican model of economic development formed an important basis for the stability 
of the PRI state. From the 1940s to the 1970s, the Mexican state was developmentalist, 
intervening extensively in the economy with import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) 
forming the chief policy. Rather than relying on a free market, neo-classical model, the 
developmentalist state actively created the economic conditions necessary to achieve 
growth.43 The economic landscape was characterised by an extensive para-statal sector 
which supported private enterprise through subsidised services (railroads, petroleum, 
electricity) and investment loans.44 High levels of protection, moreover, benefited both 
domestic and foreign companies producing for the domestic market.45 The PRI government 
assumed ownership of many strategic industries that supplied crucial inputs to 
manufacturing. It also intervened in the market to ensure price stability, known as the 
period of ‘stabilising development’, combining a rapid growth rate with low inflation.46
42 Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution, op.cit., p.29.
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State intervention in socioeconomic affairs provided government decision makers with the 
means to formulate development policies that helped build and sustain a diverse governing 
coalition which included major peasant, labour and business organisations.47 PRI control 
over the trade unions also assured private business a co-operative labour force remunerated 
through state-approved wage settlements. Development was based on an alliance between 
the state, the local private sector and foreign investors, or an “alliance for profits“.49 The 
strategy of ‘Mexicanisation’ ensured that from the 1940s and onwards, at least 50 per cent 
of any enterprise had to be in Mexican hands, a policy which was loosened considerably 
only after 1988.50
The Mexican ‘economic miracle’ resulted in dramatic economic growth, averaging 6 per 
cent per year between 1940 and 1970 and enabling the system to respond selectively to the 
demands and needs of various social groups.51 Real economic growth rates averaged 7.2 
per cent per year from 1961 to 1970, 5 per cent from 1970 to 1977 and 8.4 per cent per year 
from 1978 to 1981.52 There was a consensus among the state, the private sector and foreign 
investors which kept the power structure intact -  Mexico would pursue a capitalist path to 
economic growth -  a premise which required that the popular masses be kept under control 
through state measures.53 Throughout this period, the stability of the Mexican system was 
predicated on the economic situation being favourable for the PRI. Continuing economic 
growth was necessary for the distribution of rewards and the maintenance of a broad, class 
consensus. As long as the PRI could buy off dissent, the system remained stable. Economic 
growth had anti-democratic consequences, as it strengthened the political system’s ability 
to ward off democratic demands.54 Essentially, economic growth enabled the PRI to 
maintain its undemocratic character and retain its hegemonic grip on the Mexican political 
system. By the end of the 1960s however, the PRI was struggling to maintain the political
47 Middlebrook, The Paradox o f Revolution, op.cit., p.29.
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stability which had been constructed by Cardenas in the 1930s. The crucial event which 
heralded a dramatic shift in the nature of PRI rule was the democracy movement of 1968.
THE MEXICAN TRANSITION I: EXPLOSION OF SOCIAL DISCONTENT
The Mexican transition to democracy was spearheaded in 1968 by a mass movement which 
demanded political and social change. The events of 1968 were responsible for shifting the 
priorities of PRI rule, initiating a steady corrosion of the pillars which supported the 
government. Although the PRI maintained a democratic veneer and was moderate in 
comparison to the repressive nature of other Latin American regimes, it was essentially an 
authoritarian system which was not completely averse to repressive measures. This was 
clearly demonstrated by the Tlatelolco massacre in 1968.
Mexican student protests began in July 1968 following objections to police intervention on 
the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad National Autönoma de 
Mexico -  UNAM) campus.55 Students made a list of demands, including the release of 
political prisoners, the abolition of the special riot police (granaderos) and compensation 
for students wounded in conflicts with the police and army, as well as the families of those 
students who had been killed.56 In the lead up to the 1968 Olympics Games which were to 
be held in Mexico City, student protests evolved into a middle-class, peaceful movement 
for political democracy.57 Opposition extended beyond students and encompassed an array 
of social forces, including workers, the urban poor, teachers, lawyers, academics and 
shopkeepers, reflecting the discontent that many Mexicans felt towards the economic and 
political system.
The protest movement called for democratisation and the creation of new participatory 
channels, revealing broad socio-political pressures for change -  even more threatening for 
the PRI regime was the movement’s effort to link a radical middle-class leadership with
55 Young, Dolly Y., ‘Mexican Literary Reactions to Tlatelolco 1968’, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 
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opposition elements in the organised labour movement and the urban poor. Official 
sectors of the PRI, including the CTM, supported the government position that the 
movement was the result of “subversive agents of the left and right”, however, the 
independent railroad workers and electricians unions expressed their support and solidarity 
with the student movement.59 The breadth of the opposition, including as it did so many of 
the middle class, made it fundamentally more threatening than previous episodes of dissent 
because of the fear that it could mobilise a larger following to challenge the regime.60 The 
prospect of cross-class alliances was highly threatening to the PRI.
There was a dark side to the economic miracle. While Mexico’s development model had 
benefited some, it had also produced severe social problems such as underemployment and 
increasing inequalities in the distribution of income.61 Distribution of wealth was grossly 
uneven, the top 10 per cent of the population receiving about 40 per cent of the national 
income.6~ Not only were Mexico’s poorest becoming worse off relative to other social 
classes, the poorest 20 per cent also became worse off in absolute terms between 1950 and 
1968.63 Expansion of capital-intensive agriculture for export increased the migration of 
peasants to cities and this rising labour surplus was aggravated by a demographic explosion 
due to a combination of lower mortality rates and traditionally high birth rates.64 High rates 
of industrialisation and urbanisation produced social tensions which the PRI found hard to 
manage -  the population swelled, particularly in the cities which consisted of vast 
shantytowns to which the benefits of the ‘miracle’ had not filtered down.65
Mexico’s countryside and peasantry meanwhile, languished -  economic growth did not 
trickle down as a result of government policies which focused on industrial development at 
the expense of agriculture. There was a huge gap between public investment in agriculture 
and industry -  by 1964, the government spent 40 per cent of its total investment in industry
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and in agriculture, it spent only 11 per cent.66 Labour also had major grievances against the 
regime -  it called for an end to government repression and the right to form independent, 
genuinely democratic unions which would not be controlled by corrupt union leaders. The 
demands for an open and pluralist political system nevertheless, were interpreted by the 
PRI as a direct threat to the system and, in an attempt to discredit the protesters, it portrayed 
them as agents of a foreign conspiracy.67
On 2 October in the Plaza de las Culturas, government agents and the army violently 
repressed pro-democracy demonstrators, mostly students.68 At least two thousand people 
were arrested. Estimates of the number of people killed vary widely -  the official 
government numbers were 49 killed, but the New York Times correspondent estimated that 
200 killed was a more likely figure, with hundreds of others wounded.69 The massive 
impact of the Tlatelolco massacre on Mexican society has been extensively noted. 
Tlatelolco has been described as impinging on the political awareness of more individuals 
than any other event subsequent to the 1910 Mexican revolution.70
After 1968, an extensive body of literature emerged in Mexico, both fictional and non- 
fictional, collectively known as ‘Tlatelolco literature’. This represented an attempt to 
come to terms with the event and the perceived betrayal of the PRI government. The 
editorial in one of the major daily newspapers, Excelsior, on 3 October 1968, spoke of an 
“infinite desperation, a severe, agonising sorrow” in the consciences of Mexican citizens -  
individual journalists in the same issue of Excelsior also spoke of “the pain and 
indignation” and demanded explanations: “the people have to know”.72 Cartoons showed 
silhouetted figures throwing a coffin adorned with the words “status quo” into the sea, as 
well as a rectangle filled with black ink carrying an accusing question: “why?”.73 This
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highlights the shocked and angry reaction that many Mexicans felt towards the massacre, 
and the underlying belief that life would never be the same again.
Tlatelolco was a collective trauma which marked the watershed from the old order to the 
onset of crisis.74 The student protests of 1968 were unprecedented for the widespread 
questions they raised about the lack of democracy in Mexico.75 The crisis of 1968 initiated 
a sustained national debate on the shortcomings and contradictions of Mexican 
development -  most importantly, it seriously challenged the myth of the Mexican 
revolution and the assumption of progressive achievement of socio-economic and political 
justice which was associated with Mexico’s post-1940 development model.76 Tlatelolco 
“cast a long shadow” over Mexican society and politics and has been since remembered as 
Mexico’s ‘sad night’ (noche triste).7' More than any other event in Mexican history, the 
Tlatelolco massacre undermined the legitimacy of the PRI regime. Although the spark that 
ignited the 1968 conflict was student demonstrations against police interventions on the 
UNAM campus, participation in the democracy movement was an expression of political 
feelings far more complex and long term. Many of the protestors felt that the PRI regime 
had failed to fulfill the promises of the 1910 revolution -  the Mexican people felt betrayed 
by the government when it brutally attacked them for expressing legitimate demands.79
New forms of opposition emerged after the slaughter at Tlatelolco -  although not uniform, 
this opposition provided a challenge to the PRI.80 After 1968, many looked to the left to 
form political organisations and groups which demanded democratic, social and economic 
change. A new generation of political activists and a Mexican New Left emerged which 
organised new social movements of peasants, workers and the urban poor throughout the 
country.81 Student activists went to the neighbourhoods, factories and villages to form
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grassroots movements. Mainly focusing their efforts on non-electoral change, Mexicans 
organised around specific demands such as those relating to land, housing and high water 
rates. ' Emphasising autonomy from the state, such movements were particularly worrying 
for the regime -  if they were independent, they could not also not be controlled from above. 
It seemed that the PRI’s worst nightmares were coming true.
Disillusioned with the limits of political and economic reform, guerilla groups emerged in 
urban and rural areas in the early 1970s. In the countryside, peasants seized and occupied 
land in the northern and southern states, while in the urban centres, guerrillas staged 
kidnappings, bank robberies, bombings and political assassinations. Despite the fact that 
the government largely crushed the guerrilla threat by the end of the 1970s, these actions 
led to a political foment that the PRI could not easily contain. A number of new 
independent peasant organisations emerged in the 1970s and they began to form alliances 
with other sectors of the population -  urban squatters, rank and file labour militants, 
teachers, students and left-wing political movements.84 Several left-wing groups emerged, 
one of the most prominent was the Popular Politics tendency (later the Proletarian Line). 
Influenced by Maoist ideology, organisers established political groups in rural 
communities, urban slums and labour unions throughout Mexico, particularly in the 
northern states. Poor people in Mexico’s shantytowns organised militant demonstrations 
for water, electricity and other services.86 Although most of these groups had limited 
support, they were responsible for maintaining the politicised climate which arose after 
1968. The most important sector and the one which presented the most formidable 
challenge to the government was the labour movement. Both the labour and the pro­
democracy movement in 1968 (and afterwards) were connected by a general sense of 
disillusionment with the regime and with a sense that it could be changed.
The democracy movement of 1968 placed the government on the defensive and its policies 
following the Tlatelolco massacre clearly reflect this changed state of affairs. The PRI was
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fast losing its dominant position in Mexican politics and society due to increasingly 
stronger opposition elements, particularly labour. The following chapter will demonstrate 
how the labour insurgency between 1968 and 1976 was able to push the transition forward 
and in fact, make the transition possible. From the late 1960s and onwards, the ruling party 
was forced to redraw Mexico’s institutional structures in order to preserve its weakened 
hold over society. One of the ways in which the PRI achieved this was in the arena of 
electoral reform.
THE MEXICAN TRANSITION II: ELECTORAL REFORM, SOCIAL PRESSURES & 
ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS
Since the 1930s, regular elections have played an important part in maintaining the 
legitimacy of the PRI. Because elections had been held on schedule since then, its 
leadership was able to project the democratic image of a party fairly participating in 
competitive politics. Yet the democratic image masked a very undemocratic reality in 
which genuine opposition was repressed or co-opted. More importantly, because of the 
deep roots of the PRI in Mexican society and its near total dominance of political life -  
from the village to the Presidential Palace -  elections posed little threat to it during most of 
its period in office. With few exceptions, PRI candidates won every election until the 
1980s.87
The first sign of any electoral reform was little more than an attempt to slightly polish this 
democratic image. In 1962, President Adolfo Lopez Mateos (1958-64) created ‘party 
deputies’ which increased the representation of opposition parties in the Chamber of 
Deputies.88 It also enabled opposition parties to obtain representation in the national
o n
legislature without actually winning any electoral races. The main beneficiaries were the 
National Action Party (Pcirtido Action National -  PAN), the smaller Mexican Communist 
Party (Partido Comunista Mexicano -  PCM), the Socialist Popular Party (Partido Popular
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Socialista -  PPS) and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (Partido Autentico de 
la Revoluciön Mexicana -  PARM). During this period, opposition parties provided 
superficial criticism of the government to retain the illusion of democracy.90 In the 
congressional elections of 1964, the PAN gained 18 seats, however, the PRI still remained 
the dominant party with 175 seats.91 Before the 1962 reforms, opposition parties had 
secured only 9 of the 162 seats, in 1964, their full total came to 35 out of a total of 210.92 
Although these reforms allowed a slightly larger opposition to emerge and gain 
representation in national politics, they posed no serious threat to PRI hegemony.
A more significant period of reform began in the aftermath of Tlatelolco. The protest 
movement in 1968 had called for democratisation and the creation of new participatory 
opportunities.9. Moreover, this movement came from outside the old parties whose rather 
token opposition had, for decades, only served to legitimise the PRI. At Tlatelolco a very 
different sort of opposition was on display -  one which posed a much greater threat to the 
PRI. As pointed out above, the government’s slaughter of the demonstrators provided a 
cathartic moment in the nation’s politics. Popular revulsion at its actions forced the 
following administration -  that of Luis Echeverrfa (1970-1976) to make much more serious 
concessions. The reforms which were subsequently enacted were a response to mass 
upheaval.
The civil maelstrom begun at Tlatelolco continued into the 1970s. Protests and 
demonstrations spearheaded by workers -  many now organised in a growing independent 
labour movement posed significant problems for the PRI. President Echeverrfa launched 
what he described as an ‘apertura democrdtica’ (democratic opening) intended to give the 
PRI some breathing space and revive its flagging legitimacy. Between 1971 and 1973, he 
lowered the voting age was lowered from 21 to 18.94 Requirements to register parties for 
national elections were also made easier and the reforms made it easier still for opposition 
parties to win seats in the Chamber of Deputies.95 This was still, of course, an attempt by
90 ibid.
91 Hamnett, op.cit., p.256.
92 ibid.
93 Middlebrook, "Political Liberalisation in an Authoritarian Regime’, in O’Donnell, Schmitter and 
Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Vol. 2, op.cit., p. 126.
94 Bailey, op.cit., p.l 12.
95 ibid.
38
the PRI to maintain control. But it realised that doing so in these new conditions of 
heightened and radicalising opposition was only possible by a strategy trying to split the 
more moderate sections of the opposition -  which might be satisfied by electoral reform -  
from those who wanted much more. This more radical opposition on the streets and in the 
factories was making demands for improved wages, working conditions and housing and 
fighting for a form of union and workplace democracy which could only undermine the 
CTM’s (and therefore the PRI’s) control of labour. To satisfy those demands would mean 
an end to the Mexican model of extremely unequal but rapid ‘development’. So the safer 
course for the regime after 1968 was to continue electoral reform.
Along with electoral reform, the PRI attempted to restore faith in the ruling party through 
economic means from the 1970s onwards. As discussed earlier, the use of incentives and 
rewards was an important element in the stability of the PRI regime. This however, came 
with a catch -  the distribution of material benefits was predicated on a rapidly expanding 
economy. During the 1960s the average growth rate was nearly 6.5 per cent per annum but 
in 1971, it dropped to 3.5 per cent.96 When economic growth slowed, the PRI was 
confronted with a serious dilemma. It not only faced political opposition as a result of the 
fallout from the Tlateololco massacre, but economic downturn which threatened to erupt 
into social conflict and a generalised decline in support for the regime amongst the various 
sectors of society -  workers, peasants, the middle classes, the urban poor and business 
interests. Echeverria’s sexenio began with the implementation of conservative measures -  
he drastically reduced public spending to put an end to inflation. But with the economic 
downturn, President Echeverna introduced a new economic strategy in order to appease the 
different social classes who were adversely affected -  ‘shared development’. Conservative 
measures were rapidly abandoned in favour of an activist, growth-oriented economic 
policy.98
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The cornerstone of ‘shared development’ was a massive increase in public spending which 
poured into housing, schooling and other development programmes." Echeverria’s policy 
aimed at reducing income inequalities and unemployment and raising the standard of 
living.100 This dramatic shift however, represented a pattern which emerged under 
Echeverna -  a sharp swing from cuts in spending to a complete turnaround by increasing 
public spending. Together with the apertura democrätica, government spending and 
stimulation of the economy was an attempt to restore its eroding legitimacy. But it also 
came at a large cost -  at the end of his term, inflation ran rampant, the foreign debt 
continued to soar at alarming levels, the public sector deficit multiplied and capital flight 
also increased as the peso became overvalued and investor confidence was undermined by 
President Echeverna’s populism.101
The general trend of controlled liberalisation continued under President Jose Lopez Portillo 
(1976-1982). Enacted one year into his six-year term (sexenio) was the Federal Law on 
Political Organisations and Electoral Processes (LFOPPE). It increased the number and 
ideological diversity of officially registered political parties participating in the electoral 
sphere.102 Instead of four, seven parties were officially recognised and the Chamber of 
Deputies was expanded from 300 to 400 seats.103 The LFOPPE mainly benefited the 
smaller parties at both ends of the political spectrum.104 As a result of these reforms, the 
rules governing elections were altered so that the opposition was allowed greater access to 
mass communications, such as television, radio and print.103
The purpose of these reforms, however, was part of an ongoing PRI strategy of political 
liberalisation without structural change. They were not intended to create a stronger
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political opposition that could viably compete against the PRI.106 Instead, the LFOPPE 
ensured an increase in the level of diversity in the party system by making the electoral 
process accessible to smaller opposition parties, thereby bolstering PRI legitimacy without 
directly challenging its hegemony.107 Rather than create a pluralist system, the effect of 
such cosmetic measures was to bolster a modified one-party system.108 The PRI’s main 
concerns were to create legitimate avenues for opposition activity to prevent an 
accumulation of pressure that might erupt in violence and massive social upheaval.100 
Liberalisation was part of the PRI strategy to show its commitment to democratic ideals and 
to revive its declining legitimacy. Overall, electoral reforms tended to preserve the existing 
balance of forces by protecting the PRI’s dominance while accommodating a slowly 
growing, but still divided opposition camp.110
Continuing the trend set by Echeverrfa, President Lopez Portillo’s sexenio began 
conservative in an effort to regain the confidence of the bourgeoisie and restore economic 
stability. An IMF austerity programme stabilised the peso but at the cost of a drop in real 
wages and rising unemployment.* 111 Although such measures appeased the private sector, 
they fostered dissatisfaction among labour and nationalised industry because it called for 
cuts in social expenditures, reductions in wage increases and a wider opening of the 
economy to international market forces.112 Lopez Portillo was faced with rising social 
discontent and the situation was once again looking unfavourable for the government.
The discovery of major oil revenues in the late-1970s, however, enabled the PRI to 
postpone structural reform and to distract the populace from mounting economic problems. 
By 1982, Mexico’s oil reserves were estimated at 72 billion barrels, with probable reserves 
at 90-150 billion and potential reserves at 250 billion, which amounted to the sixth largest 
reserves in the world. Rapid exploitation and export of petroleum reserves gave the
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beleaguered PRI government some breathing space. As a result, Lopez Portillo abandoned 
conservative economic policies and resorted to populist measures. He used oil revenues to 
support policies that catered to a multiplicity of class interests.114
Starting in 1979, public sector spending increased in almost all areas of the economy.11^ 
Spending grew from 31 per cent of GDP in 1977 to 44 per cent of GDP in 1981.116 
Government construction, public works, social welfare projects and government subsidies 
of consumer goods were all part of the PRI strategy to stave off popular pressure for more 
political and economic change. 117 The regime’s principal objective was to salvage its 
legitimacy and establish political stability by catering to different class forces.118 In 
September 1982, Lopez Portillo nationalised the banks. This, however, did not cater to the 
private sector -  it was the final straw after years of economic policies which had generated 
antagonism. Such a bold act was not part of a consistent or skillfully planned PRI strategy -  
it was a desperate move to reaffirm its dominance over the economic means of production 
and to reinforce its position as the chief political force in Mexican politics.
The sexenios of Echeverria and Lopez Portillo, therefore, demonstrate the PRI’s efforts to 
buy back support from disaffected classes following Tlatelolco. Their risky efforts to do so 
highlight the considerable lengths that both presidents went to in order to maintain popular 
support. Concerted efforts were made to restore the PRI’s hegemonic position by trying to 
cater to disaffected groups in society simultaneously, without satisfying one entirely. 
Inconsistent policy measures were a clear signal that the PRI was desperate to retain its grip 
on power. Once again, the attempt to stave off political crisis came at great cost -  it 
contributed to economic and political instability which ultimately undermined the PRI 
regime.119 Reckless amounts of government spending under Echeverria and Lopez Portillo 
had been financed through massive foreign borrowing, and as a result, Mexico’s debt 
increased considerably. In 1976, Mexico’s foreign debt stood at $20 billion US dollars, in
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1 901980 it had reached $50 billion dollars. It was becoming increasingly impossible to 
prevent an economic crisis of massive proportions, as the PRI could not buy off discontent 
while maintaining an overheated economy for much longer. By trying to save itself, the 
regime only made the situation worse -  the limits of populist strategies was soon made 
clear in the debt default of 1982.
Another factor in the continuation of electoral reform in the 1980s and 1990s, was the 
profound economic crisis which struck the country in the early 1980s and the savage neo­
liberal reforms which followed it. Under President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), 
Mexico was forced to default on its international debt in 1982. This was precipitated by a 
drastic decline in oil prices and a hike in interest rates which sharply reduced the nation’s 
ability to pay its immense foreign debt of $90 billion dollars.121 The International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) intervened with a rescue fund of billions and the demand for major structural 
changes. Implementation of an orthodox macroeconomic stabilisation program had 
disastrous consequences for the population.122
Large-scale privatisation of state-run firms, cuts in subsidies to basic foods and slashed 
wages brought unemployment, greater poverty and desperation to millions. An estimated l 
million workers lost their jobs between 1982 and 1983, also, the government’s cutbacks in 
expenditures resulted in the loss of more than 80,000 jobs in the public sector during the 
1983-85 period.m The removal of long-standing price subsidies on a range of products and 
services, from tortillas to gasoline to public transportation was crippling.124 There was a 
drastic deterioration in the standard of living as sharp devaluations of the peso led to a drop 
in purchasing power and an increase in the inflation rate. ‘ The economic pain inflicted did 
not just affect the poor and the middle classes -  government workers and the sectors tied to
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the state saw their benefits retract and their wages fall.126 The IMF package included the 
reduction of government expenditures and the imposition of controls on salaries, prices and 
inflation. As a result, during de la Madrid’s presidency, Mexico experienced the worst 
economic crisis in its post-revolutionary history.128
Economic devastation forced the PRI to attempt to further accommodate some of its critics. 
In the first half of 1983, de la Madrid recognised a series of local-level (municipal) 
opposition victories, marking the first time that the PRI officially conceded opposition 
party victories in major cities. All of these elections were won by the PAN, except for in 
the city of Guanajuato which was won by a coalition of the PAN and the Mexican 
Democratic Party (Partido Democrata Mexicano -  PDM).130 In 1986, the Chamber of 
Deputies was enlarged to include 500 seats and some were designated according to each 
party’s share of the total vote. This was a change from the previous majority vote which 
had always resulted in PRI victory in congressional elections. The government’s 
allowances however, were too little too late -  they failed to satisfy a large proportion of the 
population who now blamed the ruling party for Mexico’s economic woes. Between 1982 
and 1987, economic growth rates fell to an average -0.3 per cent per year.1’3 So bad were 
the effects of the economic crisis that the PRI was soon faced with opposition from within 
its own party.
Popular opposition to the new economic strategy found its expression within the PRI itself. 
A leading PRI member, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas (the son of Läzaro Cardenas), campaigned 
against the neo-liberal policies and found immediate support. Cardenas formed the 
Democratic Current (Corriente Democrätica) which was initially organised as the Frente 
Democratico Nacional (FRD) and eventually organised into a political party, the Party of 
the Democratic Revolution (Partido de la Revolucion Democrätica -  PRD). The threat 
posed by this new opposition went to the heartland of PRI support -  Cardenas was the very
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soul of the PRI -  the heir of its traditions as well as its most famous name. Denouncing 
what they saw as an economic policy to pay Mexico’s debt at the expense of social welfare, 
Cardenas and his allies began to argue, not only against neo-liberalism, but for democratic 
reform as well.134
Mexico’s transition gained momentum with the PRI split in 1988 and the formation of the 
PRD. It was a sign that the PRI was fracturing and fast losing its hold over its members as 
well as its constituents. The emergence of a left coalition introduced a degree of party 
competition previously absent in the country’s one-party regime. In the 1988 elections, 
the PRI won with a bare majority -  Carlos Salinas received the lowest percentage of the 
vote by the PRI ever -  a majority of 50.36 per cent, while Cardenas received 31.12 per cent 
and the PAN candidate, Manuel Clouthier received 17.07 per cent.136 Prior to 1982, the PRI 
vote stood at 70 to 90 percent. ' Such a dramatic drop in electoral support was also 
reflected in congressional elections, as the PRI’s share of seats in the Chamber of Deputies 
fell from a little over 86 per cent in 1976 to just more than 50 per cent.138
This heralded a change in the electoral fortunes of the PRI. It demonstrated the amount of 
opposition that the ruling party generated as a result of its neo-liberal policies as well as 
popular frustration at the gradual pace of democratisation. The 1988 elections were one of 
the most contested elections in Mexican history and it is generally believed that PRI victory 
was obtained as a result of electoral fraud.1’9 Despite strong evidence proving such fraud, 
the PRI managed to remain in power over the next decade. In fact, electoral rorting was the 
only thing that saved the PRI from defeat in 1988. The creation and success of the PRD was 
important for the Mexican transition to democracy because it consisted of a genuine 
opposition in the electoral sphere which could unseat the PRI from its hegemonic position.
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In response to the allegations of electoral fraud in the 1988 elections and in an attempt to 
demonstrate an enduring commitment to democratisation, President Carlos Salinas (1988- 
1994) continued to institute further reforms. In 1992-93, the size of the senate was doubled, 
with additional seats allocated according to a complicated but more proportional formula.140 
Populist measures were also implemented to pacify the urban masses. The National 
Solidarity Program (.Programa Nacional de Solidaridad -  PRONASOL) was a social 
welfare program designed to meet the needs of the urban poor. It aimed to alleviate poverty 
through providing state funds for locally generated projects.141
Billed as a poverty alleviation programme, PRONASOL combined government financial 
support and citizen involvement to design and implement community development and 
public works projects.142 It was supposed to ameliorate the increasing gap between rich and 
poor and the stark inequalities generated by the continued implementation of neo­
liberalism. There were however, other purposes behind the programme -  it sought to 
prevent an alliance from forming between the PRD and the urban popular organisations and 
the popular sector generally.141 PRONASOL was also intended to consolidate political 
support by buying off a section of the electorate.144 The PRI’s attempts to recover lost 
ground as a result of the devastating economic and social effects of neo-liberal policies 
however, proved somewhat in vain as the main beneficiary of these electoral reforms was 
the PAN.
Created in 1939, the PAN was essentially a party of the right -  it was organised by urban 
middle-class conservatives and had the support of the Catholic Church and some 
businessmen, professionals and intellectuals. Until the 1960s, only the PAN had provided 
the PRI with any significant electoral opposition.145 It was not until 1979 that the PAN 
attained considerable success when the elections of that year confirmed its status as the
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principal party of the opposition.146 It won more than 1.5 million votes (11 per cent of the 
total), 4 seats in the Chamber of Deputies under the system of simple majority and 39 seats 
on the basis of the new system of proportional representation.147
Increasing support for the PAN can be found in the populism of the Echeverrta and Lopez 
Portillo administrations. Business interests were alarmed at the economic policies of both 
presidents -  many deserted the PRI because they felt that the PAN could serve them better. 
Important sectors of the bourgeoisie lost faith in the PRI’s ability to manage the economy 
and Mexican society in general. In particular, Lopez Portillo’s bank nationalisation was the 
last nail in the coffin -  it further alienated the private sector and led many industrialists to 
throw their support behind the PAN. This was evident in the 1982 elections which yielded 
impressive results for the party in the Chamber of Deputies, where it increased the number 
of its deputies elected under proportional representation to 50.14s In July 1989, the PAN 
won the first recognised opposition victory in a gubernatorial race in Baja California thus 
ending 60 years of absolute PRI monopoly at the state level.149
The PAN continued to steadily increase its representation at the state and national level 
while the PRI and the PRD experienced mixed results in the 1990s. Although there was a 
substantial improvement in the PRI’s fortunes in the 1991 federal congressional elections in 
which its support increased by 10 per cent, to 61 per cent of the popular vote, the vote for 
the PRD fell dramatically from 31 to just 8.3 per cent.150 In the 1994 presidential elections, 
the PRI’s Ernesto Zedillo won with 50.1 per cent, the PAN received 26.7 per cent and the 
PRD received 17.1 per cent.151 However, the PRI lost the election for the mayor of Mexico 
City to Cardenas and the PRD in 1997 and in the congressional elections of the same year, 
the PRI, for the first time, lost its absolute majority in the lower house of congress to the 
PAN, the PRD and two minor parties.152 In the 1997 mid-term elections, the PAN
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continued to obtain impressive results at the polls -  it received 26.6 per cent, while PRI 
support fell to a historic low of 39.1 percent and the PRD’s share also dropped to 25.7 per 
cent. The declining success of the left was the result of its failure to offer an alternative 
to the PRI -  it failed to offer leadership to the masses and did not establish other 
organisations (such as worker or peasant organisations) which could rival or challenge the 
PRI. Meanwhile, the PAN was able to capitalise on the left’s loss of support.
In the 1990s, the nature of PRI rule was qualitatively different from previous decades. 
Although the party remained in power, it was no longer leading Mexico from a position of 
strength. It now garnered less than 50 per cent of the total national vote in elections, 
compared with the 70 to 90 per cent that it had received in earlier decades. The cumulative 
impact of economic and political strife forced the government of Ernesto Zedillo (1994- 
2000) to respond with more concessions in an effort to deal with rising social discontent. 
The December 1994 devaluation of the peso and an economic crisis in 1995-96 resulted in 
a massive outburst of popular opposition in response to inflation and a generalised decline 
in living standards.154 Allegations of corruption and criminal activity among senior 
politicians, combined with the indigenous Zapatista (Ejercito Zapatista cle Liberation 
National -  EZLN) uprising, prompted the PRI to institute additional electoral reforms. 
These included the development of a new national registry of voters, campaign finance 
reform and improved opposition access to the media.155 Reforms were also enacted to 
ensure the autonomy of the Federal Electoral Institute (Institnto Federal Electoral -  IFE), 
an organisation that was created in order to supervise and mediate elections. The IFE was 
given greater ability to enforce the new laws and oversee a cleaner, fairer and more
I Stransparent electoral process.
Mexican non-government organisations (NGO) also played a leading role in the reform of 
the IFE in the mid-1990s. Pro-democracy NGOs constantly campaigned for open elections 
and monitored instances of electoral irregularities throughout the country. One of the most 
prominent NGOs was the Civic Alliance (.Alianza Civica), a network of 400 civic groups
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and smaller NGOs.157 The Civic Alliance was formed in 1994 in order to oversee the 1994 
presidential election -  it had observers in 1,810 polling stations around Mexico. ~ The 
activities of Civic Alliance were not just limited to poll watching and oversight of election 
officials on election day, they also included an assessment of media coverage, campaign 
spending and a broader effort to inform voters of their rights.159 Such efforts significantly 
advanced demands for the effective autonomy of electoral institutions, in particular the IFE.
Essentially, Salinas and Zedillo presided over the decline of the PRI state and their policies 
reflect this awareness. Salinas’s social welfare program PRONASOL was adopted in order 
to win political support and soften the blow of neo-liberal measures, while Zedillo’s 
political reforms were enacted to counter the PRI’s diminishing legitimacy and to enhance 
political stability.160 But these reforms and populist measures did not restore confidence in 
the PRI, nor did they win back the support or loyalty of many Mexicans. Due to vast 
sources of patronage through its unilateral control of the state apparatus, the PRI was able 
to control access to employment and advancement throughout the decades of stable rule.161 
Regime decomposition was a slow process due to the combination of deeply rooted popular 
allegiances to the PRI and a complex network of worker, peasant and popular 
organisations.16“ It involved the gradual erosion of a hegemonic party’s bases.163 The 
historic roots of the PRI were such that it was not defeated until 2000 by the PAN -  
Vicente Fox received 43.4 per cent, the PRI share of the vote decreased to an 
unprecedented low of 36.9 per cent and the PRD’s share dropped to 17 per cent.164 The 
presidential elections of 2000 completed the Mexican transition, ending 70 years of PRI 
rule.
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THE MEXICAN TRANSITION: REFUTING THE MAINSTREAM VIEW
Conventional explanations of the Mexican transition assume a steady and controlled 
movement towards democracy, with the natural culmination being the PRI defeat in 2000. 
Such teleological analyses neglect the profound crises which plagued the PRI beginning in 
the late 1960s and continuing into the 1990s. These crises were the result of a steady 
attrition of the supports which had historically bolstered PRI governance. Throughout its 
70-year history, the PRI state faced intermittent episodes of pressure. From 1968 onwards, 
the forces for pressure began to coalesce and compel the PRI to respond. The challenges 
which confronted the regime were qualitatively different from those in the past -  they were 
not just episodic or sporadic, they represented opposition which was structural and reflected 
deep-seated discontent with the state and the nature of its undemocratic rule, not just 
individual policies.
The introduction of reform measures after the Tlatelolco massacre was an attempt by the 
PRI to initiate a controlled, measured liberalisation of the political system without ceding 
any significant power to the opposition. A slow liberalisation of the political system was 
part of a deliberate strategy which enabled the PRI to play a reformist game without 
dismantling the Mexican state.165 These changes however, did not result in democratisation 
-  they were designed to maintain the dominant position of the ruling party and win the 
support of the Mexican people. Liberalisation in Mexico did not follow elite-led 
transitology’s framework for analysing political change. That is, the transition to 
democracy was not solely the result of a series of political bargaining between incumbents 
and the opposition, nor was it a natural development of the Mexican political system. It was 
not the PAN’s “commitment to democratic values” that helped transform Mexican politics 
and “bring about a democratic transition”, as Michael Ard argues.166 Nor does Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas deserve sole credit as “the man who ignited the democratic transition”.167
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Rather, political liberalisation was designed as a short-term measure intended to prolong 
PRI rule, and often enacted ad hoc in response to particular crises. Ard admits to as much 
when he states that the PRI’s liberalisation moves were purely a procedural strategy so that 
the party could “maintain itself in power, not to initiate a true democratic transition”.168 The 
transition to democracy in Mexico was not the result of an intricately constructed political 
agreement among various elite groups who intended to democratise the Mexican system 
over the long-term. Reform occurred as a result of popular pressure in order to address the 
PRI’s waning legitimacy. The changes were brought about by the ruling party but not 
because it was acting alone. They occurred under the pressure of a volatile population. 
Populist policies enacted from the 1970s onwards were also the result of an insecure PRI 
which was desperate to remain in power.
Mainstream literature has not completely overlooked the role of civil society in the 
Mexican transition to democracy. The 1980s witnessed a burgeoning literature on the role 
of social movements in response to the perceived failings of elite-led transitology and its 
focus on elite politics. This revisionist literature sought to emphasise the democratising 
potential of these movements.169 For Joseph Klesner, the Mexican transition needs to take 
into account the development of a “combative” civil society in the transition process.170 An 
emphasis on individual actors over collective action continues to dominate much of the 
scholarly studies on Mexico. The focus remains disproportionately at the elite level of 
politics: political parties (either in power or representative elites outside of political power), 
electoral processes and individual political actors. Such accounts continue to treat social 
movements and the labour movement in particular, as incidental to the transition. The 
principal focus continues to centre on the higher echelons of government, at the expense of 
highly significant protests from other ends of the political spectrum.
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As will be shown in the next chapter, the labour upsurge in the early to mid 1970s 
weakened the main institutional basis of the PRI -  the key foundation of its success. By 
violently crushing the insurgency, the PRI state could no longer successfully pose as the 
champion of the Mexican worker. For the business sector, the worker insurgency signaled a 
decline in the PRI’s ability to control its members; therefore, many lost confidence in the 
PRI and joined the PAN in protest. The bourgeoisie’s entry into politics, therefore, was 
detrimental for the PRI. It was precisely this labour militancy that played a large role in 
Mexico’s transition and has been overlooked as a result of trends in the social sciences. 
What remains to be shown is how labour played an instrumental role in the Mexican 
transition, adding to the political science literature by adopting a ‘history from below’ 
perspective. The following chapter will show that mass pressure from below came from the 
labour movement, especially in the crucial period 1968-1976.
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CHAPTER 3: THE MEXICAN LABOUR MOVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to elite-led transitology, worker mobilisation shattered any prospect of stability 
for the government between 1968 and 1976. Escalating disruption in workplace relations 
was dangerous for the PRI on a number of levels. Some of the most serious conflicts 
occurred in nationalised industries such as electricity, railways, telephones and steel. 
Worker mobilisation threatened to derail the industrialisation project and undermine the 
‘alliance for profits’ which was consolidated after World War Two. The disturbances which 
occurred in these areas were not limited to the workplace -  mobilisation spread to include a 
broader pro-democracy movement -  the constant pressure of regular oppositional activity 
weakened the basis of PRI rule. Unremitting labour activity forced the government to 
change and initiate reform measures during the period known as the insurgencia obrera, or 
labour insurgency. Mexico’s transition to democracy was pushed forward by the insurgency 
and its explosive tactics of confrontation. Labour’s economic and political demands were 
subversive and as a result, it unleashed a violent response from the state which would not 
tolerate such a direct threat to its rule. Striking at the very basis of PRI rule, labour was 
responsible for defying the institutional parameters of state control and for destabilising the 
regime. This does not mean that the role of elites in the democratisation process should be 
completely disregarded. Rather, it seeks to rectify the imbalances in the framework adopted 
by elite-led transitology. Evidence which demonstrates the importance of labour serves to 
complement the mainstream approach and forces a readjustment of the analytical lens.
THEORETICAL IMPORTANCE OF LABOUR IN DEMOCRATISATION
In analysing the contribution of workers in transitions to democracy, elite-led transitology 
acknowledges a highly limited input, one which is short-term and secondary to analysing 
the elite level of politics.1 Labour’s contribution is partial and brief, restricted to a largely 
insignificant role as part of the ‘resurrection of civil society’. For example, Adam 
Przeworski argues that the importance of union leaders during the transition can be found in
1 Valenzuela, Samuel J., ‘Labour Movements in Transitions to Democracy: A Framework for Analysis’, 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 21, No. 4, July 1989, p.446.
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their ability to discipline workers so they do not obstruct the implementation of reforms.“ 
Essentially, Przeworski advocates moderate worker demands and a conservative approach 
in state-labour negotiations. As a direct challenge to some of the fundamental tenets of 
elite-led transitology, a substantial amount of literature emerged which provided empirical 
evidence in an attempt to redress its omissions. In particular, Ruth Berins Collier and James 
Mahoney argue that in Latin America, the role of labour during transitions has been 
overlooked in favour of analysing elite strategies. Their argument centres around the view 
that organised workers played a prominent role in the opposition to authoritarian regimes.1 
Workers were responsible for pushing the transition forward as a result of sustained 
protest.* 34
This revisionist literature on the significance of labour emphasises its unique position in 
civil society.5 Elite-led transitology has disregarded the influence that labour has on 
authoritarian regimes. In Mexico, this omission is striking given the close relationship 
between the state and official labour unions. The sources of labour’s unique position lie in 
its capacity for mobilisation, its existing organisational network and the relationship 
between labour demands and activity on the one hand, and production and macroeconomic 
performance and policy on the other.6 Mexico is a clear example of the importance of 
labour during the transition. Labour’s strategic role, as well as its strength, spearheaded 
some of the most important opposition movements in the 1970s. The nature of these 
movements placed the PRI on the defensive and contributed enormously to weakening the 
government’s historical stranglehold over trade unions.
2
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THE ‘MEXICAN MIRACLE' & THE METHODS USED TO CONTROL LABOUR
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the labour sector wielded the most political power of the 
three incorporated sectors within the PRI, owing to the critical role its constituents played 
in 1ST7 Organised labour in Mexico has been described as one of the principal pillars of the 
regime because it facilitated the Mexican economic ‘miracle’.8 ISI provided the regime 
with economic space to accommodate labour’s demands.9 Economic growth also enabled 
the government to maintain the ‘social wage’, or non-wage benefits.10 The social wage 
included access to health care, housing and basic commodities which were state-subsidised, 
as well as a nationally defined minimum wage.* 11 In comparison to other sectors, organised 
labour enjoyed a privileged status.12
i
Workers also served to provide the PRI with a substantial political clientele. ' Despite their 
subordination to the party line, official unions could place pressure on the PRI as a result of 
their involvement in party politics at both national and state levels.14 This gave labour 
leaders considerable leverage in being able to withdraw political support for policies they 
regarded as detrimental to their organisations.15 Co-optation through the provision of 
benefits was one of the various ways in which the state dealt with the inevitable conflict 
which erupted as result of social inequalities. Because of their critical importance to 
sustained and uninterrupted capitalist development, unionised workers were provided with 
material rewards as a way of containing discord.
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A variety of reinforcing measures were adopted in order to ensure that labour followed the 
capitalist model of development in the post World War II period. The installation of corrupt 
and pro-government union leaders was one of the most effective methods relied upon by 
the state. Known as charrismo, the term emerged as a description of the secretary general 
of the railroad workers’ union, Jesus Diaz de Leon, known as ‘El Charro’, or cowboy. 
Diaz’ policy of collusion with the government and repression within the union earned him 
the notorious epithet.16 Charrismo is a form of trade union control which is characterised 
by the use of state repression to support a leadership, the systematic use of violence, 
violation of workers’ union rights and collusion between the government, industrialists and 
union leaders.17 In every decade beginning from the late 1940s, workplace conflict was 
characterised by demands for the removal of corrupt and inept leaderships in several 
industries. This presented a massive threat to the stability of the regime, as maintaining 
charrismo was central to upholding the regime’s iron grip over labour.
Although charrismo was vital for the government’s supervision of the workplace, it also 
relied on an array of legal means to prevent the emergence of independent unionism. 
Enacted in 1931, the Federal Labour Law, or the Ley de Trahajo (LFT) regulated labour 
law throughout Mexico -  it ensured that labour disputes were mediated by government- 
appointed tribunals and arbitration boards at federal, state and local levels.18 Government 
boards of conciliation and arbitration (juntas de conciliaciön y arhitraje) were responsible 
for the adjudication of conflict between labour and management.19 Because bargaining 
procedures were mediated by the state, there was a decline in strikes from 887 in 1944 to 16 
in 1953. Complex legal procedures for declaring a strike and its legality also restricted the 
ability of unions to function autonomously. The PRI was involved in every level of 
workplace relations -  its extensive reach was designed to maintain a lid on any grievances, 
but the lid could not be kept shut indefinitely.
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UNCONTROLLED MOBILISATION: THE PRES WORST EEAR
The fear of autonomous labour movements plagued the PRI even during the years when it 
enjoyed overwhelming majorities at the polls. Such worries were not unfounded -  dissent 
which went beyond the institutional parameters set by the state was, by its very nature, 
subversive. Pre-emptive mobilisation served as a safety valve through which to channel 
demands. It was integral to the stability of the regime because it ensured that when conflicts 
did arise, they were guided, directed and ultimately mediated under the watchful eye of the 
state. In fact, pre-emptive mobilisation was seen as a way of boosting the PRI’s 
‘democratic’ credentials. The impact of labour unrest on the state was intense due to the 
strategic position of organised labour in the PRI state. A clear example of the PRI’s fear of 
independent labour activism can be found in two major incidents: the 1948 and the 1958-9 
railroad workers’ disputes. The latter conflict in particular, was one of the foremost 
challenges faced by the state against official trade unionism prior to the 1970s.
Mexico has a history of reform movements within the official union movement and intense 
episodes of militant unionism and as such, the 1976 labour insurgency was part of a long 
build up of accumulated grievances. Reform movements and attempts to breakaway from 
the c/?a/To-dominated national unions in the late 1940s signaled worker frustrations with 
the autocratic nature of union politics. The anti-communism of the Cold War years made it 
particularly difficult to mount a successful challenge to the PRl’s firm control of the CTM. 
Nevertheless, worker disturbances during these years rocked the carefully crafted stability 
of the PRI regime.
In 1947, a radical contingent in the CTM led by railway leader Luis Gömez Z, sought to 
challenge the dominant faction in a battle over the secretary generalship.21 After the faction 
backed by the government won, the radical unionists led by Gomez, founded a dissident 
anti-CTM organisation, the Unitary Workers’ Confederation (Confederation Unica de 
Trabajadores -  CUT) in March 1947.22 Mexico’s three largest industrial unions -  railways, 
oil and mining -  also left the CTM and joined the CUT. Together, these opposition labour 
unions formed the Coalition of Worker and Peasant Organisations (Coalition de
21 Smith, ‘Mexico since 1946’, in Bethell, The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. 7, op.cit., p. 103.
22 ibid.
57
Organizciciones Obreras y Campesinas) in mid-1948.“ This represented a combined 
membership which rivaled that of the CTM.“4
23
Other leftist organisations sprung up, adding to the PRI’s list of worries. Labour leader 
Vicente Lombardo Toledano founded a progressive opposition party, the PPS in 1948. 
Another group of unions followed him out of the CTM and under his leadership founded 
the General Union of Mexican Workers and Peasants (Union General de Obreros y 
Campesinos de Mexico -  UGOCM) which was to act as the labour wing of the PPS.25 The 
attempt to link labour with party opposition however, was stillborn -  the PPS had limited 
support, the UGOCM was met with constant harassment by the government and numerous 
defections and the former was also weakened by the charrazos of the late 1940s and early 
1950s.26 Thus, the government killed off potential CTM rivals at an early stage, before 
alliances could be formed.
Despite government harassment, the CUT directly challenged both the CTM and President 
Miguel Aleman’s (1946-1952) conservative labour and economic development policies.27 
The CUT led massive protests against the government’s anti-strike legislation and 
demanded a general wage increase to compensate for the inflationary effects of the July 
1948 devaluation of the peso at a time when the CTM leadership supported the 
government’s economic program by avoiding strikes and wage demands.28 The government 
therefore, immediately took action to suppress an emerging organisation which could 
unseat the CTM and therefore, the PRI’s monopoly over the workplace.
President Aleman acted forcefully to disband the Coalition of Worker and Peasant 
Organisations and his first target was the principal actor in the labour opposition, the 
Mexican Railroad Workers’ Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros de la
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Repüblica Mexicana -  STFRM).29 When Gomez Z. resigned his position in the railway 
union to work full time in the CUT, he was replaced by the infamous ‘El Charro’, Jesus 
Diaz de Leon. With the government’s backing, Diaz led a leftist purge of the STFRM in 
September 1948. Police occupied union buildings, thousands of workers were fired and the 
union became an unconditional supporter of the PRFs economic policies.’1 This event 
spelled the end of the CUT challenge to the government -  over the next four years, the 
radical leaderships of the oil, mining and telephone workers’ unions were overthrown and 
conservative leaderships (charros) installed.32 By 1952, the Aleman government had 
defeated the most important labour opposition movement in Mexican history.
Throughout the 1950s, dissident sections of Mexican unions initiated a number of attempts 
to wrest the CTM’s dominant position away from it.34 In 1952, several non-CTM forces 
were unified in the Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and Peasants (Confederacion 
Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinas -  CROC), an organisation which was affiliated 
to the PRI.35 The government allowed the CROC to function because it served as a 
counterweight to the CTM. This was a typical strategy -  the government permitted the 
existence of such organisations as long as it could control and monitor their activities and 
make sure they followed the PRI line. Other movements, however, proved much more 
difficult to contain.
Worker dissatisfaction with wage levels led to the emergence of a rank-and-file leader in 
the powerful STFRM, Demetrijo Vallejo, in July 1958. Vallejo negotiated a wage increase 
and as a result, he was elected by rail workers to head the STFRM with his supporters. 
However, the Secretary of Labour refused to recognise Vallejo’s leadership, and new 
strikes were called. The most worrying feature of the movement was the public support 
which Vallejo received from striking electrical workers, the Mexican Electrical Workers’
29 ibid.
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Union (Sindicato Mexicano de Electricistas -  SME) and insurgent sectors of the petroleum 
workers and the national teachers union. '6 Even more troubling for the government was that 
the strike had a double purpose -  it not only sought higher wages, but directly challenged 
the state-controlled union structure.37 The state’s response was to send police and soldiers 
to raid union halls, while Vallejo escaped to Mexico City where he called a work stoppage 
that became nationwide within hours. In August, union elections were held and despite 
charro efforts to buy votes, Vallejo won control of the union. When Vallejo called for new 
strikes in early 1959, President Adolfo Lopez Mateos (1958-64) sent in the army to raid 
union halls and to arrest all union leaders, including Vallejo. Several were killed, and 
10,000 rail workers were arrested, along with supporting petroleum workers, teachers and
T O
students.'
The impact of the railway strikes was tremendous -  it constituted a serious threat to PRI 
rule as it challenged charrismo which the government relied on to control the work force. 
Even more significantly, dissent had been nationwide. Important strikes took place among 
the telegraph workers, kindergarten and elementary teachers and oil workers.39 In each 
case, wage demands led to a rejection of union leadership which was seen as co-opted, 
unrepresentative and unwilling to defend the interests of workers.40 A major element in 
these strikes was the demand for democratically elected, independent leadership.41 It also 
demonstrated that the government would not tolerate independent unionism. Despite 
brutally repressive measures, the militant sectors of Mexican unionism remained active 
throughout the 1960s.42 The electrical workers continued their tradition of being a 
stronghold for industrial militants and together with the CROC, they formed the National 
Labour Central (Central Nacional de Trabajadores -  CNT). The CROC proclaimed the 
principle of independent unionism, even though it was affiliated with the PRI.43 This was a
36 The above account is from Hathaway, Dale, ‘Mexico’s Frente Autentico del Trabajo: Organising Beyond 
the PRI and Across Borders’, Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association, Guadalajara, 
Mexico, April 17-19, 1997, p.5. Accessed 15 July, 2007. 
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38 The above account is from Hathaway, ‘Mexico’s Freute Autentico del Trabajo’, op.cit., p.6.
39 Berins Collier, The Contradictory Alliance, op.cit., p.58.
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peculiarly Mexican phenomenon -  unions with radical members were often affiliated with 
the PRI while remaining outside of the CTM. The government allowed the more 
progressive sectors to function as long as they played according to the rules of the game 
and did not go too far in their opposition to the regime. Reform-oriented labour 
organisations often served other purposes -  they were used by various administrations as a 
way of countering the strength of national unions which sought genuine autonomy. A 
common tactic was to back the pro-government labour organisation so that it could defeat 
the more radical unions which posed a threat to PRI domination. In return for government 
support, union leaders not only received official posts and material benefits but they were 
expected to keep their union members in line by maintaining labour docility in the 
workplace and supporting the state’s economic policies.
In the mid-1960s, there was a slow re-emergence of democratic struggles, including strike 
movements carried out by doctors and bus drivers in Mexico City.44 The government used a 
combination of co-optation and repression to quell these instances of dissent. Worker 
attempts to create an autonomous confederation was pre-empted in 1966 by the 
government’s establishment of the Congress of Labour (Congreso del Trabajo -  CT) which 
replaced the CNT. As a loosely organised umbrella group, the CT was technically 
independent but in fact composed of labour groups with an allegiance to the PRI and 
dominated by the CTM.45 Close supervision of potential rival organisations had a practical 
effect -  by allowing and even facilitating reformist elements, the government co-opted the 
moderate elements while they officially remained under the wing of the PRI. The political 
structure of the system was not designed to cope with independent opposition; rather, it was 
created in order to contain demands so as to prevent the danger of autonomous struggle. 
While it could place a lid on sectpr alliances from occurring in this instance, the period 
between 1968 and 1976 proved to be a period when the PRI could no longer maintain such 
a tight leash on the unions.
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SOCIAL DISSENT: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR IJKBOUR INSURGENCY
By the late 1960s, the state was besieged on a number of fronts. It was facing a series of 
social and political upheavals which were steadily chipping away at its foundational 
strength. These included land invasions in the countryside undertaken by peasants, right 
and left-wing guerrilla activity, student protests, the proliferation of opposition movements 
and parties and most importantly, the labour insurgency.46 Even more worrying for the PRI 
was the growth of independent unionism which in its many forms, presented the most 
serious instance of mobilisation. The legitimacy of the PRI was severely undermined and 
the very foundations of its rule began to unravel following the Tlatelolco massacre in 1968. 
It dealt a shattering and demoralising blow to the labour movement -  the brutal slaughter of 
hundreds of Mexicans meant that the state could no longer present itself as the champion of 
the worker. The CTM and official union bureaucracy however, responded to the 1968 pro­
democracy movement by backing the government, while some sectors of the organised 
labour movement showed significant support for the students.47 Profound social 
polarisation highlighted the unstable basis of the PRI’s assiduously crafted consensus.
In an attempt to recover the PRI’s faltering legitimacy, President Echeverria’s democratic 
opening (apertura democrdtica) in the early 1970s sought to facilitate the emergence of 
independent labour organisations. The democratic opening encouraged free dialogue, 
political criticism and freedom of expression within certain limits.48 The purpose behind 
this strategy was to neutralise the moderate opposition elements by instituting liberal 
reform measures. For the first few years of Echeverria’s sexenio, the independent labour 
movement was met with a certain tolerance.49 By the end of the decade, more than 100 
independent unions were organised.50 Attempting to defuse the political demands made
46 Berins Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, op.cit., pps.587-588.
47 Carr, ‘Labour and the Political Left in Mexico’, in Middlebrook, Unions, Workers and the State in Mexico, 
op.cit., p. 135.
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after Tlatelolco, however, did not succeed in the labour secto r/1 The most significant 
aspect which emerged out of the political liberalisation was a stronger and more militant 
independent labour movement.
The policies of the developmental state were responsible for the increase in size and 
strength of the working class. By 1982, over 5.3 million workers were members of labour 
unions -  26 per cent of the economically active population.52 Industrialisation also shifted 
the balance of class forces. The CNC had been an important organisation in the PRI, 
however, by the early 1970s, it was considerably less so than the CTM. Agriculture had 
been in decline since the early 1960s due to the lack of agrarian reform and the 
government’s preference for industry as the basis for development. The transformation of 
the economy into a largely industrial one also entailed drastic changes in the composition of 
the labour market. Between 1940 and 1970, agriculture’s contribution to total production 
decreased from 21 per cent to 11 per cent, while industry’s contribution increased from 25 
per cent to 34 per cent.5. Whereas two-thirds of the labour force was employed in 
agriculture in 1940, the figure decreased to one-third by 1970.54 The 1958-59 railroad 
dispute and the 1968 democratic movement destroyed the myth of undisputed PRI 
hegemony and contributed to a dramatic weakening of the party’s hold over its sectors, 
especially labour. More than any other time in the history of the PRI state, workers were in 
a position to destabilise the regime and its authoritarian structure.
THE LABOUR INSURGENCY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE
i) THE WORKERS’ OFFENSIVE: A NEW CHAPTER IN THE MEXICAN LABOUR 
MOVEMENT
The intensification of worker struggles and an increase in labour combativeness spelled 
serious trouble for the PRI. Between 1968 and 1976, the insurgencia obrem (labour 
insurgency) emerged in a number of strategic sectors. It drew considerable strength from
51
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the most influential organisations in the automobile, steel, metalworking and electrical 
products industries.55 There were movements which led to union democratisation, internal 
reform within official confederations such as the CTM, or the breakaway of unions from 
official confederations. The insurgencia was not the result of a coordinated movement with 
a single political and industrial project -  rather, it incorporated a multitude of labour 
actions, both in older national industrial unions and labour confederations and in many 
enterprise-level unions and newly created unions.56 Across industries, workers went on 
strike demanding democratisation of the workplace, shorter work hours, and improved 
safety and working conditions.' Within unions, the movement for independence 
commonly started with economic demands and broadened as the existing union leadership
co
came to be seen as an obstacle. ' In this way, it came to take on the dimensions of rejecting 
the existing union structure and advocating a more militant, representative and democratic 
form of unionism.59
The worker insurgency extended the boundaries of trade union democracy and autonomy in 
national unions as well as in hundreds of plant unions throughout the country.60 What 
distinguished the labour insurgency of the 1970s from earlier periods was that it focused on 
widespread issues, rather than just those related to individual workplaces. Compared to 
previous conflicts, the magnitude of the insurgency presented a more formidable threat to 
the state because it resulted in sector-wide support and alliances -  students and leftist 
parties also joined blue and white-collar workers in solidarity. After 1968, the PRI was not 
only faced with a loss of legitimacy but a populace which had become increasingly 
politicised after the Tlatelolco massacre. During this period, protest was not an isolated 
incident -  the widespread upheaval exemplified the pervasive disaffection with official 
union politics and more broadly, with Mexico’s authoritarian political system.
The most dangerous aspect of the insurgency for the PRI was the fact that the independent 
movement was centred on strategically important national industries which employed
58 Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution, op.cit., p.223.
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workers with substantial skills and technical qualifications, such as electrical and telephone 
workers as well as teachers.61 Labour insurgency during the 1970s was not restricted to a 
single union, or even a handful of unions. Almost every industry was hit by strikes 
including construction, textiles, automobiles, metals, machinery, transport, metallurgical- 
mining, electrical, rails and chemical-pharmaceutical. University students, bank 
employees and doctors also went on strike.63 Between 1970 and 1976, the percentage of 
total strike actions motivated by democratic principles rose from 14 to 53 per cent in 
1975.64 The level of state violence used against workers directly corresponded to the 
intensity of the democratic struggle -  the percentage of democratic labour conflicts 
involving physical violence increased from 14.3 per cent in 1970 to 22.9 per cent in 1976.65 
Between 1973 and 1977, Mexico experienced about 3,600 strikes and labour conflicts 
involving between 1 and 2 million workers.66
Worker mobilisation was widespread and reflected a generalised discontent with the nature 
of PRI rule, as well as its economic policies. These included the failures and shortcomings 
of the government’s economic policies, its exclusionary and authoritarian politics and the 
social inequalities generated by skewed development programs. Rising inflation led to an 
increase in strike frequency and towards greater pressure on leaderships to pursue an 
aggressive line in contract renegotiations.67 The establishment of salary limits led to 
increased demand for salary hikes.68 Workers were placing increased pressure on labour 
leaders to secure more effectively their interests -  their activism placed enormous strain on 
the PRI.
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ii) DEFYING THE STATE: THE ELECTRICAL WORKERS
Spearheading the labour insurgency were the unions representing electrical workers. Their 
credentials stemmed from a militant history, with the SME being the oldest democratic 
union in Mexico.69 Three unions operated in different jurisdictions. The SME was largely 
confined to the Federal District (Mexico City), the Union of Electrical Workers of the 
Mexican Republic (Sindicato de Trabajadores Electricistas de la Repüblica Mexicana -  
STERM) represented workers outside the capital and the Electrical Workers Unions 
(,Sindicato National de Electricistas Feclerales -  SNE) represented workers in plants built 
or acquired by the Federal Electric Commission after 1937. Throughout the 1960s, 
STERM had a membership of 7000, with major local affiliates in Guadalajara, Puebla and 
Vera Cruz, while SME had 21,000 members.71 The SNE was the most conservative, its 
political stance was pro-government and its internal structure remained unchanged with the 
same charro leadership of Francisco Perez Rios for 32 years who used his position to 
amass a large personal fortune.72 It was also the only one of the three unions affiliated with 
the CTM, with a membership of 30,000.71 By the early 1970s, STERM, with 9,000 
members, was by far the most radical -  it sought independence from the CTM, was Marxist 
oriented and supported the left-wing of the PRI.74
Preparations for protest action began on 16 October 1971, after the Federal Board of 
Arbitration and Conciliation withdrew legal recognition of the STERM in representing 
electrical workers outside of the Federal District. Instead, it recognised the pro-government 
SNE, seeking to replace the combative STERM. In order to oppose this decision, STERM 
planned a series of monthly ‘marches for union democracy’ designed to elicit public 
support and thereby pressure the government into reversing the decision of the Board of 
Arbitration. On 14 December, 1971 the first of these demonstrations was held in Acapulco
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and in other cities throughout the nation.75 The ‘marches for union democracy’ signaled the 
beginning of the worker insurgency -  between December 1971 and July 1972, marches 
occurred in 50 localities throughout Mexico.76 Headed by STERM and supported by 
student groups and petroleum workers, it is estimated that over 100,000 people participated 
in these demonstrations. They provided the initial driving force behind the labour 
insurgency -  these protests not only sought to protect workers’ rights, but they also began a 
nationwide movement against charrismo in other unions. Challenging charrismo meant 
challenging the state -  it went right to the heart of corporatist control.
The most disturbing features of these protests for the PRI were the cross-sector alliance
78with dissident factions in the petroleum, teachers, steel and university custodial unions. 
Along with radical university students, these groups participated in many of STERM’s 
mass demonstrations. In September 1972, STERM merged with SNE and became a 
national union, General Union of Mexican Electrical Workers (Sindicato Unica de 
Trabajadores Electricistas de la Repüblica de Mexico - SUTERM). Despite this 
mobilisation and outreach, the leadership and rank-and-file members of STERM felt they 
had to accept a merger with the SNE which was proposed by President Echeverrfa.79 In 
order to placate the rebellious STERM. it was given half of the representation. Although 
the outcome suited the government, it was not enough to dampen the deep-seated 
grievances which had been expressed by workers during the marches. The STERM dispute 
was merely the tip of the iceberg -  soon, the PRI was facing a ground-swell of opposition 
which it could not control.
The above account is from Handelman, ‘The Politics of Labour Protest in Mexico’, op.cit., p.285.
76 Delarbe and Yanez, ‘The Mexican Labour Movement’, op.cit., p. 150.
77 The above account is from Handelman, ‘The Politics of Labour Protest in Mexico’, op.cit., p.286.
78 ibid.
79 La Botz, Dan, Mask of Democracy: Labour Suppression in Mexico Today, Boston: South End Press, 1992, 
p.72.
80 Brennan, ‘Industrial Sectors and Union Politics in Latin American Labour Movements’, op.cit., p.61.
67
iii) DEMOCRATIC TENDENCY (TD)
Unity within the SUTERM was short-lived, as an independent faction pushed for greater 
militancy and internal democracy.81 The charro, Perez Rios, moved to undercut the ex- 
STERM unions and a result, he clashed repeatedly with the militant wing of SUTERM led 
by Rafael Galvan.82 The strike began when in June 1974, a collective bargaining agreement
O ')
was negotiated and signed by Perez Rios over the heads of the rank-and-file. ‘ Workers 
went on strike and voted to remove the old union leadership. Galvan supported the 
strikers and management retaliated by calling for an unrepresentative convention of 
SUTERM -  at that convention, SUTERM voted to expel Galvan and the independent
8Sfaction from the executive board of the union; hundreds of workers were also fired.
Galvan and his followers however, were not deterred -  in February 1975, they founded the 
Democratic Tendency (Tendencia Democrätica -  TD). The TD program called for 
autonomy, nationalising transnational corporations, abolishing charrismo and incorporating 
other independent unions and workers’ commissions into a broad coalition known as the 
Revolutionary Union Movement (Movirniento Sindical Revolucionario -  MSR).86 The TD 
was important as it became the major focal point of the independent workers’ movement 
during this period.87 The challenge presented by the power workers was the most 
formidable faced by the PRI. They had strategic powers unmatched by any other industry, 
as well as considerable organisational strength with the highest rate of union affiliation in 
Mexico -  97 per cent of power workers were union members in 197 5.88 Moreover, it also 
experienced extraordinary levels of rank-and-file participation in union affairs. The 
union’s history of independence and its fiercely critical stance on government economic 
policy also made the power workers’ leaders in the opposition movement.90
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Mobilisation of support for the TD kicked off with strength. A meeting and demonstration 
of 20,000 workers was organised in Guadalajara on April 5, 1975. The Declaration of 
Guadalajara was issued, demanding greater benefits and privileges for electricians, but 
more significantly for the government, it also called for a fundamental reallocation of 
wealth and political power.91 The Declaration not only called for union democracy but it 
also outlined a broad social program to fight for the original goals of the Mexican 
revolution.92 Specifically, the Declaration called for the nationalisation of strategic 
industries, the restructuring of existing state-owned enterprises and increased state 
economic intervention under worker supervision and the creation of sectoral and national 
industrial unions.9" Moreover, wide-ranging demands for the democratisation of all unions, 
collectivisation of agriculture, expropriation of foreign firms and increased worker 
participation in public planning, were highly disconcerting for the PRI.94 The TD organised 
numerous demonstrations around the country throughout the spring and summer of 1975.95
In one of the most tremendous displays of solidarity, demonstrations on November 15 1975 
in Mexico City, turned out an estimated 250,000 supporters of TD. These included other 
electricians, railroad workers, telephone workers, university employees, representatives of 
independent unions and caucuses, militants from the left political parties, members of the 
CNC and representatives of independent peasant organisations from 12 states.96 This was 
the largest protest march since 1968 and the most important show of labour strength since 
the 1959 rail strike.97 A series of demonstrations followed on November 28, 1975 across
n o
Mexico in support of TD. In a number of cities, TD demonstrators were attacked by CTM 
thugs armed with clubs and other weapons.99 Despite the government’s use of violence to 
quell widespread resistance, the labour insurgency continued to gather force and
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momentum. On March 20, 1976, TD called for a further demonstration in Mexico City in 
which 100,000 people participated.100
The working class insurgency was only part of a broader popular insurgency.101 Militancy 
spread to more unions and into the ranks of students, urban squatters and peasants.102 In an 
attempt to broaden the movement, TD organised the National Front of Popular Action 
(Frente National Action Popular -  FNAP), which was launched on May 14, 1976 at the 
National Conference of Labour, Peasant and Mass Insurgency (Conferencia National de 
Insurgencia Obrem, Campesina y Popular) -  more than 300 unions, peasant organisations 
and community and student groups formed the FNAP.103 This attempt at unifying different 
sectors of the population represented a more serious threat to the state than did the student- 
led mass mobilisations of 1968, because now industrial workers were in the forefront.104
Testing President Echeverria’s reformist rhetoric, the electrical workers called for a 
nationwide strike.105 Galvan and the TD called for a reinstatement of the fired SUTERM 
workers and for new democratic elections in SUTERM. President Echeverria called for 
dialogue between SUTERM and the TD and Galvan agreed to postpone the strike until 16 
July 1976. The dialogues were unsuccessful and the strike was called. Before the strike was 
launched, however, the government mounted a massive attack against the TD on the 
morning of 16 July.106 The army invaded and violently occupied all major electrical 
installations, both public and private, to forcibly break the strike and hundreds of workers 
were fired.107 With this single action, the movement was crushed. The TD was suppressed 
by both the extralegal and legal means available to the Mexican state.108 The Attorney 
General of Mexico later reached an agreement for all fired workers to return to work, but 
the agreement was not honoured in many places -  in some cities, returning workers were 
met by CTM goon squads and forced to renounce the TD before they were allowed to start
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their shifts.109 Its leadership was defeated and this signaled the end of rank-and-file 
militancy and a certain recovery of the position of the official union leadership.110 The TD 
was formally dissolved on 12 November, 1977 and the remaining members joined the MSR 
-  it drew support primarily from nuclear workers, as well as sectors of university and 
electrical workers but the MSR did not gain the level of support or importance that the TD 
was able to achieve.
TD’s impact and its pressure tactics cannot be underestimated. Demands made for radical 
change and the overthrow of the entrenched, corrupt union leadership dealt a severe blow to 
the already tenuous legitimacy of the PRI. Once TD surpassed the limits set by the PRI, it 
was violently contained. It had undermined one of the central pillars of PRI rule by 
operating outside the electoral arena and using demonstrations to express its opposition.111 
It reached the limit of government tolerance when it sought to expand into a broad-based 
movement unifying disparate elements of the lower class and the progressive elements of 
the middle class.112 The Democratic Tendency dealt a heavy blow to the PRI state and its 
mechanisms of control by illustrating that the government was not invulnerable to attack -  
it was the most visible expression of a broad-ranging movement which threatened to break 
up the institutionalisation of charrismo and it served as a rallying point for a much larger 
movement for political opening in Mexico.113
iv) FAT: ORGANISING RESISTANCE THROUGHOUT INDUSTRIES
One of the most significant actors in the independent union movement was the Authentic 
Labour Front {Freute Autentico Del Trabajo -  FAT). Formed in 1960, this organisation 
was unique in the context of government-labour relations because of its autonomy and its 
commitment to union democracy. It is a federation of independent unions and cooperatives,
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comprising 50,000 members.114 FAT’s activities were visible, as it was also involved in 
several industrial disputes in the late 1960s and mid-1970s.
The most noteworthy dispute occurred at the Spicer autoparts factory in the state of Mexico 
in the summer of 1975. Spicer was Mexican-owned with three US nationals on its board of 
directors.113 This industrial action was representative of the grievances which were 
expressed during the labour insurgency. The Spicer dispute was also significant because it 
garnered a large amount of support. The main grievance which workers had was the lack of 
union independence and the authoritarian tactics and stranglehold of the charros. In protest, 
workers sought to make an alliance with the FAT’s first nation-wide union, the National 
Independent Union of Workers of the Iron and Steel Industry (Sindicato Independiente 
National de Trabajadores de la Industria de Hierro y Acero -  SINTIFIA).116 A strike 
began which lasted for 121 days. Throughout this time, workers staged marches, and 
gathered political and material support from 120 organisations throughout the country, from 
students and from people in the streets.117 On August 5, 1975, FAT organised a protest 
march of 5,000 in its strongest centres in Leon, Irapuato and Salamanca -  in order to 
support the strikers, FAT created the Popular Workers’ Front of Solidarity and raised 
funds.118
As a result of the broad support, the government was forced to reach a partial settlement of 
the strike after 39 days. However, when workers returned to the plant, Spicer fired 150 of 
the 800 workers. A work stoppage led to a lockout and occupation of the factory by 
government forces and hired workers. Eventually, workers were given the option to receive 
a buy out or to return to work without the FAT union. Although the government eventually 
gained the upper hand, it was facing dissent and worker unrest on several fronts. The FAT’s 
success in organising independent unions had not gone unnoticed by the PRI which was 
alarmed at the FAT’s success in organising automobile workers.119 By 1970, there were 
27,659 workers in the auto plants, most of which were located in central Mexico. The
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centre of reform movements was in the Nissan plant in Cuernavaca, Morelos where the 
FAT had been involved. The executive committee consisted of outsiders imposed by CTM
labour bureaucrats. In reaction to this, workers rebelled in November 1971 and in union
120elections, 98 per cent voted for the rank-and-file leader Raymundo Jaimes.
The activities of FAT were considered such a threat that President Echeverna created the 
Independent Workers Union (Union Obrem Independiente -  UOI) as a counterattack 
measure.121 Unions at DINA, GM and NISSAN broke with the CTM in 1973 and affiliated 
with the UOI -  in less than a decade, UOI gained control over four big autoworker unions 
and 80 per cent of the aviation industry’s unionised workers.122 It also claimed a 
membership of 150,000. ' UOI was successful in establishing ‘workers’ commissions’ 
(radical caucuses) in the rail, petroleum, metallurgy, steel, telephone and electrical workers’ 
unions.124 However, the UOI was not as militant as the other unions -  demands were 
largely restricted to issues within specific workplaces.123 Although the UOI’s organisational 
activities limited FAT’s expansion in various sectors, the latter’s considerable 
achievements were worrying for the PRI because FAT succeeded in challenging the 
corporatist subordination of labour to the state.126
Labour militancy alarmed the government and it responded with economic palliatives as a 
way of dealing with the crisis. When economic growth slowed in 1972, the state defused 
protests by expanding direct state employment and a variety of populist social programs.127 
Public sector employment increased by 60 per cent, and Echeverna decreed three wage 
increases in response to labour unrest -  the first two increases occurred in 1973 (18 per 
cent) and 1974 (17 per cent) and the third was a 25 per cent increase after the peso 
devaluation of 1976. Elaborate programs to subsidise purchase of consumer durables by 
workers and to provide staples at a subsidised price were also implemented to ward off
120 The above account is from La Botz, The Crisis of Mexican Labour, op.cit., pps.125-126.
121 Zapata, Francisco, ‘Book Review. Allies Across the Border: Mexico’s “Authentic Labour Front” and 
Global Solidarity’, Industrial Relations, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2001, p.629.
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unrest. In this way, the President sought to placate workers and to protect their 
purchasing power. ' Independent unions, however, had grown in strength and as a result, 
Echeverrfa eventually reversed his relatively tolerant policy and undertook to strengthen the 
official labour movement and destroy the independent unions.131
199
v) AUTOMOBILE WORKERS
In the automobile industry also there were significant challenges, particularly during the 
years of the labour insurgency. Mobilisation had important implications due to the very 
nature of the industry. Larger worker concentrations per firm increased their bargaining 
leverage and the ability to mobilise. For these reasons, mobilisation in this sector had an 
explosive potential. Unions in this sector had a history of independence and were some of 
the first to challenge the government’s control. In 1961, the Diesel Nacional (DINA), broke 
with the CTM and during the late 1960s and 1970s, several of the unions had strong 
internal opposition to corporatism. In 1972 and 1974, the Volkswagen and Nissan unions 
succeeded in breaking with the state-level CTM federations in Puebla and Morelos, 
respectively. The Ford and General Motors (GM) unions, while not achieving the same 
degree of independence, did both gain increased autonomy within their respective unions. 
By the early 1970s, six of the seven automobile workers’ unions evidenced strong internal 
opposition to the official system of labour control.1 ’2 Although GM and Ford were most 
affected by strike movements, none of the 10 major automobile manufacturing companies 
escaped strikes and other conflicts related to the struggle for union democracy. "
ibid., p.8 
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vi) MINING AND METALWORKERS
Reform movements to democratise unions occurred in the mining and metalworkers, the 
powerful National Union of Mining, Metallurgical and Similar Workers of the Mexican 
Republic (Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Minero-Metaliirgicos y Similares de la 
Repüblica Mexicana -  SNTMMSRM). The democratisation of the SNTMMSRM began in 
section 67, located at the Fundidora de Monterrey in 1972 -  other sections of the union 
followed in the next few years in Monclova (section 147) and Las Truchas (section 271) 
establishing a measure of autonomy and democracy within the framework of the national 
union.114 The movement for greater internal democracy in the SNTMMSRM gathered force 
with the emergence of the Maoist-influenced Proletarian Line (Linea Proletaria -  LP). 
Lmea Proletaria was committed to grassroots organisation, direct democracy and 
mobilisation around workplace demands.135 It proved most successful at placing shop-floor 
demands in a national political context -  LP emphasised organisation in the workplace as 
the central element in labour negotiations and it had an important role in the democratic 
struggles at the Altos Hornos de Mexico (AHMSA) and Las Truchas steel plants. ' When 
a rank-and-file protest broke out at AHMSA in 1975-76 over workers’ access to fringe 
benefits and profit sharing, Proletarian Line was able to win control over the local union.1 ’7
vii) TELEPHONE WORKERS
The movement for independent workers continued unabated, spreading to the Telephone 
Workers’ Union (Sindicato de Telefonistas de la Repüblica Mexicana -  STRM). The 
STRM was known for being relatively democratic and militant in the 1970s, regularly 
coming into direct conflict with the state. When the pro-government leader of the union, 
Salustio Salgado, renegotiated a contract on behalf of the workers for a low wage increase 
in April 1976, strikes began to break out. The strikes rapidly spread to over 40 cities in 
Mexico and within 48 hours, these strikes led to the partial or complete shutdown of the
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telephone exchange system. Workers demanded autonomy from government control, 
organising the Democratic Committee of the Telephone Workers, headed by Francisco 
Hernandez Juarez.139
In recognition of the strength of the rank-and-file strike, the government was forced to 
recognise the reform movement and permit elections for a leadership -  in the election that 
followed, Hernandez Juarez won the leadership by a large majority, 86 per cent to 10 per 
cent.140 The STRM seceded from the PRI and the democratic leadership emphasised the 
development of department-specific wage and work rule agreements.141 The Proletarian 
Line also became involved in the union -  it supported this strategy and advocated shop- 
level worker assemblies, permitting it to develop a broader support base among the rank- 
and-file.142
CONCLUSION
Although the PRI state had in place a series of political, institutional and material measures 
to ensure that independent unions could not function effectively, it could not contain the 
massive outbreak of discontent from the late 1960s onwards. When labour unrest was large 
and significant, the PRI’s hold over its constituencies was jeopardised. The threat of 
independent mobilisation was constant and real for the PRI throughout the decades of 
development, but during the insurgencia obrera between 1968 and 1976, it delivered a 
crushing blow to PRI authority. It presented a greater challenge, with the possibility of 
coordinated action among different working class sectors and solidarity movements, 
particularly in the context of more general political ferment and of the regime’s more 
fragile legitimacy.14' Labour was responsible for placing continuous and relentless pressure 
on the PRI for change.
139 The above account is from La Botz, The Crisis of Mexican Labour, op.cit., p.160.
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The labour insurgency was important because it severely weakened the structures of the 
PRI, allowing other pro-democracy forces to eventually drive it out. Between 1968 and 
1976, sharpened labour-capital conflicts produced among workers and the bourgeoisie a 
critical questioning of the traditional forms of state control.144 The PRI traditionally 
mediated conflicts between classes but after 1968, it could no longer easily control these 
forces -  important sectors of the bourgeoisie lost faith in the PRI and as a result, they 
closed ranks and backed the party which they felt was more facvourable to their economic 
interests.143 This participation was evident in the growth of the PAN -  a significant portion 
of the private sector deserted the PRI and threw their support behind the PAN, as discussed 
in chapter 2.
Working class activism initiated a debilitating crisis of the PRI state -  from the early 1970s 
onwards, its hegemony and legitimacy was contested by various social forces, particularly 
business. But labour did not form a political party which could vie for power. Besieged by 
economic crisis and austerity measures in the 1980s and 1990s, the working class was 
unable to challenge the PRI for presidential power. The consolidation of neo-liberal 
policies consistently placed the labour movement on the defensive. But despite government 
efforts to crackdown on the independent labour movement, it was still able to resist 
neoliberal economic policies such as privatisation throughout the 1990s.
This was particularly evident in the opposition to government-controlled unions and labour 
federations. In 1996, the PRI was confronted by a challenge -  more than 21 unions, 
including 10 from the CT, held a series of presentations which they referred to as the 
Forum: Unions Face the Nation, promoting a debate about a variety of issues of importance 
to labour.146 The debate about the role of unions in Mexico was strengthened by the 
creation of a new labour federation in November 1997 of the National Union of Workers 
(Union Nacional de Trabajadores -  UNT).147 The UNT was formed when the STRM and 7 
other unions pulled out of the CT and joined independent unions such as the FAT. Over 
the next several years, the UNT continued to put forward a program of democratic reform
144 Cockcroft, op.cit., p.253.
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in unions and workplaces.149 Such efforts were nonetheless unable to prevent the 
implementation of a neo-liberal economic and social program which significantly 
weakened the Mexican working class because of its onslaught on traditional labour rights. 
The result was that, after a split by a section of the old PRI to form the PRD in 1988, the 
PAN was the ultimate winner in 2000.
149 ibid.
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CHAPTER 4: THE BRAZILIAN TRANSITION
INTRODUCTION
Brazil experienced one of the longest periods of military dictatorship in Latin America 
during the mid-twentieth century. In 2002, one of the leading opponents of military rule -  
Luis Inacio ‘Lula’ da Silva -  became President. It was a formidable achievement for 
someone who began his political career as a trade unionist in the struggle to end 
authoritarian rule and reverse the historical exclusion of the subaltern classes from national 
politics. The overriding theme in Brazilian history is the elite fear of unrestricted popular 
mobilisation. Under the Old Republic (1889-1930), Getülio Vargas and the Estaclo Novo, 
and the military dictatorship, the masses were either excluded from democratic 
participation or incorporated through popuiist, corporatist or clientelist channels. During the 
democratic period of 1945-1964, labour and other movements in civil society experienced a 
resurgence. Despite relative freedom, they were still restrained through the party structure, 
populist measures and elitist control of the political system. Unlike the situation in Mexico, 
the popular sector was not included in the ruling alliance -  it never occupied the same 
position of importance. It was similar to Mexico, however, in that the maintenance of elite 
hegemony was crucial for stability. Whether it was the agrarian and merchant elite of the 
Old Republic, the industrialists of the democratic period, or the military during its 20 year 
rule, the underlying consensus amongst the shifting coalition which held power was to 
preclude any political role for the masses.
Successive governments, whether democratic or authoritarian were able to keep a lid on 
mass discontent until the late 1970s. Prior to this period, any protest movements which 
arose were swiftly repressed and dealt with. By the late 1970s, as a result of 
industrialisation and the economic ‘miracle’ between 1968-1974, the working class was 
larger, stronger, and more resistant to authoritarian rule. Protest was widespread and 
leading the way was the ‘new unionism’ (novo sindicalismo) which exploded onto the 
political scene in 1978. This occurred in conjunction with opposition from various elements 
in society, including, students, peasants, the middle class and even some parts of the private 
business sector. The balance between various class forces could no longer be maintained,
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the military dictatorship faced political opposition on several fronts. This situation was 
compounded by the economic crisis of the early 1980s.
Elite-led transitology argues that the transition to democracy in Brazil, beginning in the 
mid-1970s, was a natural process, emanating from within the ranks of the military. The 
implication is that it was an unfolding development which eventually culminated in the 
direct presidential elections of 1989. Although the importance of internal divisions within 
the military cannot be discounted as a factor in the ‘relaxation’ of political controls 
(distensäo), elite-led transitology fails to ascertain the massive impact that popular 
mobilisation had on the regime. Instead, the masses are grouped together (for the most 
part), as an homogenous actor -  ‘civil society’ -  which has a fleeting and brief role in the 
political space opened up by liberalisation and the transition.
Similarly to Mexico, liberalisation in Brazil was about enhancing the regime’s legitimacy 
rather than genuine democratisation. Electoral reforms to allow genuine party competition 
were enacted in order to counteract the government’s widespread unpopularity. Once 
popular pressure became intense, the military sought to negotiate its exit from power with 
moderate opposition elements, from a place of relative strength. The purpose behind such a 
strategy was to enable the military to dictate the terms under which Brazil would be 
transferred to a civilian government. The popular sector, particularly the labour movement, 
was responsible for the continuation of the political opening (abertura) through its 
relentless opposition.
EXCLUSION OF POPULAR CLASSES - THE OLD REPUBLIC (1889-1930)
The stability of Brazilian society has historically been predicated on the exclusion of 
popular forces. A large portion of the population lacked any political or social rights and 
the Old Republic (1889-1930) was characterised by extreme levels of inequality. Only a 
highly restricted and privileged section of Brazilians exercised voting powers in the early 
twentieth century. Even by 1930, the franchise was limited to all literate males, which
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amounted to just 3.5 per cent of the population.1 23To the extent that the masses played a role, 
it was an incidental one which was designed to maintain oligarchic control through the 
extensive network of regional ties. Regional elites had the capacity to sustain their positions 
in local and national politics due to the electoral support they maintained through 
clientelistic control of major portions of the rural sector." Within the regional states, politics 
remained a contest between clans, with each province having its own pyramid of power 
reaching down to the localities through a hierarchy of political bosses known as coroneis, 
or colonels.' In exchange for jobs and funds, the rural poor voted to elect officials favoured 
by the local coroneis.4 The political power of governors resided in the system of patronage 
based in the countryside.
Under the Old Republic, power was decentralised and the federal presidency was a matter 
of mutual agreement between the economically dominant states. Most of Brazil’s regions, 
particularly the poorer ones, had virtually no voice in federal politics. The presidency 
alternated between the two wealthiest and most populous states, Säo Paulo and Minas 
Gerais and occasionally, Rio Grande do Sul. This -  the ‘politics of the governors’ -  
concentrated political power in the hands of a select few. The Brazilian economy during the 
Old Republic was centred on the export of coffee, which was dominated by the wealthier 
states of Säo Paulo (coffee) and Minas Gerais (cattle): the cafe com leite alliance (‘coffee 
with milk’). Coffee’s share in exports rose from 56 per cent in 1919 to over 75 per cent in 
1924.5 Behind the ‘politics of the governors’ was fear of mobilisation and consequently, 
disruption of the status quo.
1 Montero, Alfred P., ‘Brazil’, in Joseph, William A., Mark Kesselman and Joel Krieger (eds), Introduction to 
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STATE FEAR OF LABOUR MILITANCY RESULTS IN A WEAKENED & DEPENDENT 
LABOUR MOVEMENT (1900-1930)
Despite repression directed against the labour movement, it was successful in rocking the 
foundations of this carefully crafted stability. From the 1890s onwards, anarchism and 
anarcho-syndicalism were the dominant ideologies of organised labour in the Labour 
Federation of Rio de Janeiro (Federagdo Operdria do Rio de Janeiro -  FORJ) and Säo 
Paulo Labour Federation (Federagdo Operdria de Säo Paulo).6 Anarchist ideas derived 
from Spanish, Italian and Portuguese immigrants who came to Brazil to work on the Säo 
Paulo coffee plantations -  an unforeseen consequence of a government policy to recruit 
labourers during a time when the economy was expanding due to coffee exports.
In the first city-wide general strike in Rio de Janeiro in 1903, worker demands included a 
pay increase and a shorter workday.7 The strike spread to other trades until the number of
o
strikers was 40,000 -  paralysing Rio for 20 days. Strikes continued in Säo Paulo in 1906 
and 1907 -  followed by brutal repression.9 Despite this, the first Brazilian workers’ 
congress met in 1906, with 28 organisations from various parts of the country represented 
with delegates voting to form a national organisation, the Brazilian Labour Confederation 
(Confederagdo Operdria Brasileira -  COB).10 Although there were state attempts to create 
government-sponsored trade unions in order to undermine the influence of the militants, the 
predominant way of dealing with labour remained repression.
One method was removing the leadership through deportation. Particularly in Säo Paulo, 
immigrants were a majority of the workers and there were at least 550 deportations by 
1921.11 The Säo Paulo general strike in July 1917 marked the high point of labour activism. 
What began as a work stoppage for higher wages at a large textile factory soon spread to 
other firms, with 45,000 on strike. " Workers organised a Comite de Defesa Proletdria
6 Greenfield, Gerald Michael, ‘Brazil’, in Greenfield and Maram, op.cit., p.73.
7 Hall, Michael M. and Hobart J. Spalding Jr., ‘The Urban Working Class and Early Latin American Labour 
Movements, 1880-1930’, in Bethell, Leslie (ed), The Cambridge History of Latin America, c.1870 to 1930, 
Vol. IV, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, p.348.
x ibid.
9 ibid.
10 ibid., p.349.
11 ibid., pps.331-332.
12 ibid., p.356.
82
(CDP), largely composed of anarcho-syndicalists, who devised a broad list of demands.13 
The CDP won a 20 per cent pay increase and this was followed by an upsurge in labour 
organisation.14 A wave of strikes elsewhere in Sao Paulo and in Rio de Janeiro continued 
until 1919. Once again, however, labour militancy was crushed by state repression with the 
support of industrialists.
The 1920s was characterised by intensive efforts to purge the labour movement of its 
radical elements and bring the remainder under state control.15 Radical unions were closed, 
with arrests and deportations. Some moderate unions were spared and efforts were made to 
establish pro-government unions. The labour movement lost its most able militants through 
deportation, and there were growing internal divisions over strategy and tactics which left 
the movement in considerable disarray.16 The result was a significant decline in the 
influence of anarchism. In the late 1920s, there was a slight revitalisation of the labour 
movement under communist influence. The Communist Party (Partido Comunista do 
Brazil -  PCB) was formed in 1922, establishing itself in Rio de Janeiro unions and in 1926, 
it organised an electoral front the Bloco Operärio e Compones (BOC).17 It also managed to 
secure some minor electoral posts. Although the labour movement was still weak in 1930, 
militancy caused concern among industrialists and the military. It would not be long before 
the emergence of a restructured ruling coalition would find an institutional and long-term 
solution for taming an unruly labour movement.
CRISIS OF THE OLD SYSTEM -  THE ‘REVOLUTION ' OF 1930
The construction of a new order which would incorporate labour in a new framework was 
the 1930 revolution, a juncture in Brazilian history. An external event precipitated the 
revolution -  the Great Depression, which slashed Brazil’s export earnings. Value of exports 
fell from US $445.9 million in 1929 to US $180.6 million in 1932.18 In 1931, the price of 
coffee was at one-third of the average price in the years 1925-29 and Brazil’s terms of trade
14 ibid.
15 Greenfield, ‘Brazil’, in Greenfield and Maram, op.cit., p.74.
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fell by 50 per cent.10 Those rural elites whose economic dominance was centred on coffee 
exports were badly affected. The crisis in the economy acted as a trigger for change.
In addition, many were left dissatisfied with the exclusionary nature of the Old Republic. A 
combination of various class forces sought to replace the old structure with a government 
which would accommodate their interests. Leading the way was Getülio Vargas, a wealthy 
cattle ranch owner from Rio Grande do Sul. Vargas had support from sectors of society 
who sought change, including regional elites who had been excluded from the ‘politics of 
the governors’, the new urban middle class, industrialists and sectors of the military -  the 
tenentes, known as young lieutenants. The tenente movement began in Rio when idealistic 
army cadets and officers revolted against the government which they accused of political 
corruption and misuse of the army.20 They were inspired by reformist and nationalist ideals. 
A considerable sector of the army was also dissatisfied with a system which devoted so 
much of the nation’s wealth to shoring up an export trade dominated by one state and its 
foreign business partners.21 Large landowners excluded from political power and the cafe 
com leite alliance, particularly heavily populated states such as Rio Grande do Sul and Rio 
de Janeiro, resented the dominance of Säo Paulo and Minas Gerais. Within Säo Paulo, 
urban-centred industrialists were also unhappy with the disproportionate amount of 
resources which the state heaped on the coffee exporters.
Vargas tapped into the accumulated frustration of all these sectors of Brazilian society in 
order to lead the coup which would place him in power. A crisis in the presidential 
succession was the short-term cause of the 1930 coup. The Old Republic was based on a 
consensus among political elites that the presidency would alternate between Säo Paulo and 
Minas Gerais. Instead of nominating a candidate from Säo Paulo or Minas Gerais, outgoing 
president Washington Luis nominated his official successor from Rio Grande do Sul. 
Vargas used this opportunity to launch his coup on 3 November 1930 and reorganise 
Brazil’s political and economic structures.
19 ibid.
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THE ‘REVOLUTION '  OF 1930 & THE REALIGNMENT OF CLASS FORCES
The 1930 revolution was vital to the construction of a state able to manage discontent 
amongst the popular classes. Dependence on a rural oligarchy -  and indeed, only a 
fragment of it -  was the main weakness of the Old Republic. This rendered it unable to 
absorb the new social groups spawned by early industrial development.22 It was hostile to 
the emergence of mass-based political parties and to the effective representation of both 
urban middle class and working class interests. ~ While the working class was an additional 
source of opposition and pressure for change, it was not directly a part of the new coalition 
that eventually came to power.24 Rather, fear of the growth and radicalisation of the 
working class was one of the concerns shared by the groups pushing for change. '
However, Brazil’s revolution of 1930 did not completely destroy the foundations of the Old 
Republic. Although elements of the rural elite which had dominated state power were 
weakened, they were not completely displaced in the aftermath of the revolution -  the 
countryside remained largely untouched. This meant that the rural oligarchy was still able 
to protect its interests. The intimate link between economic and political power was not 
severed with Vargas’ assumption of power. New forces entered politics and all were in total 
agreement regarding the continued exclusion of the masses. A very broad and 
heterogeneous political coalition emerged under the new regime.26 It was based around a 
number of conflicting interests, including rural elites, industrialists, the military and to a 
lesser extent, the new urban middle class.
Vargas had not relied on the working class for support in coming to power. Therefore, there 
was not the same urgent need to pacify labour in the same way as Mexico, where workers 
had fought on various sides in return for concessions and favourable government policy. In 
Mexico, the popular sectors were viewed as crucial political resources that could be
22 Cammack, Paul, ‘Brazil: The Long March to the New Republic’, New Left Review, No. 190, November- 
December 1991, p.27.
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mobilised by the state. The PRI served to direct mass participation in politics, while in 
Brazil there was no comparable party which could manipulate the labour movement in a 
similar way. In order to prevent the militancy evidenced during the Old Republic, the 
government set out to create a dependent and passive working class. The strikes and 
mobilisation of the period after World War I had left the regime with an important lesson 
regarding working class agitation. In the period after the 1930 revolution, unions were 
prevented from consolidating an effective independent position. The main goal was to 
create a legalised and institutionalised labour movement that was depoliticised, controlled 
and penetrated by the state. Vargas set out to tame the labour movement and purge it of its 
radical elements.
VARGAS & THE ESTADO NOVO
In order to appease the urban industrialists which had backed his 1930 coup, Vargas sought 
to deepen Brazil’s industrial base and curb the country’s dependence on coffee exports. The 
first systematic state-sponsored industrialisation emerged with the creation of new 
bureaucratic structures and public firms, in particular, the national oil company Petrobräs.' 
To further his economic objectives, Vargas carried out a program of centralisation whereby 
power was transferred from the states to the federal government and policy-making became 
the domain of the executive.
After 1930, the Brazilian state began a policy of ISI. This included targeting capital- 
intensive heavy industry. Vargas was also responsible for the creation of a number of large- 
scale infrastructural projects and public works.31 Industries were established for iron and 
steel production and Brazil’s first integrated steel mill was opened at Volta Redonda in 
1943, the National Steel Company. Public enterprises were set up in railroads and shipping 
as well as steel. Coffee, tea and sugar were subject to the supervision of federal agencies.'2
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Brazil’s reliance on earnings from coffee exports was detrimental because it made the 
country subject to the vagaries of the world market. So a policy of diversification was 
adopted, whereby investment funds were substantially withdrawn from coffee production 
and instead directed into industry with concomitant policies of exchange controls, tariffs 
and credits to stimulate non-coffee based exports.”
The industrialisation drive coincided with a strengthening in Vargas’ power at the executive 
level. In the political sphere, state governors were replaced with ‘interventors’ 
(interventores) -  governors who directly reported to the president. Their job was to 
reorganise the political structure within states in order to establish a system of patronage in 
support of Vargas.34 Industrialisation required a work force which would comply with the 
government’s developmental objectives. The state’s reach in labour relations was more 
extensive and invasive than in Mexico. Stringent controls over the working class reflected a 
profound fear of labour’s potential for disturbing the status quo. However, initially Vargas 
allowed unions to function. In November 1930, the Ministry of Labour was established by 
decree and unions were legally recognised. But when strikes and labour activity emerged, 
Vargas moved quickly to reinstate tighter controls over the unions. The 1934 constitution 
declared strikes to be illegal and unions were placed under police supervision."
In repressing autonomous unionism, Vargas received the support of urban industrialists 
who favoured a policy of industrialisation with limited worker disruption. Moreover, key 
sectors of the military also agreed with tightening controls over labour in order to limit 
dissent. Industrialists and the military profited from the shift in economic strategy -  
industry received state protection and subsidies, while the construction of large, modern 
defence-related industries -  particularly steel and armaments -  was well-received by senior 
military officials. It was an astute move to maintain the support of two powerful groups. 
Sectors of the middle class also benefited from economic growth with an expansion of 
employment in the public sector. Vargas therefore, was able to skillfully balance the varied 
civilian and military interests that made up the broad ruling coalition which sustained his 
rule until 1945.
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Provision of welfare benefits served to maintain a level of labour docility in the face of 
extensive state control. Legislation stipulated a minimum wage, 48-hour maximum work 
week, paid vacations, workers’ compensation, guaranteed severance pay, maternity leave 
and pension funds. In 1933, the administration created a new social insurance institution, 
the Retirement and Pension Institute (Institute) de Aposentadoria e Pensöes -  IAP) which 
was to provide a wider range of social services including health care and housing loans, but 
it remained under the supervision of the Ministry of Labour.
Addressing economic and social inequalities through the welfare function of unions was an 
important feature of the state’s attempts to deal with the ‘social question’. The government 
was concerned with how to handle the radicalisation or potential radicalisation of the 
working class and how to respond to the emergence of the working class as an economic 
and potentially a political actor. ’8 The policy of the state was to implement a concept of 
‘social peace and harmony’ based upon direct ‘state mediation’.39 Reducing the union to an 
institution of social assistance was a crucial way in which the state sought to prevent class 
conflict. For the unions, it meant loss of independence and the ability to carry out 
autonomous action.
In order to consolidate his power, Vargas sought to find a way to circumvent the 1934 
constitution, which elected him to the presidency for a four-year term. The opportunity 
arose in 1937 when the pretext of a communist plot was used to suspend the constitution. A 
new constitution was engineered, which gave Vargas virtually unlimited powers and 
established a dictatorship known as the Estado Novo (New State) in 1937 which lasted until 
1945. Providing an ongoing solution for the problem of how to control a restless working 
class, the Estado Novo was responsible for continuing the subordination of the masses, 
particularly the labour movement.
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Any possibility of independent labour unionism was thoroughly quashed with the creation 
of the Estado Novo. A new labour policy was formulated -  working class activity was to be 
controlled through an elaborate bureaucratic-corporatist system. The Ministry of Labour’s 
duties were broadened to include firm controls over union finances, primarily through the 
impösto sindiccil, the union tax. One day’s wages per year were deducted automatically 
from each worker’s pay.40 As the most important structure of Vargas’ corporatism, the 
Ministry of Labour also decided what percentage of the funds went back to the union and 
could choose to stop funding a union for failing to comply with labour laws.41 Funds were 
largely used to supply workers with welfare assistance -  however, the tax had another more 
important purpose. It served to depoliticise labour because unions came to be seen by their 
members as providers of social security benefits rather than as instruments of collective 
bargaining.42 Provision of benefits to the working class was geared towards cultivating 
Vargas’ paternalistic image as ‘father of the people’ (o pai do povo). The state’s minimal 
social assistance was intended to demonstrate that Vargas’ brand of authoritarian- 
corporatism genuinely protected worker interests. In reality however, the labour movement 
was a bureaucratic appendage of the state.
Placed under the supervision of the Ministry of Labour, labour was tied to the government 
-  it became a bureaucratic instrument of the regime. As part of the state apparatus under the 
Estado Novo, the working class did not have any substantial influence over the direction of 
government policy. It was co-opted (cooptagäo) into a structure where its interests were 
controlled and mediated through a combination of legal and institutional measures. As a 
result, labour occupied a subordinate position. Independent unionism was strictly 
prohibited and any attempt to organise outside of official channels was swiftly crushed. It 
was a system of corporatist labour relations that had one of the lowest levels of union 
autonomy in Latin America.41
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Rather than providing institutional room for expression of labour demands and collective 
bargaining, the labour movement was restricted through corporatism. The Ministry of 
Labour exercised extensive powers over union affairs. In order for unions to be legal, they 
had to have government recognition. Elections were also closely monitored -  under 
Decree-Law no. 1402, passed on 5 July 1939, they could be cancelled and their leaders 
removed by the Ministry of Labour. Vargas sought to place all relations between labour and 
capital in the context of state administrative structures.44 Unions were prevented from 
participating in politics and providing support to political parties. The 1943 code, known as 
the Consolidated Labour Laws, or Consolidagäo das Lets do Trabalho (CLT), prohibited 
the formation of unions at the state or national level. Unions were only allowed to organise 
by plant and industry on a local basis -  just one was permitted in each plant under the 
scrutiny of the Labour Ministry.4^  Rather than constituting a challenge to state power or a 
source for conflict and disorder, labour became a functional group in the corporatist state 46 
Basic issues such as wages, hours, conditions and social welfare benefits became legislative 
matters and they were settled within the government structure.47 Organised labour became 
wholly dependent on the state.
Industrial disputes were mediated through a set of tripartite institutions, with 
representatives of the employers, the union leadership and the state sitting on key 
commissions and in labour courts -  most disputes were settled in the complex labour court 
system rather the workplace.48 Shop-floor grievances were channeled into the vast 
bureaucracy where conciliation and arbitration procedures were insulated from the 
immediate demands of the rank-and-file.49 Independent organisation within the official 
unions was virtually non-existent. In pushing for improvements or changes in the 
workplace, unions were forced to negotiate via the federal government -  production was 
not to be disrupted.
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Union leadership in Brazil was crucial in maintaining labour subservience. As a result of 
the controls the government had over leadership candidates and their removal, the 
leadership was conservative, serving to defuse mobilisation of the rank-and-file. Union 
leaders were referred to as pelegos, a derogatory term which describes the blanket that sits 
between the horse and the saddle, describing co-opted labour leaders as a device that makes 
it more comfortable for a rider (government, industry) to ride the horse (workers).30 Rather 
than represent workers, leaders were representatives of employers or the government. 
Pelegos served a dual purpose -  to maintain labour passivity, while developing a mass base 
of support for the regime.31
The weakness of the labour movement in Brazil was compounded by the lack of political 
parties to represent and articulate working class interests -  labour unions were not linked to 
any national party. The PCB was in no position to do so as a result of state persecution. 
Unlike Cardenas in Mexico, Vargas did not rely on active popular support, on the contrary, 
a fundamental aim of his labour policy was to divorce or isolate unions from political 
parties and from political activities.32 In marked contrast to Mexico, Brazilian state-labour 
relations involved little or no political mobilisation of the working class, but rather 
emphasised its demobilisation.V1 Faced with such restrictions, labour was unable to 
successfully mount an independent challenge to state authority. Popular participation and 
the negative implications which this represented for the ruling coalition once again came to 
confront Brazil’s dominant economic and political interests in the democratic period 
between 1945 and 1964.
CONTINUING THE MECHANISMS OF CONTROL: BACKGROUND TO THE 
DEMOCRATIC PERIOD
Serious challenges faced Vargas and the political elite during the final years of the Estado 
Novo (1943-1945). In the last stages of World War II, it became apparent that Vargas’
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brand of authoritarianism was at odds with the approaching demise of fascism in Europe. 
International pressure to democratise the political system (particularly from the United 
States) and demands from Brazilians to hold elections could not be ignored. High-ranking 
military officers also anticipated that the Estado Novo would not be able to survive the war. 
The dilemma now facing the political elite was how to maintain control of the labour 
movement and popular classes under a democracy.
Calling for elections in late 1945, Vargas promised that an authoritarian Brazil would soon 
be a thing of the past. The political elite however, had other reasons for supporting the 
move towards democracy. By granting democratic rights peacefully, they sought to use the 
resources of the state under their control to maintain the structure of power even after 
formal democratic institutions had been introduced.54 In 1943, Vargas began to make 
overtures to the working class in anticipation of future elections. The corporatist union 
structure established under the Estado Novo gave Vargas a vast patronage instrument for 
converting potential opponents into political clients.55
Predicting that he would need a new basis of support under democracy, Vargas appealed to 
the working class through trabalhismo. Comprising a large part of the urban electorate, this 
was a political strategy designed to attract the labour vote. In numerous speeches, Vargas 
emphasised the dignity of labour and the contributions which workers made to national 
development, while also contrasting the neglect of the working class by previous 
governments with the concern shown by the Estado Novo.56 Such speeches highlight the 
essence of trabalhismo -  it was intended to reinforce Vargas’ paternalistic image as a 
benevolent leader -  at the same time stressing the positive contributions made by labour to 
Brazilian development.
Trabalhismo was extremely worrying for the military who viewed it as a threatening 
expression of populism. Vargas talked about “readjusting” political structures and referred 
to the organised working class as an important element “for national representation” in
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speeches."’7 He also made several concessions to labour. Strikes were tolerated, dissidents 
were allowed to run in union elections (and in some cases were victorious) and wage 
increases were permitted.58 In April 1945, the PCB secured the right to organise freely and 
communist leaders were released from jail.59 These concessions, along with direct appeals 
to the working class, led the military to believe that Vargas might seek to keep himself in 
power without their support. They were also uneasy about the radical changes in the status 
quo which Vargas’ speeches seemed to imply. As a result, he was forced from office by the 
military in October 1945 and democratic elections were held in December of the same year, 
ending 15 years of Vargas in power. Military fears about trabalhismo however, were 
unfounded. Although it appeared to encourage an active role for the working class in 
national politics, it merely sought to manipulate the interests of labour without providing 
any real changes in the corporatist system. As a way of keeping the working class in line 
with government objectives, populism became an important characteristic of the democratic 
period.
In the lead-up to the December 1945 elections, the political elite used the resources of the 
expanded state to forge the broad electoral coalition that would allow it to perpetuate its 
power in the future regime.60 Before leaving office, Vargas recruited officials from the 
Ministry of Labour and union bureaucrats to establish the Brazilian Labour Party (Partido 
Trabalhista Brasileiro -  PTB) as a vehicle to mobilise labour support/’1 Drawing on the 
official labour movement, it claimed to represent working class interests. However, the 
PTB was not a rank-and-file workers’ party -  its members included bureaucrats, civil 
servants and wealthy landowners -  those who were interested in maintaining the 
established order. It pre-empted the formation of a more genuine and autonomous working 
class party.62 Lacking any historic or revolutionary roots, the PTB was organised by the 
state to garner support from urban labour for the ruling coalition.
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Another party was formed by Brazil’s political elite -  the Social Democratic Party (Partido 
Social Democratico -  PSD). It was essentially conservative, made up of Old Republic 
political bosses and Estado Novo interventores, 63 Landowners, bureaucrats, bankers and 
industrialists who had benefited from Vargas’ state-led industrialisation project also joined 
the ranks of the PSD.64 Numerically larger, the PSD had a more extensive territorial reach 
as a result of its clientelistic ties to the countryside.65 Incorporating the countryside into 
national politics under the control and leadership of the rural bourgeoisie, the PSD provided 
a massive and conservative counterweight to the PTB.66 Those who were opposed to 
Vargas formed the National Democratic Union (Uniäo Democrätica Nacional -  UDN) 
which was the opposition party during the democratic period. It was made up of a broad 
range of opponents to Vargas’ Estado Novo, but it became a moderate and conservative 
party which had the most support from the liberal professionals and intellectuals of the 
urban centres.67
Forming an electoral front, the PTB and PSD upheld the status quo and prevented the 
popular classes, particularly the labour movement from having an authentic voice in 
national politics. By bringing these two groups together, the political elite of the old regime 
forged the broad class coalition underlying the electoral alliance between the PSD and the 
PTB, which would dominate the democratic period. It was an exercise in electoral 
engineering designed to maintain the consensus created in the aftermath of the 1930 
revolution. However, it was not a unified partnership -  varied class interests within both 
parties presented serious challenges for each president. Forced to negotiate their way 
amongst different factions, the autonomy of the presidency during this period was 
restricted. Nonetheless, the elite agreement which had characterised the Old Republic and 
Estado Novo still remained -  the labour movement had to be controlled.
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THE DEMOCRATIC PERIOD (1946-1964): A NEW ERA FOR LABOUR OR NEW  
METHODS OF CONTROL?
The labour movement’s hope that democratic elections signaled a new era for working 
class organisation was quickly dispelled. General Eurico Dutra (1946-1950) wasted little 
time in demonstrating that Brazil’s corporatist structure would not be dismantled. Serving 
as War Minister under the Estado Novo, the military regarded Dutra as an acceptable 
choice for president. As the PSD candidate, Dutra headed a conservative government which 
sought to provide economic and political stability. Even before a new constitution was 
passed in September 1946, Decree-Law 9070 significantly curtailed the right to strike and 
the Ministry of Labour exercised its powers to intervene in union affairs.69 Endorsing a 
hard-line policy toward independent unionism, the 1946 constitution envisaged an 
ultimately pliable trade union movement rather than an organisation of and for the working 
class which could offer effective challenge to the government and substantially modify the 
balance of political power.70 The anti-communist climate of the Cold War resulted in a 
crackdown on leftist organisations -  the PCB was banned in May 1947 and communists 
were removed from elected office. Moreover in 1949, 234 unions suffered intervention by 
the Ministry of Labour.71 There was no mistaking the fact that Dutra’s administration 
represented a setback for the working class.
Vargas reappeared on the political scene when he won the 1950 elections and returned to 
the presidency for another term on a combined PSD and PTB ticket. His campaign was 
characterised by populist appeals to urban workers. Vargas used his connection to the PTB 
to emphasise his own record on labour relations and his commitment to improving the lot 
of the working class, describing the party as the ‘political arm of the people’ ( ‘a arma 
politico do povo’)-12 This was an important aspect in Vargas’ strategy to consolidate a new 
coalition of forces constructed around labour support to carry out a policy of nationalist 
development.73 It required the active collaboration of the more radical politicians and
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labour leaders within the PTB and the corporatist system.74 He sought to capitalise on the 
labour relations structure he had created under the Estado Novo and generate a solid basis 
of support from that structure. In exchange for their support, Vargas relaxed the control of 
the Ministry of Labour over the unions -  labour laws were not strictly applied, inter-union 
bodies were formed and the frequency of strikes increased.75 The ideological test that had 
been a requisite for union leadership and which had excluded communists from leadership 
positions within the unions was also repealed.76 Although the PCB was still banned, it 
started to organise again in the unions. These factors increased the influence of the left in 
the official unions and weakened pelego control.
Vargas however, faced massive obstacles -  he had to adopt a development strategy which 
would not alienate powerful class interests. It was extremely difficult to reconcile his 
nationalist and populist rhetoric with an economy that was experiencing high levels of 
inflation and deb t/7 The rapid industrialisation favoured by nationalists required huge 
levels of investment which the state could only finance with foreign capital -  of which the 
nationalists were strongly against -  or by printing money which caused even higher 
inflation and played havoc with economic planning and industrial relations.78 In particular, 
the military disapproved of the fact that Vargas appeared to tolerate the increase in 
communist organisation and some of the more militant labour activity.
So for the rest of his term, Vargas performed a juggling act similar to his previous 15 years 
of rule. Placating different elements was a difficult task and by early 1954, the tensions 
were evident. Vargas’ attempts to bring inflation down while trying to pacify the working 
class with wage increases brought him into conflict with the left and the right. Seeking to 
build his own basis of support from within the official labour movement, labour minister 
Joäo Goulart pressed for wage increases. This however, clashed with anti-inflation 
measures and Goulart was dismissed. The unions criticised this move and at a workers’ 
rally on 1 May, 1954, Vargas unexpectedly announced that the minimum wage would be
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doubled.74 He was now attacked by industrialists for catering to the left and for 
irresponsibility in handling the economy.80 Fearful of the economic and political instability 
which Vargas’ populist measures were generating, the military gave Vargas an ultimatum 
of either resigning, or being forced from office. Instead, Vargas chose suicide on 24 
August, 1954. The foundations of his rule were tenuous because his power did not reside in 
any one particular class, although he had tried to cultivate a solid foundation from the 
labour movement. Rather, his strength was in his ability to balance the diverse interests -  
when this failed him, Vargas chose to end his life.
Many of Vargas’ policies toward the labour movement were continued by Juscelino 
Kubitschek (1956-1961) who also came to power with the backing of the PSD and PTB. By 
combining nationalism and economic development throughout his term as President, 
Kubitschek received sufficient popular support to ward off any serious challenges from 
either civilian or military dissidents. He promised ‘fifty years of development in five’ 
with the expansion of Brazil’s infrastructure and the provision of incentives to encourage 
foreign and domestic investment in newly created and expanding industries. One of the 
cornerstones of Kubitschek’s development program was the construction of a new capital 
city, Brasilia, 600 miles north-west of Rio de Janeiro in the sparsely populated state of 
Goiäs. It was an administration that achieved a large degree of legitimacy by combining 
political stability with a relatively high rate of economic growth.83
Worker activation and protest grew during the Kubitschek presidency. In the first years of 
his presidency, unions were allowed to function without being harassed, collective 
bargaining was permitted and there were very few interventions. Kubitschek’s 
development was carried out despite mounting inflation which negatively affected working 
class wages. In July 1956, Kubitschek sought to alleviate the pressure with an increase in 
the minimum wage.85 Protest and mobilisation reached new heights in 1958 as the rise in 
inflation substantially eroded wage increases, culminating in a wave of unrest and
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violence.86 The government response in December 1958 was an increase of 58 per cent in 
the minimum wage and a rise of 30 per cent in the salaries of civil servants and the 
military. Once again, mounting inflation wiped out the new adjustment and strike activity 
and protests escalated. By June 1959, in anticipation of the upcoming presidential election 
in 1960, Kubitschek abandoned plans to implement a stabilisation program in the face of 
labour protest. Throughout 1959, the state of Sao Paulo experienced 954 strikes and in 
December, dissent and social upheaval spread to cities throughout Brazil.90
Under Kubitschek, radical and leftist tendencies within the official unions continued to 
grow. Rather than being seen as a barrier, many on the left changed tactics and began to 
view corporatism as a valuable source of political influence that could be used to put 
pressure on the government.91 This opportunity arose in a revised social security law -  it 
gave labour leaders one-third of the seats on the governing councils of social security 
agencies, including the IAP.9“ The councils themselves enjoyed considerable autonomy, so 
membership expanded labour leaders’ possibilities for autonomous action.93 Such councils 
increased the possibilities for patronage.94 Leaders sought to use “traditional means for a 
radical end”.95
Autonomous union organisations which had increased also began to form in a relatively 
freer environment. The most important were those associated with the PCB, such as the 
Permanent Committee for Trade Union Organisations (Comite Permanente das 
Organizagöes Sindicais -  CPOS) and the Pact for Unity and Action (Pacto de Unidade e 
Agäo -  PUA) which later became the General Workers Command (Comando Geral dos 
Trabalhadores -  CGT).96 These organisations were responsible for linking unions and 
worker demands throughout Brazil. The emergence of these groups seemed to point to a
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break in the whole structure of government-controlled unions and the corporatist system of 
the Estado Novo?1
When serious labour conflict threatened undisputed government control over the unions 
however, the situation changed. The degree of freedom granted to labour was qualified -  it 
was a government which continued to stress control over the masses.98 Kubitschek 
responded to the rising tide of labour protest and strikes at the end of the decade with 
charges of subversion and cracked down on the labour movement through the arrest of 
union leaders and police occupation of and intervention of unions.99 The state attempted to 
prevent the PCB from gaining control over unions, moving forcefully in 1960 against a 
leftist-inspired rail and maritime strike.100 So even though labour was allowed to function, 
when protest appeared to threaten established interests, the government responded with 
tough measures. There was very little change in the legal framework in a direction that 
fundamentally favoured workers or altered the basic, restrictive labour laws.101 Key 
elements which maintained government regulation over union matters, such as the union 
tax (imposto sindical) still remained in place.
By the early 1960s, organised labour had experienced dramatic changes. Economic growth 
and industrialisation had increased the number of unionised workers and electoral 
competition afforded the labour movement an opening in which to organise and strike.102 A 
number of radical labour leaders gained leadership positions in the official unions and 
occupied important posts in the bureaucracy. It was unclear whether the next president 
would permit the left to continue to mobilise or whether there would be a crackdown on 
labour activity. The first four years of the decade would demonstrate the limits of Brazilian 
democracy
Elected in January 1961, Jänio Quadros resigned after only seven months in office. He was 
succeeded by the PTB vice president, Joäo Goulart (1961-1964). As Labour Minister under 
Vargas, Goulart’s populist style and his association with the left-wing of the PTB led the
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military, the centre and many in the centre-right to view him with suspicion. The army high 
command (in conjunction with conservative politicians) sought to restrict Goulart’s power. 
He assumed the presidency once a compromise was devised which obliged him to share 
power with a prime minister and a cabinet that would be collectively responsible to 
Congress.10' But a plebiscite restored his full presidential powers in January 1963 and 
military and conservative efforts to prevent Goulart from upsetting the status quo proved to 
be in vain.
Lacking a strong support base in any one class, Goulart turned to the left and the labour 
movement to strengthen his mandate. As a result, labour mobilisation reached an 
unprecedented level under Goulart. For the first time, it encountered an environment which 
allowed independent worker organisations to flourish. This led to an increase in the level of 
labour activity and strikes -  in 1962 there were 148 strikes, while in 1963, there were 
172. ” Radical labour leaders displaced pelegos in the official labour structure and were 
instrumental in coordinating and leading strikes.105 Goulart’s administration witnessed a 
prominent role for radical labour leaders, many of whom were allowed to establish control 
over Brazil’s most important union organisations, including the single largest national 
confederation, the National Confederation of Industrial Workers (Confederaqao National 
dos Trabalhadores na Indüstria -  CNTI). These union leaders also became executive 
directors of some of the largest state-administered social welfare agencies.106
Mobilisation of the labour movement however, had serious consequences. It frightened the 
middle and upper classes, greatly narrowing Goulart’s base of support within these groups 
-  the alienation of such support meant, in turn, that the president was increasingly 
dependent on the mobilisation of workers to carry out his reform program.107 But he still 
sought to balance between classes -  an example of this was the Dantas-Furtado Plan.
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Goulart’ s economic program called for anti-inflation measures such as stringent wage 
controls and cuts in credit and public spending.108 Deflationary policies were balanced by a 
series of structural reforms designed to redistribute wealth.100 Goulart sought to redistribute 
land to peasants, increase income tax on high earners and extend voting rights to illiterates 
so as to undermine the oligarchic rural machines which controlled the electoral system in 
the countryside.110 The Plan however, antagonised both the left and the right -  labour 
criticised wage controls and the right were alarmed at the progressive elements.111 Lacking 
sufficient support, the President was unable to carry through the Plan in Congress and it 
was discarded.
Failing to balance successfully the different class interests, Goulart was forced to turn to the 
radical left in order to blunt the challenges from the right -  in particular, the army high 
command was becoming increasingly vociferous in its opposition to Goulart. Nevertheless, 
he continued to add fuel to the flames by adopting leftist rhetoric and threatening to 
mobilise the labour movement to carry out a left-wing coup. This shift to the left however, 
was a desperate act -  it was meant to demonstrate to the right that Goulart’ s support was 
strong and that workers were prepared to defend the president against any attempts to 
displace him from power. The reality however, was that the threat posed by Goulart to 
capital was more rhetorical than real. Adding to this mix were serious economic woes -  
high inflation, combined with a worsening recession, led to a situation where domestic and 
foreign capitalists withheld investment. Economic crisis, in conjunction with political 
polarisation and the president’s identification with the radical left, alarmed segments o f the 
middle class, industrialists and most importantly, the military. Throughout February and 
March 1964, Goulart held mass rallies. On 13 March in Rio de Janeiro, he signed a series of 
decrees nationalising the oil industry and expropriating large estates.113 A few days later, he 
presented Congress with a series of reformist bills which included the granting of the right 
to vote to enlisted men and the legalisation o f the Communist Party.114 Goulart’ s critics
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were convinced that the creation of a ‘republica sindicalista’ (trade union state) was 
imminent.115
The military responded with a coup on 1 April, 1964 which overthrew two decades of 
democratic government. Because of the need to restrict popular mobilisation, the ruling 
elite in Brazil had never organised genuine channels for the legitimate expression of 
dissent. This meant that when extensive mobilisation occurred under Goulart’s presidency, 
it threatened the status quo and thus, it was inherently dangerous for conservative elements. 
Although there were differences between the presidents in the democratic period, the 
framework of power largely remained untouched. From Dutra onwards, the state used the 
corporatist framework established under the Estado Novo to impose its will upon the labour 
movement.116 All elected governments managed the finances of unions and co-opted 
working class leadership to collaborate with the state -  they also made use of the 
mechanisms of control embedded in the CLT.M/ Between 1946 and 1964, different 
administrations made populist appeals to the working class -  a strategy designed to gain a 
support base independent of other classes and the military, not to genuinely empower the 
labour movement. So the union movement tended to be a vehicle of political support for
1 1 Q
populist governments, rather than institutional conduits for working class pressure. The 
increased assertiveness of the labour movement under Goulart, however, signaled a 
potential danger for conservative elements -  it was the last straw for the military. On the 
other hand, Goulart only allowed independent worker organisations to operate as long as 
they supported him -  he was not interested in genuinely strengthening the labour 
movement, but rather, sought to use it against his opponents in order to thwart attacks from 
the right. Viewed from the military’s perspective, worker mobilisation and Goulart’s 
attempts to introduce progressive reforms threatened to undo the very basis upon which the 
Brazilian state had been constructed under Vargas and the Estado Novo. The last phase of 
the democratic period proved to the ruling classes that the reestablishment of controls over
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labour was necessary -  this led to the systematic subjugation of the masses under military 
rule.
MILITARY DICTATORSHIP - THE SUPPRESSION OF INDEPENDENT POLITICAL 
ACTIVITY & THE ECONOMIC ‘MIRACLE '
Upon taking power, the military acted immediately to suppress radical forces. This was 
done in order to prevent the reoccurrence of the political polarisation and dangerous 
instability of the Goulart years, whom the military accused of ‘deliberately bolshevizing’ 
Brazil.119 Under General Humberto Castello Branco (1964-1967), the First Institutional Act 
(IA-1) of April 9, 1964 gave the government the right to annul or ‘cassate’ (dismiss) the 
mandate of any of the nation’s elective officers and to deprive them, as well as any other 
officials or citizens, of their political rights for 10 years.120 This device allowed the regime 
to remove 89 of the 409 deputies elected in 1966 between December 1968 and October 
1969. The military sought to maintain a semblance of liberal democracy by keeping 
Congress open (although it was shut down at various times) and by maintaining a two-party 
system.
In October 1965, following the defeat of pro-government candidates in gubernatorial 
elections by opposition politicians, a hard-line military faction reacted by forcing President 
Castello Branco to decree a Second Institutional Act (IA-2).122 It created the electoral 
system which would persist until the early 1980s, laying the foundations for the creation of 
a government party, the National Renovation Alliance (Alianga Renovadora National -  
ARENA) and an opposition party, the Brazilian Democratic Movement (Movimento 
Democrätico Brasileiro -  MDB). All other political parties were suppressed. This system 
was intended to maintain the appearance of liberal democracy, however, it was far from 
genuinely competitive. As the conservative, pro-government party, ARENA retained the 
network of patronage which was crucial for its electoral dominance -  the countryside. The 
MDB, as the ‘official’ opposition party, presented no serious threat for the regime during
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the 1960s. Numerous institutional acts, constitutional amendments and executive decrees 
were engineered to give the regime unlimited powers and strip Congress, the legislature and 
the judiciary of any independent role.
The suppression of autonomous political activity was also accomplished with an extensive 
security apparatus. A network of police and military forces cultivated an environment of 
fear. In December 1968, the Fifth Institutional Act (IA-5) was imposed by General Artur da 
Costa e Silva (1967-1969) in response to massive student and labour protests against the 
military dictatorship from March to June 1968. Students were killed, progressive lecturers 
were expelled from universities, activists were imprisoned and tortured, universities were 
invaded by the armed forces and hundreds ‘disappeared’. ' IA-5 enabled the president to 
close Congress, suspend the mandates and political rights of numerous politicians, impose 
press censorship and remove various Supreme Court justices.124
The most repressive and violent period of the military dictatorship occurred under hardliner 
General Emilio Medici (1969-1974). Arrests, torture and ‘disappearances’ became a 
common feature under Medici. The tight lid on political opposition was seen as necessary 
by the hardliners in order to carry out rapid industrialisation with limited disruption, thus, 
the crackdown on political activity coincided with an economic boom. Brazil’s model of 
economic development exhibited similarities with the Mexican path to rapid economic 
growth. The state played a key part in underpinning the ‘economic miracle’ which peaked 
between 1968 and 1974 through massive investment in infrastructure and heavy industry 
(steel, hydro-electricity and telecommunications) and through direct and indirect subsidies 
to private capital.123 Growth was predicated on a ‘triple alliance’ between the state, and 
foreign and domestic capital.120 The military kept all basic industries and utilities under 
state control and largely retained the nationalist policy of ISI by selective tariffs.127 Brazil’s 
state sector also expanded -  hundreds of state corporations were established and the state
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invested millions in public firms like Compania Vale do Rio Doce (CRVD or Vale), a 
mining conglomerate that was Brazil’s largest public firm.128
Large-scale projects in shipbuilding, mining, oil, bauxite and aluminum were financed and 
managed by bureaucratic agencies and state firms -  these projects often operated in 
conjunction with larger development plans designed to attract domestic and foreign 
entrepreneurs.12y One of the most important agencies responsible for economic 
development was the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (Banco 
Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social -  BNDES), established in the early 
1950s under Vargas. The BNDES played a key role in channeling public funds to industrial 
projects during military rule, such as the trans-Amazonian highway, the Tucuruf 
hydroelectric plants and the A ^m inas metallurgy park.130
Industrialisation propelled the country from a largely rural based economy to one which 
was substantially industrial. During the boom, real GDP grew at an average yearly rate of 
11.3 per cent between 1968 and 1974 and the industrial growth rate also reached levels of 
12.6 per cent.131 The rate of growth of exports averaged about 15 per cent per year for the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, and by the mid-1970s, over one-third were manufactured 
goods.132 Exports rose by 126 per cent -  from $2.7 billion to $6.2 billion and foreign 
exchange reserves rose from $656 million in 1969 to $6.417 billion in 1973.131 These 
changes were also evident in dramatic demographic shifts -  between 1968 and 1980, the 
proportion of the population living in cities rose from 45 to 68 per cent.1,4
Although Brazil experienced some of the highest growth rates in the world during this 
period, there was a darker side to the positive picture that official statistics painted. Skewed 
levels of income distribution antagonised large sectors of the population, particularly the
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urban working classes. Restrictive wage policies meant that real minimum wages fell 
continuously while higher-income groups benefited enormously. ' The effect of the 
military on the distribution of wealth in the 1960s and 1970s was stunning. In 1960, the 
richest 10 per cent of the population received 39.6 per cent of the national income; by 1980 
they received 50.9 per cent, while the poorest 50 per cent received only 12.6 per cent.136 
The Brazilian economic ‘miracle’ proved to be a double-edged sword for the regime -  the 
end of impressive growth rates marked the beginning of the military’s demise.
THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY -  ERECTIONS, POPULAR OPPOSITION & 
ECONOMIC CRISIS
By 1975, the military could not ignore the demands made by various groups to democratise 
the political system. Although the regime was prepared to institute piecemeal reform in 
order to placate civil society, it also sought to ensure that reforms would not fundamentally 
threaten its power. Divisions within the military further complicated the debate over which 
strategy to adopt. Vacillations between political liberalisation and reinstituting authoritarian 
measures reflected the internal rifts within the military, namely, the battle between the soft- 
line and hard-line factions. As a result, the Brazilian transition was characterised by shifts 
from liberalisation to re-establishment of political controls over the electoral process.
The presidency of General Ernesto Geisel (1974-1979) initiated a period of distensäo, 
beginning in March 1974. This ‘relaxation’ witnessed a gradual reduction of restrictions on 
civil and political liberties. Censorship of the media and police surveillance was eased, 
allowing the MDB to reach a wider audience and appeal to a larger section of the 
population due to increased access to radio and television. In October 1974, the military 
allowed free elections for Congress, which alarmed the government because they 
demonstrated the increasing strength of the opposition, particularly in urban centres. The
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MDB increased its representation in the Chamber of Deputies from 28 to 44 per cent and
137gained 16 of 22 senators, as well as winning majorities in six state assemblies.
Internal divisions within the armed forces were an important factor prompting 
liberalisation. During the hard-line years of General Medici, Brazil’s security network grew 
extensively, particularly the two main security organisations -  the Operations and 
Intelligence Department for Internal Defense (Destacamento de Operagöes e Informagöes 
de Defesa Interna -  DOI-CODI) and the National Intelligence Service (Servigo National de 
Informagöes -  SNI). The intelligence network expanded dramatically during the Medici 
years and was centered around the system of political control headed by the SNI. ' A vast 
structure of intelligence gathering and surveillance gave the security agencies enormous 
power and autonomy in domestic policy-making. ' The particularly harsh crackdown on 
all forms of political mobilisation under General Medici was directed by the hard-liners 
who were in control of the SNI and DOI-CODI -  the security network, therefore, was the 
refuge of the hard-line.
Some of the officer corps reacted negatively to the excesses of security forces -  the soft- 
liners believed that the military’s function and its basic principles had been distorted, thus 
jeopardising the integrity of the armed forces.140 To preserve the hierarchy it had become 
necessary to neutralise the hard-line, to tone down repression and to return the military to 
the barracks.141 For General Geisel and the soft-liners, placing curbs on the autonomy and 
impunity of the hard-liners within the repressive apparatus was a prerequisite to the 
consolidation of their own position within the state.142 The rifts between the hard-liners and 
soft-liners were the result of historical factors -  military factionalism had always been a 
source of conflict within the Brazilian armed forces. Divisions were primarily the result of 
debates over which type of government was suitable for Brazil. Soft-liners favoured a
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restricted liberal form of democracy and were keen on maintaining coalitions as well as the 
status quo. This was compatible with the political system which emerged under Vargas and 
the Estado Novo. The hard-liners preferred to rule with force and repression -  they were not 
interested in crafting coalitions, but rather, in strengthening Brazil’s domestic security 
forces and increasing the nation’s international standing as an economic and military 
powerhouse. The rise of a powerful repressive apparatus under General Medici complicated 
the already existing split and created further tensions at a time when the military was facing 
considerable popular and elite pressure to democratise.
Political liberalisation had another purpose -  the regime was dealing with increased popular 
opposition to its rule and instituting reform measures was seen as a way of defusing dissent. 
The military’s most repressive years damaged its image in the eyes of many Brazilians. It 
alienated more and more sectors of the population, including large segments of the middle 
class and urban white-collar workers. By the late 1970s, the nature of opposition was 
stronger than in previous periods and it had become more frequent and extensive. The 
military made little effort to incorporate the popular sectors or labour into the governing 
structure. This differentiates Brazil from Mexico, where incorporation of the popular sector 
and labour into the institutional framework was a crucial way in which the PRI was able to 
control opposition when it emerged in the late 1960s and early to mid-1970s. By contrast, 
the Brazilian military ruled primarily through crude force.
Opposition to the government was not limited to any one particular class or segment in 
Brazilian society. Business discontent grew over what was seen as the excessive growth of 
state enterprises and economic interventionism.14' The ‘anti-statism’ campaign of the mid 
1970s, known as ‘desestatizasäo’, was led by the private sector in Sao Paulo which was 
resentful of the government’s continued controls over its economic activities. The 
campaign consisted of lobbying the government, issuing public statements and reports 
which detailed the grievances of the private sector and national meetings in the key 
organisations set up to represent business interests. In particular, the private sector had 
serious reservations about the Second National Development Plan (1975-79) which called
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for increased state intervention in the economy and required large investments in 
petroleum, energy, chemicals, pulp and paper.144 Business interests were critical of the 
public enterprises and para-statal companies that spearheaded the state’s deepening 
involvement in productive activities in competition with private capital.145 Many 
industrialists also lost confidence in the government following the MDB’s impressive gains 
in the 1974 elections.
The gradual politicisation of key sectors of the entrepreneurial class in opposition to the 
authoritarian state led to demands for greater liberalisation.146 At first, calls for 
liberalisation were exclusively directed towards the economic sphere. By 1978, however, 
calls to open up the political system were fueled by the centralisation and technocratic 
closure of decision-making.147 Although most large private enterprises depended on state 
contracts and support, they also suffered from competition with state enterprises and 
frustration over the difficulty in reaching policy-makers.148 The regime’s most important 
policy decisions were insulated from political pressure -  various branches of the state, 
(sometimes at odds with one another), controlled economic decisions, leaving businessmen 
frustrated over the possibility of influencing specific outcomes.149 In late 1977, the 
Congress of the Producing Classes (a former corporatist body representing the private 
sector) held a national meeting which called for greater political freedom, decentralised 
economic power, reduced bureaucracy and more state support for private initiative.150
In the same year, the Chairman of the Sao Paulo Chamber of Commerce issued a statement 
claiming that most industrialists supported a return to democracy.151 Four leading Brazilian 
industrialists issued a manifesto in mid-1978 declaring that “only democracy absorbs social
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tensions”.152 The manifesto challenged the basis of Brazil’s economic growth -  it criticised 
the military’s centralised control, the closure of political channels and the inequality that 
had marked the country’s industrialisation strategy. Thus, domestic capital’s opposition 
gradually acquired an explicit democratic content.154 Public criticism of the regime became 
more extensive -  important segments of the private sector advocated democracy and 
political reform as the only way to resolve Brazil’s social and economic problems, thus 
business became part of the broader movement calling for democratisation in the late 
1970s.
Another visible opponent of the military were students, whose protests highlighted the 
widespread disillusionment with the hardships of military rule. Demonstrations were 
sparked off in 1977 by the imprisonment of a group of students and workers who 
distributed an anti-government pamphlet. On 1 May, 1977, students mobilised and took to 
the streets. Despite police intervention, more than 10,000 protested in the centre of Sao 
Paulo, demanding liberation of the May Day prisoners, amnesty for political prisoners and 
the reestablishment of democratic liberties. The student movement spread rapidly to the 
entire country. In the main cities such as Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia and Porto Alegre, 
university strikes multiplied, as did street demonstrations, protest assemblies and 
confrontations with police. On 23 August, 1977, a ‘National Day of Struggle’ took the form 
of student strikes and marches in the large urban centres, with such slogans as ‘Down with 
the Dictatorship’. The student movement became a political centre, mobilising intellectuals 
and receiving the solidarity of sectors of the Church, artists, journalists and lawyers.15^ The 
political situation in Brazil was becoming increasingly volatile and unmanageable.
The military was also faced with sustained opposition from the Catholic Church. Large- 
scale human rights abuses and increasing media coverage of torture, deaths in custody and 
disappearances galvanised the Church into becoming the unofficial opposition against the 
military regime.156 An increased commitment to social justice issues also formed an 
important reason for the Church’s involvement in the political sphere -  it founded and
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supported programs in favour of specific groups, such as landless peasants, Indians and 
urban workers -  those who had been adversely affected by the inequalities generated by 
rapid industrialisation. ' From 1976, the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops 
(CNBB) issued several documents and reports which strongly criticised the regime and 
advocated substantial change in favour of the lower classes. ' The CNBB, comprising of 
240 episcopal divisions and 350 bishops, was crucial in co-coordinating and promoting a 
progressive orientation.159 Documents and statements calling for structural reforms in 
Brazilian society and the economy were usually formulated at CNBB general assemblies 
with 200 bishops in attendance.160 In order to press for change, the Church was active in 
mobilised and organised Christian Base Communities (CEBs) which brought together local 
residents to discuss immediate social needs, take political action and encourage grassroots 
organisation.161 They were also active in evaluating political parties and their platforms and
1 9urging members into political action to defend their rights. “ It is estimated that by the end 
of the 1970s, there were 50-80,000 CEBs in Brazil with over 4 million participants.163
What makes the political activism of the Catholic Church in Brazil unique is that it was not 
just a group or sector, but the institution as a whole which promoted a strategy of change.164 
Although there were disagreements within the episcopate and variations from diocese to 
diocese, on the whole, the Church emerged as a defender of the poor and oppressed during 
the harshest years of authoritarianism and placed a large amount of pressure on the regime 
to democratise. The Church ran political education programs to encourage popular 
organisation in order to press for services such as education, health care and running water 
and it also provided information on political parties and elections. During the transition, the 
Church played an important role through its attacks on the regime, political education and 
mobilisation in the CEBs, support of civilian politicians and its role in the new unionism.165
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Labour militancy formed the most serious threat to the government -  more than any other 
social sector, the working class paid the price for rapid industrialisation.166 Years of 
repression and far-reaching control coincided with the period of rapid development. 
Predominantly situated in the suburbs of Säo Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, blue-collar
1 f\1industrial workers numbered 4 million by 1970 and 6 million by 1980. However, they 
were concentrated in several major industrial centres. This created the necessary conditions 
for the emergence of an explosive and militant labour movement known as the ‘new 
unionism’ (novo sindicalismo) between 1978 and 1982. Worker opposition, its militancy 
and the crucial role it played in the broader democratisation movement, will be looked at in 
further detail in chapter 5.
As a result of the distensao, a large number of popular groups sprang forth and established 
alternative forms of political, social and economic organisation. From grassroots collectives 
concerned with the cost of living, to neighbourhood associations clamouring for 
improvements in social and welfare provisions, the military was confronted with the 
proliferation of social movements which utilised the democratic opening to place their 
interests on the agenda. Popular organisations included the Cost of Living Movement, the 
Workers’ Pastoral, the National Labour Front (Freute Nacional de Trabalho), the Women’s 
Movement for Amnesty, and regional MDB organisations. Along with segments of the 
Catholic Church, opposition parties and professional associations, these groups joined 
workers in strikes, pickets and street protests throughout Brazil. Labour’s opposition was 
dangerous for the military because it extended beyond the unions proper, stimulating 
greater activism within the large working-class neighbourhoods and communities -  the new 
unionism championed the demands of the lower classes generally.168 Grassroots 
mobilisation intensified the military’s fears of large-scale popular resistance. The military, 
therefore, turned to the electoral arena as a way of maintaining its rule.
To prevent the MDB’s dominance in Congress and to pacify the hard-line faction in the 
military, liberalisation proceeded at a slow pace. In preparation for the 1978 elections,
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Geisel introduced the ‘April Package’ (Pacote de Abril) in April 1977. The purpose of the 
April Package was to ensure that the gubernatorial election would be controlled by 
gerrymandered state ‘electoral colleges’.169 It was also designed to skew the electoral 
system to ARENA’S advantage by reducing the representation in Congress and in the 
Electoral College of the more populous, urban and industrialised states of the south and
170centre-south, while over-representing ARENA strongholds in the north and north-east. 
This measure set a maximum representation for the more populous states, disadvantaging 
opposition-dominated Sao Paulo, and a minimum to favour the least populous states. The 
government was allowed to appoint one-third of the Senate in order to guarantee control of 
the upper house.172
This exercise in political engineering enabled the military to maintain control of the key 
governorships and of a majority in the Senate.17’ Despite such engineering, the MDB 
gained 57 per cent of the valid senatorial votes, but it did not gain a majority in the upper 
house -  ARENA also still held the majority in the Chamber of Deputies with 231 seats 
against the MDB’s 189.174 But most of the MDB’s votes were cast in the more developed 
states and in the larger cities, its share of votes in Säo Paulo was 84 per cent, in Rio de 
Janeiro State 63 per cent and in Rio Grande do Sul 62 per cent.l7> Demographic changes 
increasingly worked against the regime. As voters in the cities came to outnumber those in 
non-urban areas, the predominantly rural bases of support for the military regime were 
undercut.176
Geisel’s successor, General Joäo Figuereido (1979-1985) extended the distensäo with a 
policy of abertura which was intended to buttress the process of liberalisation while still 
maintaining a tight rein over the democratic opening. In order to demonstrate his 
commitment to the abertura, General Figuereido decreed an amnesty permitting political 
exiles to return in November 1979. Moreover, he allowed for the release of political 
prisoners, censorship of books and newspapers (but not of radio and television) was
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abolished and some strikes were allow ed.177 IA-5 was repealed and the president promised 
a return to direct elections for governor and other offices in 19 82.178 The government also 
abolished ARENA and the MDB which had dominated elections since their creation in 
1965 and new, independent political parties were allowed to form. ARENA changed its 
name to the Democratic Social Party (Partido Democrdtico Social -  PDS) and the MDB 
became the Party of the Brazilian Democratic M ovement (Partido do Movimento 
Democrdtico Brasileiro -  PMDB). The allowance of multiple parties was intended to 
fragment the opposition forces, diluting the strength of the PMDB as the only significant 
opposition party by creating several parties which would compete against each other.
The formation o f the W orkers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores -  PT) was a significant 
development in Brazilian politics. One of the main differences with M exico was that unlike 
the CTM, the W orkers’ Party was not a creation of the state -  it was born out of the labour 
struggles and grassroots organisation which punctuated the political landscape from 1977 
and onwards. Its leader, Lula, was a leader o f the M etalworkers’ Union of Säo Bernardo 
and Campo (Sindicato dos Metalürgicos de Säo Bernardo do Campo). The party grew 
steadily in the 1980s and 1990s -  its representation in the Chamber of Deputies went from 
8 in 1982 to 49 in 1994 -  almost 10 per cent of the C ham ber.180 The PT was an extremely 
important advance in leftist politics, given the highly controlled nature of political parties in 
Brazil and its extensive links with grassroots labour and the rank-and-file -  its emergence, 
as well as its impact on national politics and role within the labour movement will be 
examined in more detail in chapter 5.
Although the government continued liberalisation, it utilised its control in order to prevent 
any major opposition victories. In anticipation o f the November 1982 elections, General 
Figuereido introduced the November 1981 ‘electoral package’. This package established 
that all votes were to be along party lines, prohibiting party alliances. Designed to divide
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opposition parties, the package required voters to choose party ‘slates’ rather than 
individual candidates for office, preventing opposition parties from picking and choosing 
the seats they would contest. Despite such measures, the PMDB continued to increase its 
electoral strength through significant gains at the polls. The 1982 elections represented a 
milestone in Brazilian politics. A large number of Brazilians -  48 million -  voted for city 
councilors as well as state governors.18’ The opposition won easily in Sao Paulo, which 
accounts for 21 per cent of Brazil’s population.184 Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and Sao 
Paulo, the three largest industrial states with 42 per cent of the population and two-thirds of 
Brazil’s GDP, all elected opposition governments. ' The PMDB took 9 governorships and 
269 members in the Electoral College.186 But the PDS took 12 of the state governorships
1 0*7
and 359 members in the Electoral College, thus enjoying a comfortable majority.
In 1983, the opposition began the cliretas ja! campaign (direct elections now!) which 
consisted of opposition politicians, social movements and labour unions -  it was the largest 
set of demonstrations since 1964.188 Hundreds of thousands of Brazilians mobilised to push 
for re-democratisation and an end to the military dictatorship. Ultimately however, it did 
not lead to direct elections. A constitutional amendment was introduced in 1983 to replace 
the Electoral College with direct presidential elections in 1985 -  however, it failed by 22 
votes in Congress.189 Despite this, the cliretas ja! rallies exerted tremendous pressure on the 
military at a moment when the question of who would succeed General Figuereido was not 
clear.190 With hundreds of thousands of Brazilians on the streets demanding democracy, the 
government was unable to maintain a united front.
The military was also faced with a crisis as a result of its economic policies. The optimism 
generated by the boom period gave way to the stark reality of economic downturn from
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1978 onwards. Foreign indebtedness rose from US $12.5 billion in 1973 to $43.3 billion in 
1978 and $90 billion in mid-1983.191 Debt increased 29-fold over the period and per capita 
income had only gone up 2.3-fold, from $832 to $1,924.192 By 1981, debt-service payments 
equaled 72 per cent of Brazil’s exports, up from 51 per cent in 1977. The scale of the 
disaster is evident in the statistics. Between 1980 and 1983, real GDP fell by at least 8 per 
cent and per capita GDP by over 15 per cent.194 The hardest-hit sectors were those 
producing durable consumer goods and capital goods -  industries which were concentrated 
in the urban parts of Brazil -  unemployment in these areas became a serious problem.195
With economic recession, the government found that some of its most important sectors of 
support, such as business and the urban middle classes, were no longer willing to tolerate 
its rule -  they became firm opponents of the regime. These were the sectors of society 
which had welcomed the military coup in 1964 because they had been alarmed at the 
populist appeals of Goulart. They had tolerated the military because they benefited 
considerably from industrialisation. But from the mid-1970s, anti-regime sentiment steadily 
increased until the economic downturn of the early to mid-1980s solidified opposition to 
the military. For business interests especially, it was the last straw. The growth of 
grassroots social movements and the militancy of the new unionism added to the list of 
groups who now actively resisted military rule. Liberalisation and electoral reforms were 
the methods the government opted for in order to be able to control the political opening 
and deflate social and political tensions. The transition however, proved to have a 
momentum of its own.
By the mid 1980s, the military was anxious to negotiate an exit from power and install a 
civilian government favourable to its interests. The economic crisis had reached massive 
proportions and there was mass unrest. In late 1984 and early 1985, major segments of the 
PDS left and established the Party of the Liberal Front (Partido Freute Liberal -  PFL), 
which then allied itself with the PMDB to elect a new opposition president, Tancredo
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Neves.196 These segments defected because they were dissatisfied with the nomination of 
Paulo Maluf as PDS candidate for president. Neves, however, was an acceptable candidate 
for the military -  he assured the top brass that there would be no accountability for past 
human rights abuses. The outcome of the Electoral College ballot in January 1985 handed 
Neves a sweeping victory. There were 480 votes for Neves and 180 for Maluf. ‘ In 
March 1985, the PMDB moved into office. However, Neves died before taking office and 
his place was taken by vice-president Jose Sarney, one of the defectors from the PDS to the 
PFL.199
The transition to democracy was well underway with this indirect election of a civilian 
president. Brazil completed the transition with direct elections for president in 1989. These 
were the first direct presidential elections held since 1960 and 82.1 million voters turned 
out to cast their votes.200 The two main candidates were Fernando Collor de Mello from the 
National Reconstruction Party (Partido da Reconstruqäo Nacional -  PRN) and Lula from 
the PT. Lula came close to winning the presidency, however, he was defeated in the run­
off, with 37.8 per cent to Collor’s 42.7 per cent of the vote.201 Although Collor was a well- 
heeled member of Brazil’s elite, this represented the culmination of Brazil’s transition to 
democracy.
Political liberalisation in Brazil was achieved through various legal and institutional means, 
such as controlling elections and determining a suitable civilian candidate for the 
presidency in 1985. Moreira Alves and Hutton argue that the regime handed over “a few 
rings from off its fingers” but kept “all it fingers and claws intact”. The military, 
however, was eventually forced to step down as a result of the combined pressures of the 
downward economic spiral and the increasingly vocal demands from various sectors in 
society. The new unionism and opposition from the Sao Paulo business community applied 
crucial pressure on the military to accept a degree of democratisation well beyond its first
l% Frieden, ‘The Brazilian Borrowing Experience’, op.cit., p. 121.
197 Roett, ‘Brazil’s Protracted Transition to Democracy and the Market’, in Wise and Roett, op.cit., p.203.
198 Bruneau, ‘Brazil’s Political Transition’, in Higley and Gunther, op.cit., p.264.
1 w Frieden, ‘The Brazilian Borrowing Experience’, op.cit., p. 121.
2(1(1 Bruneau, ‘Brazil’s Political Transition’, in Higley and Gunther, op.cit., p.277.
21,1 Skidmore, Brazil, op.cit., p.214.
Jl2 Moreira Alves, Marcio and Marjorie Hutton, ‘New Political Parties’, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 6, 
No. 4, Autumn 1979, p.l 14.
117
concession of mere liberalisation.20. Once popular pressure became intense, the military 
sought to negotiate its exit from power from a position of relative strength, so that it could 
dictate the terms under which Brazil would be transferred to a civilian government. 
Although it initially held onto power and tried to placate large sectors of the population by 
attempting to maintain high growth policies despite crippling levels of debt, the costs of 
running the economy in this way proved too high. Such policies reflect the desire and 
desperation to maintain power.
THE ‘IDEAL’ TRANSITION
The Brazilian transition holds a special position in elite-led transitology. It is viewed as 
having undergone the ‘ideal’ type of transition from authoritarianism to democracy.204 One 
of the definitive characteristics which makes Brazil the ‘archetypal case’ is the fact that 
political elites negotiated the terms under which the country was to become a democracy. 
These elites included the military officers who sanctioned Neves as candidate for president, 
a politician who had risen through the ranks of the government party, the PDS, until he 
defected to the opposition. Neves was acceptable to the right and left elements of the 
political spectrum because of bis conservative platform.
Transitology does not completely overlook the role of mass mobilisation in Brazil. 
However, in keeping with the dominant framework of analysing politics as elite-dominated, 
the masses play an incidental role. For example, Alfred Stepan argues that no opposition 
activity in Brazil can account for the regime’s initial decision to liberalise.205 Although 
important social actors such as labour and industrialists did protest, the pace and scope of 
the transition was dictated by incumbent elites, up to and including the indirect election of a 
civilian president.206 Similarly, Huntington argues that during the democratisation process 
in Brazil, the control of the government “was never seriously challenged” .207 O’Donnell 
states in even more explicit terms that the Brazilian popular sector was “weakly organised”
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and “scarcely activated politically”. Although some allowance is made for the diretas ja! 
campaign, the impact of such opposition is seen as rapidly dissipating.
What is surprising is that there is abundant evidence which refutes the assertions made by 
elite-led transitologists. This is not to argue that the Brazilian transition was the sole result 
of popular mobilisation. Rather, the extensive impact of popular mobilisation has been 
neglected in the attempt to demonstrate that democratisation is essentially about elite 
actors, their behaviour and decisions. This focus is intentional. Chapter 1 argued that elite- 
led transitology’s preoccupation with elite processes is the result of a normative preference 
for a conservative democracy. Strategies of compromise at the elite level are meant to 
isolate radical sectors both at the right and left of the political spectrum.209 The deliberate 
exclusion of popular forces, therefore, is considered favourable because it facilitates the 
installation of a moderate democratic government.
The military did retreat because of electoral losses, but it was not the overriding factor as 
elite-led transitology would lead us to believe. The Brazilian transition did not follow a 
natural or predictable path. Democratisation occurred through a mixture of concession from 
above and struggle from below. The combined impact of the economic crisis and internal 
splits within the military created a situation where the costs of staying in power were 
calculated as being too high. Popular mobilisation (particularly of the labour movement) 
placed the regime on the defensive and forced its retreat from power. The ways in which 
the oppositional activities of the new unionism contributed to the transition to democracy 
will be examined in chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5: THE BRAZILIAN LABOUR MOVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
The ‘new unionism’ (novo trabalhismo) exploded onto the political scene in 1978. The 
labour movement in Brazil occupied a subordinate position in the state structure. Union 
leaders (pelegos) were part of the apparatus of control -  their bureaucratic positions 
distanced them from the everyday concerns of the shop-floor. Brazil’s military regime 
failed to establish institutional channels for the expression of dissent. The depoliticisation 
of the organised working class was the main goal. To prevent labour militancy, the military 
relied on force combined with a rigidly controlled labour system.
This situation, however, changed in the late 1970s. Unleashing the pent-up demands of the 
working class, a wage campaign in 1977 was the catalyst for a new unionism. One of its 
most important aspects was rank-and-file mobilisation -  this highlighted the increased 
assertiveness of the working class. The leadership role played by labour in organising and 
mounting collective resistance to the authoritarian regime was particularly troubling for it. 
Similarly to Mexico, this was not just a sporadic illustration of discontent, but a widespread 
systemic challenge which initiated the sequence of events leading to the military’s exit 
from power. Labour’s activities were crucial in forming civil society’s demands for an end 
to authoritarianism and in the general push for democratisation during the abertura. 
Another significant aspect of the new unionism was the creation of a genuine leftist party, 
thePT, in 1980.
METHODS OF LABOUR CONTROL UNDER THE MILITARY
Despite an increase in the levels of union activism in the later years of Brazil’s democratic 
period, the labour movement was unable to mount successful opposition to the military 
coup. State intervention in the unions clearly demonstrated the new regime’s attitude 
towards worker activism. Leftist leaders were removed and replaced by pelegos, many
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unions were totally outlawed and dissent was forcibly suppressed.1 23 Between 1964 and 
1979, there were a total of 1,202 interventions in trade unions, 78 cases of legal removal 
from office (destituigäo), the cancellation of 31 different elections and of the registration of 
254 trade unions. The military extended its reach into the labour arena by adding further 
coercive instruments. Strike laws were instituted to check the level of disruption in the 
economic sphere. Decree-Law Number 4330 (DL 4330), passed by the military on 1 June, 
1964, detailed the situations under which workers could legally declare a strike. Strikes 
were prohibited by employees in ‘essential services’, defined as water, energy, light, gas, 
communications, transport and others.4 5The terms under which strikes could be declared 
legal however, were so restrictive as to preclude most reasons for protest.
The DL 4330, however, was not motivated solely by political factors -  the military had 
another agenda -  the rapid industrialisation of Brazil. This required strict worker adherence 
to economic targets. A state-controlled wage policy was put into force almost immediately. 
After 1964, the Finance Ministry determined wage increases in the public and private 
sectors according to a set formula based on government figures/ Wages were readjusted 
annually, taking into account anticipated inflation and estimated productivity increases.6 
Referred to as the ‘belt-tightening laws’, collective bargaining over salaries was prohibited, 
with wage increases dictated by a simple executive decree.7 Most important was the
o
calculation for the minimum wage which was a benchmark for all wages.
An integral part of the government’s program of economic development was the extensive 
security apparatus. Through the systematic application of legal and extra-institutional 
measures, the tentacles of military surveillance reached all corners of society. Adding to the
1 Greenfield, ‘Brazil’, in Greenfield and Maram, op.cit., p.80.
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various Institutional Acts, the National Security Law was passed on 29 September, 1969 -  
Decree-Law Number 898 (DL 898). Hardliners in the military argued that the national 
security of Brazil was under threat from domestic leftist forces. DL 898 made it illegal to 
strike, controlled the media and other information networks and prohibited specific political 
parties.9 Government workers could receive lengthy prison terms for promoting strikes in 
‘essential’ or public services.10 These methods of control set the stage for the economic 
miracle and the harshest period of military rule.
BACKGROUND TO THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW UNIONISM
a) CHANGES IN THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY
Brazil’s industrial structure was transformed in fundamental ways by the economic miracle. 
The emphasis on industrially-driven development created a large and more belligerent 
workforce concentrated in the most dynamic industries. Between 1960 and 1980 the 
number of people employed in the secondary sector (including manufacturing and 
construction) grew from 2,940,242 to 10,674,977." By 1974, because of dramatic growth 
in modern industrial sectors, especially consumer durables and capital goods industries, 
metalworkers directly engaged in production numbered 943,000 and constituted about one- 
third of the manufacturing labour force of 2.8 million.12 They became the most serious 
threat to the government’s system of labour control.
Most important was the Metalworkers Union of Sao Bernardo do Campo. Known as the 
‘ABCD’ region of metropolitan Sao Paulo, the centre of the new unionism was in the towns 
of Santo Andre, Säo Bernardo do Campo, Säo Caetano and Diadema. It contained the 
largest concentration of industrial workers in Brazil.1 3 The largest multinational companies
9 Moreira Alves, Maria Helena, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, Austin: University of Texas Press, 
1985, p. 118.
10 ibid.
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were located in the ABCD region, especially in the town of Sao Bernardo do Campo -  
these included Ford, General Motors, Volkswagen, Mercedes-Benz, Fiat and Saab-Scania. 
These companies employed the majority of motor industry workers. Just three large 
companies -  Ford, Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz -  accounted for 80,000 workers out of 
the total of 133,000.14 There were also 10 other firms employing 18,000 in the other metal- 
mechanical sectors.15 Working class concentrations were found in Osasco and Quarulhos in 
the greater Säo Paulo area and in Betim, Contagem and Monlevada in the state of Minas 
Gerais.16
As a leading sector in the growth model, the metalworking industry played a critical role in 
stimulating the economic miracle -  because of its size and interdependence with the rest of
17the economy, the industry had a profound impact on the whole course of development. 
Between 1968 and 1974, metal industry output grew at a compound annual rate of 22.0 per 
cent, over twice as fast as the 11.2 per cent for the economy as a whole.18 Many workers in 
the metallurgical sector were young and less likely to be constrained by traditional forms of 
control. Their strategic employment, technical skills, geographic concentration and lack of 
loyalty to old parties constituted a novel challenge to the regime.19
Despite the fact that the model of economic growth was touted by the regime as an 
unqualified success, the metalworkers did not receive many of the benefits associated with 
the miracle. Workers in these industries experienced the same decline or stagnation of real 
wage rates as other sections of the working class, despite sharp increases in productivity 
and profits.20 A long list of grievances also contributed to the feeling amongst many 
workers that their livelihoods were being sacrificed for the sake of speedy industrialisation. 
These included long hours without overtime pay, unsafe working conditions, layoffs, a lack 
of job security, and no right to strike. Workers, however, were not the only social group
14 ibid.
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who suffered from the military’s economic policies. By the late 1970s, Sao Paulo featured 
dense networks of neighbourhood associations and groups attached to the progressive 
section of the Catholic Church, which together formed a grassroots base for opposition to 
the regime by working and poorer people.“ Brazil’s economic transformation gave 
industrial workers the means necessary to assert themselves and to forge alliances with 
those who had also been neglected in the pursuit of rapid industrialisation.
b) RANK-AND-FILE ORGANISATION: THE NEW UNIONISM EMERGES
Wide-ranging controls placed on the working classes did not completely eradicate labour 
activism during the economic boom. The metallurgical industry in particular was rocked by 
work stoppages seeking wage increases. By mid-1973, there were signs that large-scale 
resistance was building, with a wave of strikes at the Vilares steel plant and the 
Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz car factories in Säo Paulo.22 Throughout the 1970s, 
worker dissent was expressed in the factories through forms of struggle such as slowdowns 
in the production line and stopping different sectors of the assembly line at different 
times.23
Rank and file organisations, known as factory commissions (comissöes defdbrica) began to 
emerge. Dedicated to secretly building a network of resistance within factories from the 
grassroots, these commissions had to mobilise clandestinely inside the work plants. They 
eventually reached such a level of underground growth that they became practically parallel 
trade unions. Factory committees also began to infiltrate the official trade unions, slowly 
developing union opposition groups that fought government-controlled officials in internal 
union elections. Known as the Union Opposition (Oposigäo Sindical) movement, it was an 
important force in the struggle to break free from state control, winning elections in 
important trade unions. Most of their efforts were devoted to reversing state interventions, 
winning elections in unions and forming new associations. A group of new and aggressive 
labour leaders also emerged, known as authentic unionists (autenticos). The president of the
21 Guidry, ‘Not Just Another Labour Party’, op.cit., p.88.
22 Munck, The Labour Movement in Argentina and Brazil’, in Boyd, Cohen and Gutkind, op.cit., p. 125.
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Metalworkers Union of Sao Bernardo, Lula, was part of the autenticos movement.24 
However, the range of repressive measures legal and otherwise used by the military, 
ensured that protest was not sustained until workers found an outlet for the collective 
expression of their grievances -  the wage campaign. This campaign took advantage of the 
abertura initiated by the military in the mid-1970s and capitalised on the internal divisions 
within the military coalition by publicly expressing their frustration and resentment towards 
authoritarian rule.
c) LIGHTING THE FUSE: THE WAGE CAMPAIGN
In August 1977, the government admitted that it had manipulated the officially accepted 
rates of inflation for 1973 and 1974.2> Such a striking admission provided the working class 
with ammunition. Confirmation of the military’s policy was provided through a study 
conducted by the Inter-Union Statistical Department (Departamento Inter-sindical de 
Estudos Estatisticos e Socio-Econömicos -  DIEESE). It calculated that during the period 
immediately following the implementation of the ‘belt-tightening laws’, many workers 
suffered salary losses of more than 30 per cent.26 Salary loss was particularly severe during 
the ‘miracle’ years of high economic growth in 1973 and 1974.27 The minimum salary had 
been decreed by the federal government in Brazil since 1959. Taking 1959 as the base year, 
DIEESE published a study analysing the yearly loss of real purchasing power of the 
minimum salary -  by 1976, the minimum salary had only 31 per cent of the purchasing 
power it had in 1959.28 Nearly all workers witnessed their position in the income structure 
deteriorate relative to the upper classes.29
Leading the way in the sustained attack on the government was the Metalworkers Union of 
Sao Bernardo. Known as the ‘wage recovery campaign’ (reposigdo salarial), or the 
‘campaign of the 34.1 per cent’, the metalworkers immediately held assemblies demanding
24 The above account is from Moreira Alves, ‘Trade Unions in Brazil’, in Epstein, op.cit., pps.49-50.
25 Fausto, op.cit., p.303.
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the replacement of lost wages.' The Oposigäo Sindical militants and the autenticos 
mobilised their members in a series of demonstrations and rallies to attract public attention 
-  this developed into one of the first nationwide union activities to break the silence 
imposed by the military’s violent repression.' The movement to recover wages created a 
springboard from which the working class could voice their demands and strike at the very 
heart of the military dictatorship -  it set the stage for the one of the most dramatic 
confrontations in Brazilian history.
THE NEW UNIONISM 
a ) 1978
Brazil’s novo sindicalismo represented an important turning point in the history of labour- 
state relations. It was a movement that dealt a major blow not only to state authority, but to 
the rapid development strategy. Resistance to the military regime was manifested in major, 
crippling strikes over several years involving millions of workers. Through their activism, 
workers sought trade union autonomy and to change the government’s wage policy. They 
also demanded the right to have direct bargaining with employers, the right to strike and to 
coordinate inter-union activities without prior government approval. " Specific social 
rights, such as job security and the limitation of working hours was integrated with the 
struggle for wage increases and better living conditions.’3 In various ways, the movement 
was able to raise these issues and defy the elaborate system of controls which had been in 
place for over 40 years.
On 12 May 1978, the strike began with a worker sit-down action. At the Saab-Scania truck 
and bus factory in the industrial suburb of Sao Bernardo do Campo, 2500 of Lula’s 
metalworkers punched their time clocks, assumed their work positions and sat down,
,(l Greenfield, ‘Brazil’, in Greenfield and Maram, op.cit., p.82.
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refusing to start their machines.'4 This was a shrewd tactic, as pickets outside the plant 
would have made it easier for the police to attack and arrest them -  plant management was 
not prepared to drag the workers away from their machines. It did not take long for the 
movement to spread to other plants. In the next four days, several large factories were 
crippled by worker stoppages, including Mercedes, Volkswagen, Ford Perkins Engines and 
Chrysler. Within 10 days, the strike action had spread to 90 firms in greater Sao Paulo.'5
Bypassing state permission, employers decided to bargain directly with the workers and as 
a result, on 31 May, the metalworkers received an extra 11 per cent one-time pay increase 
to adjust their base pay for the past understatement of inflation.36 A show of strength by the 
rank and file assisted by the union was able to secure wage raises and force direct 
negotiations between firms and their employers.37 The two-week strike against the auto 
industry and especially the subsequent direct bargaining was heavily reported by the press, 
much of which depicted the movement as the workers’ response to General Geisel’s 
promised liberalisation.' Even though this was prohibited in practice, the unions began to 
consult with employers without the interference of the government or Labour Courts.' Not 
only was it a crucial accomplishment, but it set an important precedent for unions all over 
the country.
Metalworkers throughout the state of Sao Paulo continued to disrupt production with work 
stoppages. For the next two months, 213 engineering factories in Sao Paulo state were 
affected by strikes.40 Factory commissions were established in all the large firms, including 
Massey-Ferguson, Caterpillar, Philco, Villares, Siemens and General Electric.41 At Ford, a 
stoppage lasting over a week affected the entire plant, and the Chrysler factory was 
paralysed -  this provoked a general period of labour unrest which spread to other large 
firms in the metal-mechanical sector such as Phillips and Pirelli which were forced to
34 Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, op.cit., p.205.
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concede a 10 per cent wage rise or more.42 Smaller firms and other sectors such as 
chemicals, textiles, ceramics and petroleum were also affected.4' In Santo Andre and Säo 
Bernardo, 82 per cent and 72 per cent respectively of union members participated in 
strikes.44 In most cases, strikes were spontaneously organised by workers in the factories 
and autentico-led unions accepted responsibility in some instances -  the Metalworkers 
Union of Säo Bernardo was a prominent example of a union which played a key role in 
leading and co-organising strikes elsewhere.43
From factory to factory, the 1978 strikes followed a similar pattern. Organised by their 
factory committees, workers made demands specific to their workplace. Official unions 
adopted a hands-off position in order to prevent the government from charging them with 
organising an illegal strike as grounds for intervention. Only after employers requested that 
the union represent workers did union leaders co-ordinate the factory-level actions and 
negotiate with employers’ organisations -  again, independently of the state.40 The new 
unionism sought to combine grassroots mobilisation with institutional action at the official 
union level.47 When a specific union local refused to aid the strikers, members of the Union 
Opposition often took over -  this process greatly increased the legitimacy both of the rank- 
and-file militants of the Union Opposition and of their autentico leaders.48
Several union leaders such as Lula, Olfvio Dutra from the Porto Alegre bank workers (Rio 
Grande do Sul), Joäo Paulo Pires Vasconcelos from the metalworkers in Joäo Monlevade 
(Minas Gerais) and Arnaldo Gongalves of the Metalworkers’ Union of Santos (Säo Paulo) 
became a consulting squad, helping in some cases to negotiate between union leaders and 
their members.49 They became known as the intersindical volante, or ‘flying inter-union 
organisation’ -  from 1978, it entered into contact with unions all over Brazil to try to unify
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demands and struggles.50 These leaders publically challenged the government’s tough 
stance towards worker dissent. Lula was regularly called upon to help organise strikes in 
other states -  this helped consolidate his leadership role.'51 As a result of the extensive links 
between unions, strikers were able to better coordinate their demands and actions.
The widespread political mobilisation set in motion by the new unionism could not be 
contained initially by the employers, pelegos or the government. It contributed to the 
emergence of a political consciousness in many poorer and working-class areas of Brazil. 
In particular, the new unionism came to symbolise the struggle against authoritarianism and 
oppression. Disputes originated in the factories, but once they spilled out into the streets, 
they gained popular support. Labour also received favourable press treatment -  workers 
were portrayed as having legitimate concerns. The new unionism sought to link economic 
and political issues in its opposition to the military regime -  it combined economic 
demands with calls for democratisation and an end to authoritarianism. The political space 
opened up by the aberturu in 1974 was utilised by the labour movement to widen the space 
for political protest. Serious worker disturbances extended beyond the metallurgical sector 
-  the strike movement spread to schools, hospitals, banks and other public service sectors. 
By the end of 1978, a total of 539,037 workers had participated in strikes.'53 Despite the fact 
that the government did not react to worker protests in 1978 with full scale repression, it 
was still determined to prove that it was firmly in control and that nothing could destabilise 
its grip over the liberalisation process.
Employing one of its preferred instruments for curbing worker protest, the government 
introduced a new law on 4 August 1978 -  Decree Law number 1632 (DL 1632). The 
definition of the term “essential” was extended to include sectors such as banks, port 
workers, hospitals and public services among others.54 It also included an open ended 
clause allowing the president to prohibit strikes by decree in additional areas to those 
already deemed ‘essential’.'55 DL 1632 raised the penalties for strikes in essential activities
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to include a 30-day suspension, which could be followed by dismissal with just cause.56 
Further penalties included indictment under the National Security Law which could carry a 
sentence of up to 20 years in prison/7 The Decree Law was an ad hoc response to political 
and social dissent. Despite the harsh nature of the military’s reaction, the new unionism was 
preparing for its most explosive confrontation to date.
b) 1979
1979 proved to be one of the most momentous years for the labour movement and for 
Brazilian society in general -  it was a year which evidenced the largest number of strikes in 
the country’s history. The metalworkers took advantage of the political liberalisation to 
increase their protest and test the limits of the new president, Figuereido. However, 
employers and the government were better prepared to face worker dissent and despite 
significant gains, the CLT and the legal structure of control were still firmly in place.58 
When their annual working agreement expired in March 1979, Lula and other union leaders 
planned for a different strategy to that adopted in 1978. After employers rejected a 78 per 
cent wage increase and demands to legally recognize the non-official union representatives 
who had emerged in competition with the pelegos, 160,000 ABCD metalworkers went on 
strike on 13 March 1979.59 The next day, workers at the Ford plant walked out and this was 
followed by the Volkswagen factory, where thousands of workers formed a picket to block 
the main entrance.60 Workers responded to the strike call in Santo Andre, Säo Caetano and 
in large firms in Campinas and Säo Jose dos Campos -  Mercedes, General Electric, 
Cobrasma, Embraer and others.61 From the beginning, the strike was centred in Säo 
Bernardo, and above all on the large auto plants.62
The main wage demands were discussed in the neighbourhoods of Säo Bernardo where 
most of the metalworkers lived, at meetings attended by union activists, students and
56 Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil, op.cit., p. 197.
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housewives -  a significant cross-section of the local population -  in churches and rooms 
belonging to the Catholic CEBs.63 Because the metalworkers raised issues involving the 
poor, a large sector of the population identified with many of their concerns.64 Pickets were 
organised at factory gates and at bus stops which were important strategic locations/0 It 
was a tactic which resulted in more rank-and-file involvement.66 Almost all the large and 
medium factories had their own bus service to bring in employees from their homes to the 
workplace.67
In order to stop the protestors, close to 2000 armed police along with dogs and armoured 
cars, moved in at the Volkswagen factory which had the largest number of protestors in the 
ABCD region.68 The union responded by organising mass pickets on the roads leading to 
the plant and then at the pick-up points for the work buses.69 By the end of the first week, 
the Volkswagen plant was still virtually paralysed, yet, in spite of the propaganda campaign 
on television and radio and the use of police to intimidate picketers, the large firms in Santo 
Andre and Säo Bernardo were at a halt.70 The momentum of the strike was kept up by mass 
meetings of workers and the activities of the union leaders and wage committees. Wage 
committees were made of 30 to 40 militants who organised pickets, meetings and helped 
the union directors. Regular mass meetings were held in which tens of thousands of 
workers participated.71
The strike movement soon took over Säo Bernardo itself -  it developed solidarity with 
important segments of civil society which reinforced the legitimacy of the workers’ 
demands. Säo Paulo city councilman Paulo Vidal successfully introduced a resolution 
supporting the strike. Opposition congressmen and the local bishop, Claudio Hummes, 
joined in the picketing outside the factories. A total of 5000 people attended a solidarity
67 Bava, Silvio Caccio, ‘Neighbourhood Movements and the Trade Unions: The Säo Bernardo Experience’, in 
Kowarick, Lucio (ed), translated by Fisher, William H. and Kevin Mundy, Social Struggles and the City: The 
Case of Säo Paulo, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1994, p.205.
64 • / • Iibid.
65 ibid.
66 Beecham and Eidenham, ‘Beyond the Mass Strike’, op.cit., p.24.
67 Bava, ‘Neighbourhood Movements and the Trade Unions’, in Kowarick, op.cit., p.206.
Beecham and Eidenham, ‘Beyond the Mass Strike’, op.cit., p.24; Humphrey, Capitalist Control and
Workers’ Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry, op.cit., p. 181.
69 Beecham and Eidenham, ‘Beyond the Mass Strike’, op.cit., p.24.
711 Humphrey, Capitalist Control and Workers’ Struggle in the Brazilian Auto Industry, op.cit., pps.181-182.
71 The above account is from Humphrey, Capitalist Control and Workers’ Struggle in the Brazilian Auto 
Industry, op.cit., pps.181-182.
131
rally in Säo Paulo. “ When police repression and harassment intensified, Bishop Hummes 
spoke at a union assembly to offer his backing: “The Church supports the strike because it 
considers it just and peaceful and hopes that workers will remain united around their 
leadership”.71 The mayor of Säo Paulo opened the doors of the Vila Euclides soccer 
stadium for the metalworkers to hold their huge strike meetings, attended by up to 80,000 
people.74
On 21 March, Labour Minister Murilo Macedo ruled that talks should be held between 
labour and capital.75 Employers were determined to take a tough line this time and believed 
that the government would back them up -  they refused to bargain until the strikers 
returned to work.76 Negotiations continued throughout the strike, and after 10 days, with the 
threat of intervention hanging over them, the union leaders agreed to put forward a proposal 
for a return to work pending further negotiations over a 45-day period -  this offer was 
rejected by mass meetings of over 90,000 w orkers/7 Brazil’s auto industry, then the largest 
in the developing world and paralysed by a strike clearly illegal under the labour laws, 
presented a challenge to the government that was obvious to all. The Regional Labour 
Court, which heard the salary dispute, rendered a decision which upheld management’s 
offer -  when strikers refused to accept the verdict, the government intervened on March 23, 
declaring that the ABCD unions were engaged in an illegal strike and arrested Lula, along 
with 200 other people.74 Military police surrounded union headquarters in Säo Bernardo, 
Santo Andre and Säo Caetano, and closed them down -  the government declared the soccer 
stadium off-limits to strike assemblies.80
Refusing to admit defeat, the strike movement intensified in strength and continued to voice 
the collective frustrations of the popular classes. Strikers stood firm, demanding immediate
79
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negotiation. On March 24, an estimated 20,000 people gathered in the centre of Säo 
Bernardo.82 Strike funds were non-existent, so workers had to depend not only on relatives 
and friends, but on a sympathetic public, especially among the Catholic clergy and laymen 
who donated money, food and time to keep the protests alive. The May strikes 
demonstrated that the new unionism had spread to become a broad struggle against the 
dictatorship. The Church, led by the cardinal and archbishop of Sao Paulo, Dorn Paulo 
Evaristo Arns, provided meeting places and moral support. As the strike dragged on, 
however, the workers’ position grew weaker. ' They were forced to accept the earlier offer 
of a compromise with a truce of 45 days, during which negotiations would take place.84 
Employers agreed that workers would be paid for the days on strike and there would be no
Q C
victimisation, including dismissals, for 120 days. " The intervention against the union 
would be partially lifted. About 70,000 workers gathered in the Vila Euclides soccer 
stadium to hear the proposals and Lula was allowed to address the meeting. Workers 
accepted the truce, as union leaders were under enormous pressure from the PMDB, other 
unions and the church to come to an agreement. After two weeks, the strike had ended.
The situation became extremely tense however, after workers returned to the factories and 
found themselves facing retaliation from employers. At Saab-Scania, management refused 
to pay for the days on strike and Volkswagen withdrew its early morning bus service. In 
each case, workers responded with protest stoppages and sit-down strikes. At the May Day 
demonstration (10 days before the end of the 45-day truce) there were 150,000 people in 
the streets of Säo Bernardo.86 Hundreds of thousands crammed into the Vila Euclides 
soccer stadium carrying placards and banners.87 Public servants, students, people from the 
amnesty movement and neighbourhood associations were united in popular 
demonstration.88 The strength of the protests forced the military to revoke its intervention 
of the Metalworkers’ Union of Säo Bernardo and return its leadership to those who had
81
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been legitimately elected by the rank-and-file -  this was a significant achievement for the 
new unionism in its search for autonomy from the state.89
A settlement was finally reached when most of the metalworkers’ unions, led by the 
Federation of Sao Paulo Metalworkers, accepted an offer of a 63 per cent wage rise for 
workers earning between 3 and 10 times the minimum wage -  this represented a wage 
increase of 6 per cent over the March 1978 settlement for most workers in the industry.90 
Lula decided that it was the best offer possible under the circumstances and convinced a 
mass meeting of 90,000 workers to accept it.91 The Minster of Labour soon announced 
Lula’s release and along with other purged leaders, was allowed to return to office, 
removing the intervention. Government officials assumed that they would be 
compromised in the eyes of their rank and file, however, the assumption was false -  the 
May Day rally brought an overwhelming show of support for Lula.
This was not just a blue-collar working class phenomenon, although it originated in the 
factories, the new unionism spread to also include white-collar workers. Many other social 
groups had been adversely affected by the government’s economic program and repression 
served to alienate many more people. The example set by the metalworkers served as an 
impetus for others to initiate work stoppages. Around 30 strikes involved key economic 
sectors such as urban transportation, ports, steel and trucking, whilst in industries such as 
banking, telecommunications and electricity, the mere threat of industrial action was 
sufficient to alarm employers and the government.94 Government workers flouted the law 
prohibiting strikes in the public sector -  Säo Paulo state civil servants walked out, as did 
their counterparts in the state of Rio Grande do Sul.95 The breakdown of strikes shows how 
metalworkers played a prominent role in the opposition to the government. In 1979, there 
were 27 strikes in the metallurgical sector, with 958,435 strikers.96 The primary and 
secondary teaching sector experienced the second highest rate of strike activity and number
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of strikers, with 16 strikes involving 752,000 teachers.97 This was remarkable given that 
historically, the teaching sector was characterised by low levels of labour conflict and strict 
government controls.
Even more remarkable were the number of public sector and bank employees who 
participated in industrial action -  in the former there were 5 strikes involving 387,998 and 
in the latter, 4 strikes with 105,000.98 Only a year earlier, laws had been further tightened to 
prevent strikes from disrupting ‘essential’ sectors -  DL 1632 increased the penalties for 
those involved in ‘illegal’ strikes in the banking and public service sector yet in spite of 
such restrictions, hundreds of thousands of white-collar workers took part in work 
stoppages. The DL 4330, a law which had been passed by the military after only two 
months in power, prohibited strikes in urban transport and yet, in 1979, there were 19 
strikes with 443,160 workers.99 Smaller stoppages were relatively peaceful but police 
repression and intervention against the unions occurred in every large strike.100 Pressure 
was placed on the government at all levels, through demonstrations, mass rallies and other 
organised protests.101 In total, almost 3.2 million workers went on strike during 1979.102
Through mobilisation, union leaders learned that grassroots organisation was fundamental 
to achieve popular support. Challenging the system of labour relations and bypassing its 
convoluted mechanisms of control was, therefore, highly subversive. In contrast to the pre- 
1964 period, the ‘authentic’ labour leaders did not gather their strength from positions 
offered in the state -  they gained it through organising workers on the shop floor.104 One of 
the major weaknesses of the labour movement during the democratic period and under the 
military was the lack of genuine representation. Union activity reinforced the shop-floor 
link between worker and union representative.1"  The new unionism, therefore, was 
characterised by close links to the workers at the firm level and a very activist posture in
97 ibid.
98 ibid.
99 ibid.
111(1 Beecham and Eidenham, ‘Beyond the Mass Strike’, op.cit., p.26.
11,1 Bava, ‘Neighbourhood Movements and the Trade Unions’, in Kowarick, op.cit., p.202.
11)2 Fausto, op.cit., p.303.
11)3 Salewicz, Stephen, ‘Corporatism and the Brazilian Labour Movement’, Latitudes, Vol. 2, 1992-1993, p.7. 
1(14 Erickson, Kenneth Paul, ‘Populism and Political Control of the Working Class in Brazil’, in Nash, June, 
Juan Corradi and Hobart Spalding Jr (eds), Ideology and Social Change in Latin America, New York: Gordon 
and Breach, 1977, p.217.
11)5 Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, op.cit., p.204.
135
collective bargaining.106 Labour activity posed a strong challenge to pelegos, confronting 
them with the possibility of losing their constituencies if they failed to support the new 
militancy.107
As a result of the new unionism, important changes occurred in labour relations. An 
unofficial system of independent relations between employers and workers parallel to the 
corporative system started to form roots.108 It increased space for trade union organising 
inside the plants.100 Years of repression and neglect meant that for many workers, their new 
found militancy was not merely about attaining wage increases -  it represented an 
affirmation of a new collective identity.110 This was also a movement which sought to 
reclaim the dignity and self-worth of a class which had been forced to bear the burdens of 
enforced industrialisation. The labour movement forced its presence onto the economic and 
political stage by bringing the most modern sectors of the economy to a virtual standstill 
and forcing the government to deal with its concerns.
c) 1980-1985
The early 1980s marks a period when labour militancy was curbed and repression was 
unleashed. President Figuereido was determined to maintain firm control of the transition in 
order to counter the strength of the labour movement and civil society. The government 
would no longer tolerate the political threat posed by the upsurge in worker and social 
mobilisation. When it came time to review their employment contract in 1980, the 
Metalworkers Union of Sao Bernardo prepared for another fight. It decided not only to 
press for salary increases but for improved safety conditions, a reduction of the work week 
from 48 to 40 hours, double pay for overtime and guarantees against workers being 
dismissed for participation in strikes.111 There were over 300 meetings per factory to set up 
the basic organisational structure for the strike -  workers elected a mobilisation committee 
made up of 400 representatives from all major business corporations which worked side by
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side with the leadership board and a union salary committee of 16 members in charge of 
running the strike.112 Discussion about what form the action should take went on in parish
113halls, neighbourhood associations, shantytowns and the CEBs. '
On 1 April, 200,000 metalworkers from unions in all four of the ABCD cities went on 
strike.114 Although the strike began in the ABCD area, it received the support of 
metalworkers in the industrial districts of the interior of Säo Paulo as well.115 Between 
40,000 and 80,000 workers regularly turned out for union assemblies in the local soccer 
stadium, even in the face of such explicit threats as flights by air force helicopters pointing 
machine guns at the assembled crowds.116 Even with the threat of force so vividly on 
display, ordinary Brazilians still continued to defy state authority. Figures put out by the 
union claimed that in total, 330,000 workers went out on strike, while even the government 
put the figure at 205,000 -  the strike embraced not only the ABCD suburbs, but nearly 40 
other cities throughout Säo Paulo state, making it the largest labour action in Brazil in 15
In response to popular demonstrations against the government, the Labour Minister ordered 
the Säo Bernardo Metalworkers Union closed and stripped Lula of its presidency on 17 
April -  within days, 1,600 union activists, including Lula, had been arrested. Vila 
Euclides soccer stadium was again closed off to the strikers and the military declared the 
workers represented an illegal “pressure group”, forbidding companies to negotiate.119 The 
tough stance was intended to demonstrate that despite concessions, the government would 
not allow such an open and widespread threat any longer. It encouraged companies to reject 
worker demands and asserted that the strike was political in nature, which meant a 
declaration of illegality.120 Despite support from the Säo Paulo Archdiocese, the strike was 
declared illegal by the Regional Labour Court and the union suffered intervention. Union
112 Moreira Alves, ‘Trade Unions in Brazil’, in Epstein, op.cit., p.54.
113 Bava, ‘Neighbourhood Movements and the Trade Unions’, in Kowarick, op.cit., p.209.
1,4 Sader and Silverstein, op.cit., p.45.
115 Moreira Alves, ‘Trade Unions in Brazil’, in Epstein, op.cit., p.54.
116 Erickson and Middlebrook, ‘The State and Organised Labour in Brazil and Mexico’, in Hewlett and 
Weinert, op.cit., p.247.
117 Greenfield, ‘Brazil’, in Greenfield and Maram, op.cit., pps. 106,83.
1 lx Sader and Silverstein, op.cit., p.45.
1,9 ibid.
1211 Greenfield, ‘Brazil’, in Greenfield and Maram, op.cit., p.83.
121 ibid.
137
headquarters were subsequently taken over by the military police and the army. Lula and 18 
other top leaders were charged under the National Security Law with the crime of
1 72organising an illegal strike.
Divisions in the military between the hard-line and soft-line factions led to internal disputes 
over how to handle popular protest. Faced with inflation and a mounting economic crisis, 
the hard-liners won out. Union halls were closed so workers met at the main Säo Bernardo 
church, leading President Figuereido to accuse Cardinal Arns of “inciting the workers to 
strike”. ' Union leaders had foreseen the repression and had set up alternative leadership 
and parallel structures so the stoppage could not be crushed with one blow.124 A strike fund 
was formally established and people organised in different states to obtain political and 
material backing for the protestors in Säo Bernardo -  money, food and medical supplies 
were donated by workers in all states, which set up regional strike funds of support and 
shipped the goods to Säo Bernardo as a sign of solidarity.12r> The mobilisation of 
neighbourhood committees and church-related organisations also contributed to the 
politicisation of working class communities.126 According to Silvio Caccia Bava, workers 
throughout the country thought of Säo Bernardo as “strike town” -  the movement 
symbolised a political watershed and a turning point in the struggle for demands which
127were shared by many people.
The military’s security forces however, occupied the whole town so that Säo Bernardo 
resembled a war zone. Armoured vehicles parked in conspicuous places, military 
helicopters flew over the town constantly, heavily armed military police or army soldiers 
guarded the occupied union headquarters and surrounded the churches to prevent workers 
from assembling.124 Säo Bernardo was under a virtual state of siege.130 When the 
government banned rallies in the streets or the soccer stadium, the movement’s organisation 
moved out into the neighbourhoods where a broad network of meetings in churches, parish
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halls and workers’ houses, all coordinated by the general strike committee, continued 
organising.131
Many opposition groups supported the strikers and there was a strong show of defiance on 
May Day 1980 in Sao Bernardo, when demonstrators forced the government to allow their 
planned rally.132 In order to show its total support for the strikers, the hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church celebrated a mass in the Cathedral of Sao Bernardo do Campo. 
Approximately 10,000 people assembled around the Cathedral to hear the mass being 
broadcast through loudspeakers. ' Helicopters circled above and armoured vehicles were 
parked in a ring just beyond the area. Different groups of workers began to arrive from all 
streets and the crowd slowly grew close to 100,000 people.174 Forming another ring around 
the military, workers intended to break the circle and join those who were caught between 
the troops and the Cathedral. Tension increased as protestors silently watched the troops 
and then began to shout slogans asking the soldiers not to obey their repressive orders. The 
workers began to sing songs of resistance while the Church hierarchy and opposition 
politicians negotiated with the army command. Finally, troops began to withdraw from the 
square to the applause of the thousands of workers still gathered in the area. Singing 
resistance songs, an estimated 120,000 people formed a long march and walked throughout 
the city until they reached the Vila Euclides stadium. May Day marked an important 
moment in the history of the new unionism. This was the first time that a direct order of the
1 33military government was disobeyed by those in the immediate command of the troops. ‘
Rank-and-file support, however, began to wane and by 11 May, the last of the strikers, the 
metalworkers of Sao Bernardo, voted to return to work.136 There was no prospect of 
negotiations with the government, repression was becoming more brutal day by day and 
resources were depleted.137 Despite the impressive level of resistance, the 41-day strike was 
eventually defeated.138 The Metalworkers Union of Sao Bernardo was placed under
131 Bava, ‘Neighbourhood Movements and the Trade Unions’, in Kowarick, op.cit., pps.210-211.
132 Greenfield, ‘Brazil’, in Greenfield and Maram, op.cit., p. 107.
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intervention and approximately 5,000 workers were laid off in reprisal for the strike. 
None of the workers’ demands were met and many companies deducted from salaries all 
the lost strike days. Although it had suffered setbacks, two important consequences 
emerged from the new unionism. Workers had set up a flexible structure of organisation 
with direct representation of the rank and file and the strikers developed a vast network of 
support throughout the country.140 Although it was defeated, the Sao Bernardo strike shook 
the very foundations of the government’s pay policy and of the official union structure 
itself.141
Between 1980 and 1983, the government was determined to control the pace and the nature 
of the abertura. In 1981, General Golberry do Couta e Silva, a key regime strategist stated: 
“Our strategy on the labour front is to wipe out a powerful movement that has turned to 
political provocation. It is a movement led astray by its leaders, who have gone beyond 
their original field of action”.14- As part of the military’s strategy, Lula was sentenced in 
1981 under the National Security Law to three and a half years in prison, although the 
verdict was brought to appeal and overturned.14, Brazil’s abertura was clearly limited. The 
military set out to actively strengthen its hold over the working class while paying lip- 
service to the ‘transition to democracy’ -  it sought to reassert its increasingly shaky grip. 
Although President Figuereido was instituting reform measures such as allowing new 
parties and negotiating the question of political amnesty, he also showed that this 
liberalisation did not apply to the working class.144
The incidence of large-scale labour protest also declined in this period due to the dismal 
economic situation. In 1981, GNP fell by 1.9 per cent, with industrial production falling by 
7.5 per cent.143 From 1980 onwards, trade unions were placed on the defensive -  economic 
recession, unemployment and massive layoffs dramatically reduced the number and 
intensity of labour conflicts. According to figures from the Institute? Brasileiro de 
Geografia e Estatistica in mid-1981, more than 900,000 people lost their jobs in the 6
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major metropolitan areas of Brazil and by August, unemployment in those cities was 
estimated at 2,000,000.146 A DIEESE study completed in June 1981 shows 12.8 per cent 
unemployment in the metropolitan area of Sao Paulo alone and 18.4 per cent 
underemployment among those who had jobs.147 Increasing rates of inflation hit workers 
hard, rising from 110.2 per cent in 1980 to 211.0 in 1984; the price of basic goods, 
primarily foodstuffs, rose even faster.148 According to DIEESE figures, the amount of 
labour time necessary to earn a basic basket of goods at the minimum wage went from 138 
hours in 1978 to 163 hours in 1981.149 Brazil experienced one of the worst years ever in
1983 -  GNP plunged by over 4 per cent while inflation climbed by 239 per cent -  causing 
huge losses in real wages.150
Even though the combination of government repression and economic factors decreased the 
intensity of labour action, worker activism was kept alive through the factory commissions 
and organisation continued in many plants in the early 1980s. While the number of 
industry-wide strikes decreased between 1979 and 1984, the strengthening of links between 
union leadership and rank-and-file organisation was reflected in the significant increase in
1984 in the number of short strikes in single plants, which totaled 626.151 Workers held 
strikes within factories in order to pressure management to recognise the right to union 
representation and the freedom to organise inside companies. In 1981, Ford recognised the 
union as a bargaining agent and formally accepted a factory committee. The following year, 
workers elected a factory committee of 28 to handle grievances and to negotiate directly 
with the Human Relations Department of Ford. When workers went on strike at the 
Volkswagen plant in 1983 demanding a 40-hour week, management decided to accept the 
reduction of the weekly workload but linked it to a 20 per cent cut in pay. “ To support its 
proposal, the company presented a petition with 22,000 signatures. ‘ Alleging that these 
were obtained under pressure, the Metalworkers Union of Sao Bernardo suggested that a 
plebiscite be held to properly establish employee views. The plebiscite was held, with the
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company’s proposal losing by a large majority. This was the first time in Brazilian history 
that a corporation agreed to hold secret elections to resolve a labour issue.154
The Volkswagen dispute led to several gains for workers in management negotiations. In 
April 1983, violent protests occurred in Säo Paulo, with jobless workers storming the state 
governor’s palace in a March Against Unemployment. The same month also witnessed a 
strike of 10,000 automobile workers in Sao Jose do Campo which shutdown General 
Motors. To demonstrate their solidarity, Sao Bernardo metalworkers engaged in a 
slowdown. They also helped orchestrate a major strike action in July 1983 involving oil 
workers in various parts of the nation and staged a sympathy strike of their own that 
paralysed Brazil’s major automobile manufacturing plants.135 One of the most significant 
strikes of the early 1980s was that of the petrochemical workers in Paulinia (Sao Paulo 
state) and Mataripe (Bahia) which led to the first general strike in Brazil since the military 
coup of 1964. Workers organised a 5-day strike to protest against the enactment of a law 
which had annulled many of the benefits received in previous years.156 The strike in both 
states was violently repressed, with government intervention in both unions. Chemical 
workers, bus drivers and glass workers also went on strike to express their support. In the 
ABC region alone, 100,000 workers joined the solidarity movement which ended with 
another intervention in the Metalworkers Union of Säo Bernardo -  these events culminated 
in a 24-hour strike involving over 3 million workers throughout Brazil in July 1983 against 
the economic policies of the government.1^7
The strength of the new unionism was apparent in the large corporations -  management 
bypassed the military’s restrictions and negotiated directly with union leaders for contracts 
which were subsequently approved by government administrators.158 As a result of their 
tight organisation at rank-and-file level inside the factories, workers were able to guarantee 
the de facto functioning of their union even during periods of official government 
intervention.156 Nationwide strikes continued -  in October 1984 thousands of workers and 
students in Rio and Säo Paulo took to the streets to protest government austerity measures,
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particularly a presidential decree limiting pay rises to 80 per cent of cost of living 
increases.160 In 1985, there was a major strike in the metalworking industries that continued 
intermittently for 2 months. The resurgence of protest on a massive scale illustrated the 
ongoing strength of rank-and-file organisation inside the factories and demonstrated that 
the new unionism continued to function despite the government crackdown.
LABOUR 'S LEADERSHIP ROLE IN CIVIL SOCIETY
Brazil’s new unionism had a massive impact on the transition -  the nature of opposition not 
only changed, but it also intensified. It was not a movement that was confined to the 
working class, its strength derived in many ways from the backing of many community 
organisations. The new unionism helped to create consciousness and awareness of social 
injustices. Once demands became broader and more overtly political, the labour movement 
moved beyond an emphasis on shop-floor and industrial relations issues and championed 
the demands and concerns of the lower classes more generally.161 In particular, the new 
unionism questioned Brazil’s rapid development model and the extreme inequalities which 
it generated -  it encouraged the urban poor to take social and political action in their 
neighbourhoods where the government had failed to deliver necessary services. Worker 
demands raised awareness in thtfavelas  and led to grassroots associations which sought to 
address local government and urban issues such as the provision of water, electricity, 
sewers, transport and schools. Labour became in effect, a banner and a megaphone for 
subaltern groups.162 Amongst the many groups that flourished during this time were 
squatters’ organisations, the Catholic CEBs, the amnesty movement and the cost of living 
movement. In the larger Brazilian context of widespread poverty and repression, these 
forms of popular organisation became the only legitimate places for organising
1 z o
grievances. '
Opposition to the military dictatorship was not restricted to the popular classes, it also 
included politicians and business and professional associations such as the Brazilian Bar
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Association (Ordern dos Advogados do Brasil -  OAB) and the Brazilian Press Association 
(Associacao Brasileira de Imprensa -  ABI). Calling for the rule of law and an end to the 
military’s censorship of the press, these associations represented significant portions of the 
middle class who voiced their concerns and joined the collective call for democratisation. 
Both sought to bring the public’s attention to the government’s use of torture and arbitrary 
arrests, and demanded that the military regime issue an amnesty and repeal IA-5. Above all, 
however, the most important contribution of the new unionism was the creation of a left- 
wing party which became a vehicle for the integration of popular and middle-class 
demands.
CREATION OF THE WORKERS PARTY: LINKING UP MASS RESISTANCE
A new socialist-based party was the most important development to emerge from the new 
unionism. When the military allowed new parties to form in 1979, the PT was created in 
October and was officially launched on 10 February the following year. It was based in Säo 
Paulo where the core of the nationally known labour leadership associated with the new 
unionism was located and a mass base had already manifested itself in the strikes of the late 
1970s.164 One of the main reasons behind the creation of the PT was not only to represent 
worker interests, but also to provide a platform to link the various social movements. It 
sought to prove an institutional avenue for the experiences gained during the new unionism. 
By the time the PT was formed, the question of the participation of the workers was no 
longer an abstract discussion among intellectuals, but rather had been placed on the agenda 
of the debate about democracy by the actions of the labour movement itself.165
As a vehicle for genuine worker representation, the PT, for the first time in Brazilian 
history, allowed workers to have a voice in national politics. It was a party which insisted 
both on addressing worker demands and on the need for workers to have an independent 
political voice. Defying the Brazilian tradition of elitist parties, the PT was organised from 
the bottom-up, a feature known as ‘b a s i s m o Grassroots mobilisation and direct 
participation in the formulation of policies were central themes in party meetings and
u’4 Keck, op.cit., p.72.
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conventions. It also refused to join with the PMDB and form alliances with other parties -  
instead, the PT established itself as an alternative to other Brazilian opposition parties. It 
was formed in order to genuinely express worker concerns and encourage popular 
participation, without any ties to the official bureaucracy or government structure. Workers 
were not the only members, also included were rural unions and peasant leagues, CEBs and 
church organisations that worked with landless peasants, former communist militants or 
militants of the ‘armed left’, groups of leftist revolutionaries, intellectuals, members of the 
middle class and parliamentary deputies.166 Because of the broad make-up of the party, it 
did not have a fixed ideology or agenda, rather, it defined itself as a ‘socialist’ party which 
addressed social justice issues, grassroots democracy and economic redistribution in favour 
of poorer groups. Some of the PT’s main themes were the decentralisation of political 
power, government accountability to social movements and a reversal of priorities away 
from elite groups toward the disadvantaged.167
Hoping that the new party law would split the opposition, the military assumed the labour 
movement would be unable to provide a united political front. The Workers’ Party 
however, represented a serious political threat to the status quo and the military carried out 
acts of sabotage throughout the early 1980s in a concerted effort to demoralise members. In 
early 1980, the party’s offices in Campo Grande (Mato Gross do Sul) were burned to the 
ground and activists in several other regions were arrested for promoting the new party. In 
February 1981, 15 members of the PT were arrested in the states of Amazonas, Ceara, 
Bahia, Brasilia and Säo Paulo for protesting against the scheduled trials of Lula and 12 
other union leaders. A month later, the PT’s headquarters in Säo Paulo were burgled -  
documents and other materials were taken and though no proof was ever found, party 
leaders suspected it was the work of the military.168
Despite government hostility, the PT gradually increased its electoral strength, fought back 
and continued to mobilise in the push for democratisation. At the end of 1982, it had 
245,000 members, with 64,000 in Säo Paulo, 35,000 in Minas Gerais, 36,000 in Rio de
166 Lowy, Michael and Arthur Denner, ‘A New Type of Party: The Brazilian PT’, Latin American- 
Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 4, Autumn 1987, p.456.
167 Abers, Rebecca, ‘From Ideas to Practice: The Partido dos Trabalhadores and Participatory Governance in 
Brazil’, Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn 1996, pps.37-38.
I6K The above account is from Sader and Silverstein, op.cit., p .51.
145
Janeiro, and 16,000 in Rio Grande do Sul.169 Lula became the first president of the PT and, 
in 1982, ran on the PT ticket for governor of the state of Sao Paulo -  although finishing in 
fourth place, he won more than one million votes. To support the diretas ja! campaign in 
1983, the PT held a large public rally which illustrated its commitment to democratisation. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the PT steadily built its electoral base and increased its 
national profile. In the November 1986 Congressional elections, the PT increased its 
percentage of votes to 6.2 per cent and elected 17 federal deputies.171 Lula was elected to 
Congress with more votes than any other deputy, including PMDB president Ulysses 
Guimaraes, and key PT members also received Congressional seats, such as party president 
Dutra (of the Porto Alegre bank workers) and Vasconcelos (of the Joäo Monlevade 
metalworkers).172 Other PT members were elected to state legislatures -  they went from a 
total of 12 in 4 states to 33 in 13 states.17'1
Sectors of the population hitherto excluded from formal politics were mobilised though the 
party’s extension of its support base. In the presidential elections of December 1989, Lula 
came close to winning the presidency and received more than 31 million votes.174 In the 
second round of the elections, Lula was closely beaten by the PDS candidate Fernando 
Collor de Mello, who received 42.75 per cent, compared to his 37.86.175 Undeniably, its 
most important achievement was in the 2002 elections in which the PT won the presidency. 
Lula won 61 per cent compared to the PDS candidate, Jose Sera who gained 39 per cent of 
the national vote.176 This translated into 52.8 million votes for Lula which was a larger 
absolute total than has ever been achieved by a presidential candidate in Brazilian history 
and in a democracy.
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CONCLUSION
The Brazilian labour movement was historically excluded from the ruling alliance -  
although the post-World War II democratic period appeared to herald a new dawn, in 
reality, workers were used as pawns in the shifting and precarious coalitions which 
characterised Brazilian politics. Populism was used as a tool to manipulate worker interests 
and maintain the subordinate position of the labour movement. The only parties which 
claimed to represent workers were elitist, clientelist instruments of the state which had no 
ties to the rank-and-file.
Relying not only on force, the military regime enacted various legal and corporatist 
measures to repress working class protest. The dictatorship did not have the political 
resources necessary to split the labor movement, such as the ability to bribe the labour 
leadership as a way of counteracting dissent in the same way as the Mexican regime which 
could control the rank-and-file by manipulating the labour leadership -  charrismo. 
Opposition was even more dangerous for the military because it occurred from outside the 
channels of control and was therefore, much more difficult to contain. In Mexico, the 
formation of the PRD was the result of an internal split within the regime -  essentially, it 
was a rebellion of the political elite. In Brazil, however, it was the opposite -  the challenge 
to the system originated outside the regime’s mechanisms of control and took an electoral 
form that had its roots in the new unionism. The PT emerged independent of the 
government and as such, it presented a radical, autonomous challenge which was viewed by 
the military as dangerous, given its solid base of popular support. In the context of 
repression and a society where politics was the domain of the elite few, the new unionism 
and the creation of the PT was an explosive development. It was alarming for the military 
because it questioned the basis upon which Brazilian society had been constructed by 
demanding the inclusion of the subaltern classes in politics.
The significance of the new unionism in Brazil was in the way that it opened up the 
political space during a period when repression was still ongoing, despite liberalisation. As 
soon as the new unionism surfaced, worker opposition helped push the transition to 
democracy forward. Worker struggles allowed other sectors in society to raise their 
demands and participate in the nationwide call for an end to the military regime. The new
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unionism gave a voice to subordinate classes -  it not only raised political consciousness but 
it also led to new forms of popular, grassroots organisation. Once labour placed 
redemocratisation on the agenda, white-collar, professional groups, as well as the popular 
classes, joined the broader democratisation movement.
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CHAPTER 6: THE SOUTH KOREAN TRANSITION
INTRODUCTION
The 1992 presidential elections in South Korea signaled the beginning of a new era. Kim 
Young Sam became the first civilian president after more than 30 years of military rule. As 
a key figure in the opposition to authoritarianism, Kim gained his democratic credentials 
during some of the most brutal years of dictatorship. Efforts to democratise the country, 
however, were not restricted to members of the oppositional elite. Whether it was rebellion 
against Japanese colonialism in the early to mid-twentieth century, student protests in 
favour of democracy during the 1960s, or the formation of democratic trade unions led by 
female workers in the 1970s, the power and authority of the state has regularly been 
challenged. In each instance, popular resistance was stifled but it was never completely 
eradicated.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, important sectors of the popular classes began to present 
a systematic challenge. The rapid industrialisation of South Korea from 1961 onwards laid 
the foundations for the downfall of authoritarianism. Profound economic, industrial and 
social transformation not only strengthened the ability of the working class to organise, but 
also created a large middle class which was repulsed by the excesses of authoritarianism 
and which allied itself with the labour movement in the push for democratic change. They 
were joined by students, intellectuals and religious groups in a broad alliance which spilled 
out into the streets to collectively voice their demands. It was not until the 1980s when the 
combined strength of different social forces, led by the labour movement, was powerful 
enough to pressure the state on an enormous, unprecedented scale and force the military to 
democratise. In this regard, the Korean case differs significantly from Mexico and Brazil in 
that the opposition was more sustained, combative and organised.
However, South Korea’s transition to democracy displays several similarities with Mexico 
and Brazil. Controlled liberalisation in the early 1980s was initiated by the military regime 
as a way of counteracting mounting criticism and lack of legitimacy. Once the political
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space was opened however, unremitting protest was responsible for maintaining the 
momentum for democratisation and led to the June 1987 democracy declaration. The 
regime’s failure to incorporate the popular sectors meant that when political dissent 
erupted, it was on an uncontrollable scale -  a situation which has parallels with the 
Brazilian case. Similarly to Brazil, the Korean state did not establish institutional channels 
through which popular opposition could be harnessed by the state.
HISTORY OF RESISTANCE -  KOREAN POPULAR FORCES 
a) JAPANESE COLONIALISM (1910-45)
When the Japanese annexed Korea as a colony in 1910, almost five centuries of 
uninterrupted rule under the Yi dynasty came to an abrupt end. During the Yi period, 
politics was dominated by the yangban, an elite landowning class whose political power 
and social status resided in land ownership and control over the state. Although the 
yangban collaborated with the Japanese, many Koreans actively fought against the 
imposition of foreign rule. Nationalist and independence movements emerged as a source 
of resistance. Established in exile, the Korean Provisional Government became a centre of 
nationalist opposition outside the country.1 2 Within Korea, student, worker, intellectual, 
religious, cultural and farmers groups were formed in order to resist the Japanese. In 1925, 
there were 180 politically oriented societies, including 300 religious youth societies, 128 
labour organisations, 44 youth societies and others which advocated political, economic 
and social reforms. Such organisations were limited due to strict control over their 
activities. Japanese cultural policy permitted carefully controlled books and newspapers, 
regulated school curricula, banned the teaching of the Korean language and rewrote the 
country’s history.3
Creation of a large military and police force was designed to curb the level and impact of 
anti-Japanese sentiment. The harsh nature of Japanese colonialism also led to the
1 Hamilton, Clive, Capitalist Industrialisation in Korea, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986, p.18.
2 Nahm, Andrew C., Korea: Tradition and Transformation. A History o f the Korean People, 2nd ed.,
Elizabeth, New Jersey: Hollym International Corp, 1996, p.278.
2 Hamilton, Clive, op.cit., p.18.
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emergence of Korean nationalism. This was most forcefully expressed in the ‘March First 
Movement’ of 1919, in which two million Koreans participated in nationwide protests 
against colonial rule.4 5 Japanese property and police stations were attacked and a 
Declaration of Independence was issued calling for a free Korea and replacement of the old 
regime with a democratic constitution guaranteeing civil liberties.3 Alarmed, the Japanese 
brutally crushed the movement resulting in the deaths of several thousand people.
Posing the most serious threat however, was the labour movement. Under colonialism, 
labour formed the most organised resistance and played a leading role in backing and 
instigating rebellion amongst other sectors in society, including peasants and students. For 
this reason, the colonial government attempted to suppress all forms of labour activity, 
particularly in the 1920s which was characterised by labour disputes, peasant rebellions and 
student-led agitation. Strikes were led by dockworkers and miners who voiced economic 
and political demands.6 Unions began to emerge throughout the country with similar 
notions and various nationwide labour organisations were formed.7 However, laws enacted, 
particularly the Public Peace Act of 1925, provided the legal justification for worker 
persecution.8 A variety of tactics were used to suppress union activity, including 
prohibiting workers’ rallies and arresting union leaders.9 The Korean Communist Party was 
founded in 1925 and actively struggled against the Japanese, however, arrests and state 
repression restricted its ability to organise. In the 1930s and early 1940s, labour was driven 
underground as a result of systematic and harsh persecution but in the process, it developed 
closer ties to the communist movement.10
Despite repression, resistance continued -  peasants formed unions and councils to protest 
Japanese agricultural policies, holding demonstrations, hunger strikes and in some cases, 
refusing to cultivate and harvest.11 Students were also active in the anti-colonial struggle,
4 Rees, David, A Short History o f Modern Korea, Isle of Man: Ham Publishing, 1988, p.66.
5 Hamilton, Clive, op.cit., p. 18.
6 Kim, Hwang-Joe, ‘The Korean Union Movement in Transition’, in Frenkel, Stephen (ed), Organised Labour 
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ILR Press, 1993, p. 134.
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10 Koo, Hagen, ‘The State, Minjung and the Working Class in South Korea’, in Koo, Hagen (ed), State and 
Society in Contemporary Korea, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 134.
11 Kang, Man-gil, A History o f Contemporary Korea, Folkstone, Kent: Global Oriental, 2005, p.44.
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protesting against Japanese education and cultural programs and in the wider push for 
independence. For example, formed in 1924, the General League of Korean Youth was 
active in the independence movement and included 223 youth organisations with over 
37,000 members.12 Popular mobilisation represented a serious danger for the Japanese -  as 
long as it could be managed through the extensive security apparatus, it could be prevented 
from deposing the government. In the next period, mass empowerment created the 
necessary conditions for a genuine democratic government.
b) U.S. MILITARY OCCUPATION (1945-48)
Defeat of the Axis powers in World War II resulted in the sudden collapse of Japanese 
colonialism on 15 August, 1945. Korea’s abrupt liberation left a vacuum which was 
immediately filled by nationwide political mobilisation. Influenced by communism, 
‘peoples’ committees’ were formed, numbering 145 by the end of August. They 
functioned as basic units of government, freeing political prisoners and maintaining law 
and order.14 The underground labour movement emerged to take over and run factories that 
had been hastily abandoned by the Japanese and some factories were operated by peoples’ 
committees. Workers soon transformed these committees into unions and established the 
National Council of Korean Trade Unions (Chun Pyung) to unite the unions.13
Many intellectuals and labour activists who led the independence movement under 
colonialism were responsible for forming Chun Pyung which soon comprised 16 affiliated 
industrial federations and nearly 1,200 local unions.16 Chun Pyung’s initial membership of 
180,000 increased within two months to 553,408 in 224 branches and 1757 local unions.17 
On 6 September, 1945, local peoples’ committee representatives and national leaders met in
12 ibid., p.48.
13 Hart-Landsberg, Martin, ‘South Korea: The “Miracle” Rejected’, Critical Sociology, Vol. 15, No. 3, Fall 
1988, p.31.
14 ibid.
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17 Kwon, Seung-Ho and Michael O'Donnell, ‘Repression and Struggle: The State, the Chaebol and 
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Seoul to organise the Korean People’s Republic (KPR).1S The KPR took over national 
administration and control over press and radio, while many groups such as workers,
students and farmers formed organisations and associated with the KPR.14 For a few weeks,
20the KPR achieved de facto sovereignty.
Popular organisation, however, did not last long. Cold War geopolitics put an end to the 
intense mobilisation which emerged after the fall of colonialism. The spread of left-wing 
mobilisation represented a fundamental obstacle to the consolidation of a Southeast Asian 
bulwark against communism. The US containment strategy resulted in the establishment of 
a government that was virulently anti-communist. In September 1945, US forces arrived 
and established the US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). Heading the 
new Korean government was Syngman Rhee, a conservative political figure who shared the 
USAMGIK’s deep distrust of left-wing politics. Wasting little time, Rhee and US forces 
openly declared war on the KPR, ruling its activities illegal in the south and attacking Chun 
Pyung in December 1945.21 The factories which had been taken over by the committees 
were seized and strikes were outlawed.22 In order to combat the challenge posed by Chun 
Pyung, the government established the right-wing and anti-communist Confederation of 
Korean Trade Unions (CKTU) in March 1946. Formation of the CKTU established an 
important precedent -  the official trade union movement was transformed into an 
appendage of the state.
Between September and November 1946, popular resistance to Rhee and the USAMGIK 
reached new heights and several provinces were gripped by demonstrations. The province 
of Pusan was hit first in September 1946, when a general strike led by Chun Pyung spread 
throughout Korea to involve 251,000 workers. This was followed by demonstrations and 
massive rioting the following month in Taegu.24 Peasant rebellions known as the Autumn 
Harvest Uprisings, swept throughout the Kyongsang and Cholla provinces.25 Alarmed at
lx Hart-Landsberg, ‘South Korea’, op.cit., p.31.
19 ibid., p.32.
20 Hamilton, Clive, op.cit., p.21.
21 Hart-Landsberg, ‘South Korea’, op.cit., p.32.
22 ibid., p.32.
23 Cumings, Bruce, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981, p.354.
24 ibid., p.356.
25 ibid., p.351.
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the rapid spread of the rebellion, the USAMGIK declared martial law in Taegu and U.S. 
troops, along with the local police force were sent in to help break the strikes and end the 
spreading insurrection. It is estimated that 30,000 people were arrested in the autumn of 
1946, including 11,624 Chun Pyung workers.26 Systematic repression destroyed Chun 
Pyung -  it ceased to exist.
The end of Japanese colonialism signaled new prospects for the establishment of a 
democratic Korea. When this was dashed by the arrival of the USAMGIK and Syngman 
Rhee, Koreans continued to resist through the creation of political organisations and 
uprisings which defied the imposition of rule by another foreign power. State repression, 
however, resulted in the destruction of the left -  it would be another decade before the left 
would re-emerge as a significant force.
c) SYNGMAN RHEE (1948-1960) -  DESTRUCTION OF THE LEFT & 
THE KOREAN WAR
Although Rhee was elected as president in July 1948, the newly established Republic of 
Korea (15 August, 1948) faced immense problems from its inception. Riots, strikes and 
demonstrations in the cities and the countryside continued to plague the new regime. 
Elections were held but they were largely a sham -  Rhee’s political power resided in the 
repressive apparatus and US support. The military and police were crucial in crushing the 
left and Rhee’s political opponents. Providing billions in military and financial aid, the US 
provided the South Korean government with the resources necessary to maintain the 
instruments of control and intimidation. Enacted in December 1948, the National Security 
Law was used to tighten controls over the press and arrest opposition, particularly from the 
organised left. Under Rhee, there was a wholesale purge of ‘disloyal’ elements in the army, 
police, press and educational establishments. Some 90,000 people were arrested in an 
eight month period in 1948-49.28
26 ibid., p.379.
27 Hamilton, Clive, op.cit., p.23.
28 ibid.
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Systematic destruction of leftist forces was completed as a result of the devastating effects 
of the Korean War. During the three years of war between 1950 and 1953, fighting touched 
almost the entire country. Seoul changed hands four times and was almost totally destroyed 
in the process. Nearly one million Korean civilians as well as 320,000 Korean soldiers 
were killed.10 Property damage was estimated at $2 billion.31 Thousands of people were 
killed or jailed without trial. Acting under the wartime emergency, Rhee’s regime executed 
thousands of leftists and many more fled to North Korea. “ Nowhere was this crackdown on 
leftist organisation more evident than in the labour movement -  independent worker 
organisation virtually ceased to exist and South Korea’s official labour movement came 
under government control.
d) STUDENT  ‘REVOLUTION ’ OF I960 & DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
By early 1960, the unpopularity of the Rhee regime was widespread. Two crucial events led 
to its downfall. First, the government rigged vice-presidential elections in March 1960 so 
that its candidate, Yi Ki-bung, would win. Second, a student was killed by a tear gas 
canister in demonstrations against Rhee. These two events instigated a widespread revolt 
against the Rhee regime. On 19 April 1960, more than 30,000 students in Seoul 
demonstrated and 130 were killed while thousands were wounded." Known as the ‘April 
student revolution’, massive student protests continued throughout the country and martial 
law was declared. Hundreds of university professors defied martial law and gathered in the 
capital to call for Rhee’s resignation.’4 Although protests were mainly led by the small 
urban educated classes, broader discontent with the regime was rife. When the military 
refused to fire on protestors, Rhee resigned and fled the country. The April student uprising 
demonstrated the ability of popular resistance to bring down an authoritarian government -  
although popular forces had been weakened by the effects of repression and war, by the 
early 1960s they had effectively reorganised and forced Rhee out of power.
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Democratic elections in July 1960 installed Chang Myon, leader of the opposition under 
Rhee, the Democratic Party, as President. Various political and economic problems 
crippled the new regime and it lacked widespread support in Korean society. Members of 
the Democratic Party shared much of the same social and educational background as 
Rhee’s Liberal Party, thus it was not directly representative of the forces that had brought 
about the April student revolution.35 The explosion of renewed political activity, 
particularly within the student and labour movement, also contributed to destabilising the 
government. In an open political environment and with a weak and divided (but far less 
repressive) government, Koreans took to the streets -  during the 10 months the government 
was in power around 2,000 demonstrations took place, involving one million people.16 New 
labour organisations sprouted and launched a movement to combine and unite fragmented 
labour groups. '7 The first wave of labour disputes occurred almost immediately, numbering 
227. After the 1960 revolution, the union movement was characterised by a struggle of 
the rank and file to assert the legitimacy of worker activity independent of the
39government.'
Renewed mobilisation of the popular classes, coupled with factional strife, economic crisis 
and unstable government, alarmed the South Korean military. As a result, a military coup in 
May 1961 led to the overthrow of democracy. At the end of the 1950s, South Korea had 
few autonomous political organisations -  in this context, the stirring of students and the 
educated middle class in April 1960 was felt as a titanic disturbance at the centre.40 The 
student revolution gave workers a brief opportunity to seek an autonomous path but this 
failed in the wake of the military coup.41 A darker era for autonomous labour organisation 
was on the horizon.
35 Cole and Lyman, op.cit., p.31.
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THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE UNDER PARK (1961-79)
a) AUTHORITARIANISM CONTINUES
Led by General Park Chung Hee, the military coup of May 1961 was a reaction against 
rising mass mobilisation. The military viewed itself as a modernising force which would 
foster economic development through the assumption of state power -  organised left-wing 
dissent was perceived as a threat to national security. The volatility of the Chun Myung 
period proved to senior military officials that the popular classes needed to be controlled. 
Immediately, Korea was placed under martial law and a special military tribunal was 
appointed to purge the military, government and society of people that the junta regarded as 
corrupt or undesirable.42 Political activity of any kind was prohibited and strict controls 
over the press were implemented. Anti-communist laws were passed and anyone suspected 
of being a communist was arrested. A key instrument of control in the authoritarian state 
was the creation of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) established in June 
1961, an agency with extensive surveillance powers. Park, however, sought to maintain a 
semblance of democratic procedure. From October 1963, elections were held regularly, but 
they were rigged -  the results always guaranteed victory for the government party, the 
Democratic Republican Party (DRP). The opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) was 
allowed to run against the DRP but the existence of an opposition party was merely for 
show -  the NDP had no real power. Superficially democratic institutions were grafted onto 
a coercive state apparatus comprised of the military, police, the KCIA and the personal 
authority of Park.43
Park’s wide-ranging network of control was designed to suppress the activities of one 
group in particular -  the labour movement. Cold War politics dictated the state’s attitude 
towards worker activism. Left-wing trade unionism was banned because it was viewed as 
harmful to social stability. Anti-communism became the basis of state ideology. Labour 
was completely excluded -  its political activities were prohibited and no legitimate pro-
" Eckert et al, op.cit., p.360.
44 Sohn, Hak-kyu, Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea, London and New York: Routledge, 
1989, p.20.
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labour or left-wing political parties were allowed to exist.44 Creating a subordinate, pro­
government trade union federation was one of Park’s chief priorities and in August 1961, 
the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) was established, replacing the CKTU. It 
was organised into 16 industrial federations comprising 2,359 unions and 336,974 
members.45 The FKTU was administered by an executive committee made up of nine men, 
each one hand-picked by the KCIA.46 It had complete control over the 16 national-level 
industrial unions which, in turn, exercised statutory powers over regional and branch-levels 
-  essentially, it was a top-down chain of command.47 Legislation was also enacted which 
prohibited union involvement in politics. Essentially, the FKTU served to moderate union 
demands, carry out government policy and monitor worker activity.
Various methods were employed to enforce obedience amongst workers. The Labour Union 
Law gave the government the exclusive right to remove the leadership of any union or 
decertify any union if they contravened the law or, in the words of the legislation, were 
“likely to harm public benefit”.48 This made unions dependent on the state for legal 
recognition and the right to formally represent worker interests.49 Precluding the possibility 
of forming a labour party, the Labour Union Law prevented unions from forming, 
cooperating with or contributing money to any political party.50 Such legislation was 
designed to leave only government-sanctioned institutions, such as the Ministry of Labour, 
various labour committees and the FKTU as vehicles for the representation of worker 
interests.51 Strikes were declared illegal and lengthy procedures were prescribed for 
conciliation and dispute mediation under the Labour Dispute Adjustment Law. Third 
party intervention in union activities was banned in a direct attempt to prevent linkages 
between workers and student groups, political parties and activist church organisations.53 
The dominant institution making the decision on wage rates was the labour-management
44 You, Jong-U, ‘Changing Capital-Labour Relations in South Korea’, in Schor and You, op.cit., p.l 19.
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council rather than direct bargaining between unions and firms -  workers were often forced 
to join company-controlled labour-management councils rather than unions.54
The state also used coercion and violence as a way of restricting worker dissent. At the 
forefront was the KCIA which was in direct charge of information gathering and 
surveillance activities of labour activists.55 The KCIA penetrated nearly every arena of 
Korean life, with agents in factories, central and local government offices and university 
classrooms.56 Dissident workers were blacklisted and their names and personal information 
widely circulated among industries to prevent them from obtaining employment.57 Military 
style management in some factories was particularly harsh -  management often hired thugs 
to keep disobedient workers in line and beatings were not uncommon.
Ideology was employed in an attempt to maintain a submissive workforce. Emphasising 
familial labour-management relations, the Saemaul Movement (New Community 
Movement) stressed the workers’ moral obligation to work overtime and obedience toward
CO
management. Its three catch phrases, ‘diligence’, ‘self-reliance’ and ‘cooperation’ were 
actively implemented at the factory level.59 To instill fear in workers, the threat of invasion 
from communist North Korea was routinely invoked by the state. The government’s anti­
communist ideology made it difficult to mount any form of opposition -  it was likely to be 
branded as communist and therefore, illegal. Under Park, all the methods of maintaining 
labour quiescence were drawn together to form, at first, a nearly impenetrable mesh.60 
Mounting opposition from civil society and the labour movement in particular, however, 
began to penetrate the mesh in the 1970s.
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b) THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE & KOREAN WORKERS
Park’s military coup was viewed by many South Koreans as an illegitimate assumption of 
power -  as a result, he sought political legitimacy through the pursuit of economic growth. 
An important motive behind the military coup was to make South Korea an industrial and 
military powerhouse through rapid industrialisation. Ironically though, it was through rapid 
economic growth that the seeds of dissent were sown and the groundwork was laid for 
Park’s demise. The role of the state in stimulating and directing economic development was 
integral to Korea’s industrialisation. Institutional structures were established to support and 
propel development. These included the Economic Planning Board (EPB), established in 
1961. The EPB was responsible for outlining, budgeting and implementing the state’s 
economic plans. Nationalisation of the banking system and control over credit was also a 
cornerstone of industrial policy. By controlling the flow of finance, the state was able to 
target specific industries for export-oriented industrialisation (EOI).
Park’s government actively intervened in the market to coordinate, guide and discipline the 
private sector through strategic allocation of resources and the use of diverse policy 
instruments.61 These included tariff exemptions, tax reductions and a preferential credit rate 
for exporters as well as access to foreign loans, low interest rates and licenses for major 
investment projects. The major vehicles for industrial policy were huge privately-owned 
conglomerates called chaebol, the largest of which -  Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo and 
Lucky-Goldstar -  became household names.63 Government support of the chaebol led to 
their unusually rapid growth, expanding five to nine times faster than the economy as a 
whole.64 By 1987, nine of the largest chaebols made up 63.6 per cent of South Korea’s
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GNP and the ten biggest accounted for 23 per cent of value-added and 11 per cent of 
employment.65
Big business colluded with the state in suppressing labour activity. The availability of state 
riot police at management’s request often escalated strikes into violent clashes.66 South 
Korea’s competitive edge was largely the result of cheap labour. But extremely long 
working hours, high rates of worker accidents, hazardous working conditions, in 
conjunction with low wage rates, made the situation ripe for the explosion of discontent. 
Workers often expressed their despair and the miserable conditions in which they worked 
through poems, songs and writings.67 As with the ‘new unionism’ in Brazil in the 1970s, 
workers sought broader political change in the form of democracy and an end to 
exploitation and despotic management. As a result, labour volatility began to increase from 
the late 1960s onwards.
This increase in worker opposition was a direct consequence of rapid industrialisation. The 
swiftness and abrupt nature of economic transformation was enormous. In the space of 
three decades, South Korea advanced to first-world nation status. In 1963, it was one of the 
poorest countries in the world. GNP per capita was $87 dollars in 1962; by 1990, it had 
increased to $5,199.68 This placed it in the upper-middle-income economies by the World 
Bank.69 Industrial production accounted for a mere 9 per cent of the GNP in 1962, but it 
increased to 31 per cent in 1985, while the share of agricultural production dropped from 43 
per cent to 15 per cent.70 Statistics on trade levels and GNP growth also highlight the extent 
to which South Korea’s economy boomed. International trade volume in 1965 was only 
$650 million, accounting for 21 per cent of GDP; the figure increased to $12.35 billion in 
1975 and $61.42 billion in 1985.71 The trade volume rose more than 20 times within two
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decades and since 1975 has consistently accounted for more than 50 per cent of GDP.72 
From 1965 to 1990, average annual GNP growth was 9.8 per cent in Korea.73
Profound changes in South Korean society took place as a result of economic development. 
Millions of people from the countryside sought employment in the new factories and urban 
migration intensified during the EOI period.74 It is estimated that approximately 11 million 
Koreans migrated from rural to urban areas between 1957 and 1980.75 By the early 1980s, 
the number of factory workers had grown to 3 million and as the largest occupational 
grouping, it possessed huge potential power.76 This power was visibly demonstrated from 
the 1970s and onwards, when the burdens of forced industrialisation became too much for 
Korean workers to bear.
c) GRO WING OPPOSITION TO PARK IN THE 1970s
The increasing combativeness of civil society in the 1970s presented major problems for 
the government. Workers, students and church groups formed alliances in the struggle 
against authoritarianism. Their growing strength steadily chipped away at the state’s power. 
An important event which brought labour concerns to the attention of broader Korean 
society was the death of Chun Tae-Il in November 1970. A garment worker in Seoul’s 
Peace Market, Chun Tae-Il committed suicide in protest against low wages, unbearable 
working conditions and the government’s repressive labour policies.77 This was a 
watershed event for the independent labour movement -  3 days after Chun’s death, students 
at Seoul National University held a rally and organised a Student League for the Protection 
of the People’s Rights, conducting a factual investigation into Chun’s death and labour
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conditions in the Peace Market.78 Demonstrations on university campuses increased, calling 
attention to the labour problem and living conditions of workers under the slogan, 
‘Combine the labour movement with the student movement’. This campaign was joined 
by religious and civic leaders, while churches held prayer services demanding just
on
application of the labour laws. Chun Tae-Il’s death not only highlighted the plight of 
factory workers, but it also led to the formation of the Chonggye Garment Workers Union 
(CGWU). The CGWU was the first union formed by women workers and was instrumental 
in staging demonstrations against the system of labour control over the next several years.
Worker activism however, was severely restricted following a political blow to the regime. 
After a near loss in the May 1971 general election, Park responded by dissolving the 
National Assembly and declaring the new ‘Yushin’ (revitalising) constitution. It was also 
an attempt to quash worker and student demands for increased political openness following 
the death of Chun Tae-Il. The Yushin period marked a particularly harsh period of 
authoritarian rule -  Park was provided with the constitutional means to exercise dictatorial 
power. Under the Yushin state, even more strict controls over labour and the media were 
imposed. Labour control took such legislative forms as the law of Special Measures for the 
Security of the Nation (December 1971) which expanded compulsory government 
arbitration to all industries so that most labour disputes came under the jurisdiction of 
administrative agencies whose ruling became final and binding.81 Violations were treated as 
criminal offenses and punished under criminal law.82
Such measures also had a broader economic purpose -  they were designed to limit 
industrial action with the state’s shift toward industrial deepening. The Heavy and 
Chemical Industries drive (HCI) in the early 1970s was designed to make Korea less 
dependent on imports and to establish new export industries by giving more depth and
o o
integration to the economic structure. ' Six strategic sectors were targeted including steel, 
heavy machinery, shipbuilding, petrochemicals, automobiles and electronics. The rapid
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expansion of these industries, in conjunction with appalling working conditions, created a 
large, militant working class which reached out to other disaffected groups.
In spite of heavy-handed state repression, several sectors in society continued to organise 
and form alliances. Workers sought democratic trade unions, wage increases, eight hour 
work days, an end to violent police repression and better working conditions. They 
demanded the right to collective action, bargaining and association. Students, the 
democratic opposition and many intellectuals also supported worker activism -  students 
became involved in disputes while the NDP and dissident intellectuals brought labour 
issues to the political battleground.85 Church groups played an important role in supporting 
grassroots labour struggles -  they provided guidance and shelter for activists, ran workers’
o / :
night schools and organised small group activities to raise worker consciousness. Leading 
the resistance was the Urban Industrial Mission (UIM), the Young Catholic Workers’ 
Organisation (JOC), the Korean National Council of Churches and the Student Christian 
Federation. Workers found a way around the harsh labour laws by turning to church groups
87for opportunities to air their grievances.
Collective action in the 1970s was fuelled by workers’ growing consciousness. Economic 
inequality associated with rapid economic growth became a serious social problem and 
beginning with Chun Tae-Il, worker protests exposed the inhumane conditions of factory 
work. Continuing low wages, despite increases in economic and industrial production, 
generated widespread resentment amongst workers. As the anti-government movement 
developed with its growing alliances and its increasing concern for social justice as well as 
democracy, the National Alliance for Democracy (NAD) was formed in July 1978 to 
oppose authoritarian rule -  it campaigned for an end to the dictatorship, a guaranteed 
minimum standard of living and for a self-reliant national economy.89 As economic 
disparities became more visible and as the Park regime became more brutal, the various
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movements converged and labour issues became the dominant theme of Korean political 
struggles.90
Female workers laid the groundwork in the struggle to establish independent unionism. 
Labour-intensive light industries dominated the early period of industrialisation. In 1963, 
there were only 182,000 female workers in the manufacturing sector but the number 
increased to 1.4 million by 1985.91 Women workers were concentrated in a few light 
manufacturing industries such as textiles, garments, shoes and the electronics industries 
which grew most rapidly in the 1960s and through the middle of the 1970s.92 Male workers, 
on the other hand, were disproportionately concentrated in heavy and chemical industries 
which began expanding later -  in the early to mid 1970s. ' Working conditions in the 
female-dominated industries were often appalling. Low wages, coupled with atrocious 
working conditions, despotic management and sexist treatment, compelled women to take 
industrial action. From the early 1970s, female workers played a leading role in the major 
disputes of the decade. The bitter confrontations between workers and the state had 
unsettling implications for the regime -  the harsh Yushin restrictions were not a deterrent. 
Instead, labour activism during this period verged on the “insurrectionary” 94 Following the 
death of Chun Tae-Il, women workers formed the CGWU in the Peace Market section of 
Seoul, where over 20,000 workers laboured in more than 1,000 sweatshops.95 Over the next 
10 years, the CGWU used demonstrations, sit-ins and hunger strikes in their struggle.96
The Ban-do textile company branch union was formed by women and in 1974, 1,000 
women staged a massive sit-in. In the mid 1970s, a woman was elected as leader of the 
Dong-11 Textile Company union and in 1976, women workers at the Dong-11 Textile 
Company clashed with armed police when they tried to occupy the factory in protests
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against the management’s attempts to bust their genuine democratic union. An 
independent union was also created when female workers broke away from the Won-pung 
Textile Company branch union in the mid-1970s." In 1976, women at the Pangnim Textile 
Company, one of Korea’s largest firms, declared a strike after their demands for payment of 
overtime and a reduction of working hours were refused.100 More than 800 women workers 
at the Namyoung Nylon Company took strike action against the union leadership’s 
acceptance of a low wage offer in 1977.101 These incidences demonstrate that women not 
only formed independent unions, but they defied Confucian myths of female 
submissiveness -  their efforts to organise democratic unions was all the more formidable in 
the context of the social and cultural norms which permeated patriarchal Korean society. 
Even though labour conflicts become more frequent during this period, in most cases they 
were broken up through management’s collusion with police forces, the KCIA and brutal 
repression. They did, however, set the stage for a labour dispute which would serve as a 
catalyst in the downfall of the Park regime at the end of the 1970s.
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cl) THE Y.H. COMPANY INCIDENT
By 1979, opposition to Park was stronger than in previous years -  labour disputes were
more numerous, students, religious groups and the NDP were more vocal in their criticism
of authoritarianism and the regime’s grip on dissent was no longer all-inclusive. The
incident which sparked widespread demonstrations against the Park regime occurred in
1979 at the Y.H. Wig and Garment Company in Seoul. Y.H. was one of the numerous
102textile-apparel manufacturing plants which were the mainstay of Korea’s exports. 
Women made up the majority of workers and a few years earlier, they had formed a 
democratic union and gained some improvements in working conditions.101 The situation, 
however, appeared bleak in August 1979 when the firm went bankrupt and closed down.104
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To protest against the loss of their jobs, 190 female employees staged a sit-in 
demonstration.105
When management tried to break the strike, the women moved their protests to the 
headquarters of the NDP where they staged a sit-in hunger strike.106 The strike gained 
widespread attention from the media and increasing support from the public -  large crowds 
of supporters gathered outside the building, as well as other democratic unions, including 
the Dong-11 and Ban-do unions. Religious groups, academics, journalists and civil rights 
activists all lent material and moral support. On the third day of their strike, 1,000 riot 
police violently stormed the NDP building, killing one worker and injuring 100 people 
including NDP members and journalists.109 All the women workers were severely beaten 
and arrested with the police wielding batons and iron pipes and firing tear gas.110 The 
government charged the UIM with having instigated the sit-in and detained two clergymen 
-  the leader of the NDP, Kim Young Sam, was accused by the government of ‘provoking’ 
the clash by providing the women workers with shelter and for drawing public attention to 
their plight.111
Police brutality in crushing what was perceived to be a legitimate protest sparked 
widespread anger and resentment. The womens’ resistance served as a rallying cry to 
coalesce the anti-government forces.112 It triggered several more widespread anti­
government demonstrations throughout the following months. In September, student 
demonstrations in Taegu led to fierce street fighting with police.* 11’ Although student 
actions were the most militant, they were not the only demonstrators -  church figures, 
intellectuals, workers, and the urban masses in general also participated. Political tension 
mounted when the DRP voted to expel Kim Young Sam from the National Assembly on 
October 4 after he succeeded in gaining control of the outspoken anti-government faction
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of the NDP.114 A week later, opposition assemblymen resigned en masse. In Pusan, the 
second largest city in Korea, student protests erupted into full-scale anti-government 
rioting.115
Protests were not restricted to shouting slogans -  they included hand-to-hand fighting with 
the police and organised attacks with firebombs on police stations, vehicles and 
government buildings.116 Rioting of similar intensity spread to the nearby city of Masan,
117followed by Chongju and Seoul and martial law was declared in the Masan-Pusan area. 
The force of anti-government sentiment shook the entire nation, engulfing Korea’s major 
universities and reactivating political mobilisation. Amidst the deteriorating political 
situation, a disagreement on how to handle civil unrest arose between Park and the director 
of the KCIA, Kim Jae Kyu -  the outcome of the disagreement was Park’s assassination at 
the hands of Kim on 26 October, 1979. The end of Park’s 18-year rule was not solely 
caused by the Y.H. incident, rather, it provided a mass outlet for the release of accumulated 
discontent. Working class struggles became more intimately enmeshed in the larger 
political struggles against the authoritarian state.118 The shifting balance of power between 
the state and society was evident in strengthened oppositional forces. In the next decade, 
resistance to authoritarianism was unleashed with an unexpected intensity.
CHUN DOO HWAN (1980-88) -  THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
a) MILITARY RULE
Park’s assassination resulted in the immediate collapse of authoritarianism. In the political 
vacuum which followed there was a massive mobilisation of civil society. By the 1980s, 
the forces which were in favour of democracy were much stronger and combative -  they 
could not be repressed. When authoritarian labour controls were removed in the aftermath
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of Park’s assassination, an independent labour movement expanded.119 In the new political 
space, the number of labour conflicts dramatically increased. In the first five months of 
1980, the Korea Times reported 897 labour disputes, more than twice the 427 recorded in 
all of 1979.120
In spite of demands for democratisation, a military coup in December 1979 resulted in 
another General assuming power, Park’s former Defense Security Commander, Chun Doo 
Hwan. In an attempt to stem the tide of intensifying social and political activity, Chun 
declared martial law on 17 May, 1980. On the same day, a leading opposition politician, 
Kim Dae Jung was arrested for his outspoken criticism of the government. In the city of 
Kwangju, protests erupted in opposition to the military regime on 18 May. Kwangju was 
not only the home of Kim Dae Jung, but it was also the capital of one of the poorest 
provinces in South Korea, South Cholla. Known as the Kwangju Uprising, students and 
citizens rose up to demand not only Kim’s freedom, but also their fair share of economic 
growth.1-2 After demonstrations were savagely repressed by paratroopers, the whole city 
rose up and the main streets became battlefields.123 Military occupation of the city resulted 
in 10 days of clashes and the massacre of hundreds of people. The government claimed that 
200 people were killed, in reality however, the figure was closer to 2,000.124 It was a 
traumatic event for South Koreans -  millions were shocked and horrified at the savage 
nature of the military’s actions. Although the regime tried to stifle and distort reports on the 
violence, knowledge of what happened was widely circulated.123 Anti-Chun passions rose 
even higher in Kwangju and throughout South Korea when the government refused to 
acknowledge any responsibility for the massacre. The massacre was, according to John
127Lie, the single most politicising event for anti-government activists in the 1980s. It
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continued to haunt Chun and more than any other single factor, it denied his regime
i o o
legitimacy.
In the aftermath of the massacre, authoritarian controls were reimposed. The military 
suspended all political activity and repressed the labour movement. Thousands of workers 
were purged from unions and ‘rectification’ or ‘reeducation’ camps were set up where the 
most militant activists were ‘deprogrammed’ of their leftist thinking. A ‘purification’ 
campaign was also unleashed in all public and private bodies which effectively set targets 
for the weeding out of the subversive. Close to 8000 government employees were fired 
and 40,000 ‘hooligans’, including political dissidents, were rounded up. Extensive media 
censorship and the prohibition of political activities were reminiscent of the worst of the 
Park era. The Trade Union Act in 1981 once gain prohibited the involvement of third 
parties in workplace industrial relations. ' These setbacks temporarily prevented labour, 
students and other political dissidents from organising sustained resistance to Chun. 
Nevertheless, the tide would soon turn and popular resistance in the mid-1980s posed the 
greatest challenge that any South Korean government had ever seen.
b) POLITICAL LIBERALISATION & DEMOCRATISATION
Over the next few years, Chun sought to rectify his tainted political image and gain 
legitimacy by focusing on economic growth. The early 1980s were marked by an economic 
downturn. Through the enforcement of a stabilisation policy, the Chun regime managed to 
recover economic growth from -5.2 per cent in 1980 to 11.9 per cent in 1983 and also 
brought down the inflation rate from 28.7 per cent to 3.4 per cent in 1983. ' Confident 
about the stability of his rule, beginning in December 1983, Chun relaxed the government’s 
political control.1 33 Through the University Autonomy Measure, police forces stationed in 
the universities were removed from campuses, students and professors who were expelled
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for their anti-government activities were restored to their original positions and political 
activities allowed for opposition politicians.1"4 But this limited liberalisation greatly 
intensified the anti-regime efforts of students, opposition parties and other dissident
135groups.
Mass organisation rapidly reappeared and dominated the national scene. In February and 
March of 1984, university students restored and reorganised anti-government student 
groups.136 In November 1984, students from 42 universities and colleges organised the 
National Student Coalition for Democratic Struggle (Chonhangnyon).137 This was the first 
nationwide student organisation since the April revolution of 1960 which led to the 
downfall of Rhee. The Korean Council for Labour Welfare (KCLW) was organised in 
March 1984. Composed of various labour unions that had spearheaded the anti-Yushin and 
pro-democracy struggles in the 1970s, including the Chonggye union, the KCLW tried to 
restore and strengthen unity and solidarity among labour movement groups. The KCLW 
and Chonggye union jointly launched a massive campaign against the labour laws. Students 
and labour resurrected their alliance and co-operated with each other to restore labour 
unions. In addition, church groups, such as the National Catholic Priests’ Corps for the 
Realisation of Justice (NCPCRJ) assisted the labour movement, waging a signature 
campaign for the revision of labour laws.138 Almost every sector of society came forward to 
articulate their demands and oppose the government -  students, workers, the middle 
classes, church groups, farmers, women’s groups and opposition politicians.
Expanding organisation led to a significant gain for the opposition party. In January 1985, a 
newly formed opposition party, the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP) was established 
by reinstated opposition politicians, just before the National Assembly elections in 
February and it aligned itself with civil society groups In the February elections, Chun’s 
government party, the Democratic Justice Party (DJP) was almost defeated by the NKDP
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which received 29.2 per cent of the popular vote against the DJP’s 35.3. The NKDP’s 
gains galvanised civil society and led to the formation of nationwide alliances. Student 
groups, youth, labour unions, religious organisations and other civil society groups were 
united and coordinated under the unified leadership of the umbrella organisation, the 
People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR).140 Established 
in March 1985, the PMCDR was not just a group of elite dissidents -  it was reflective of 
the alliance of students, labourers and religious leaders.
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Pressure kept mounting on the regime and escalating demonstrations placed Chun on the 
defensive. Starting in early 1986, religious activists issued a series of declarations and 
statements reprimanding the regime and demanding an immediate constitutional revision.'41 
Launching a ‘non-confidence’ campaign against the government, 783 professors at 29 
colleges and universities nationwide publicly announced ‘statements on the current 
situation’.142 The NKDP also launched a campaign to collect 10 million signatures 
throughout South Korea in support of constitutional revision in February 1986. Despite a 
series of harsh police crackdowns on NKDP headquarters and the arrest of activists, the 
campaign continued. In order to stem the tide of mobilisation, Chun announced in April 
1986 that he would support any constitutional change endorsed by the National Assembly 
and that he would leave office in February 19 8 8.143 Unimpressed, students persisted in their 
efforts to bring down authoritarianism. In April and May 1986, two students committed 
suicide through self-immolation to protest the continued presence of US troops and 
demonstrations erupted in the industrial city of Inchon.144 Led by radical workers and 
students, 10,000 people participated.146 Leftist university groups, such as Minmintu and 
Jamintu demanded ‘conventions of the masses’ to discuss the outline of a new 
constitution.146 The impetus for democratisation was maintained when it was publically 
disclosed in June 1986 that In-Sook Kwon, a female university student, had been sexually
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assaulted by police at the Puchun station -  this incident shocked Korean society. An 
important consequence was that it mobilised the middle class, who were outraged at such a 
gross abuse of government power. Middle class involvement in the struggle to bring down 
the Chun regime was a major factor in the transition to democracy.
c) THE MIN JUNG MOVEMENT
A defining characteristic of the South Korean transition to democracy was the broad 
democratic front formed between civil society groups. Such an alliance represented an 
enormous threat to the government. Middle class support for student demonstrations in 
June 1987 played a critical role in bringing about a political opening.147 Facilitating this 
loose coalition was the re-emergence of the concept of minjung as a unifying ideology, a 
term which literally translates as the masses or the popular classes.14* The concept refers to 
the three min principles: minjung (the people), minjok (the nation) and minju 
(democracy).149 Uniting the middle classes, working classes, urban poor and farmers 
together, the minjung movement brought together disparate social elements in the struggle 
for a common goal: a democratic South Korea. It implied an alliance of Koreans alienated 
from power and from the distribution of the fruits of economic growth.150
The political environment of the 1970s contributed to the contemporary development of the 
minjung movement -  the most significant factor being the hardening of the authoritarian 
state under Yushin which intensified student, opposition party, religious and intellectual 
struggles against the regime.151 Under Chun, the minjung movement developed into a more 
organised and popular opposition movement with broader popular support.1*2 Reactivation 
of minjung also included the use of traditional cultural forms to express political dissent.
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Students used popular culture as an instrument for raising critical consciousness -  during 
protests, they danced to farmers’ music, dressed in traditional farmers’ white clothes and 
battled with riot police.15’ This was the mask-dance drama, with its characters depicted as 
struggling against exploitative company owners.154 Social and political protests were staged 
in the form of reconstructed folk culture.155 In this way, minjung became a powerful 
political symbol and provided a new social identity for all who participated in the 
opposition to authoritarian rule.156
THE 1987 JUNE PEOPLE'S UPRISING
The culmination of the democratic struggle to end authoritarianism was the June ‘People’s 
Uprising’ in 1987. An important incident which carried the pro-democracy momentum 
forward was the death of Pak Chong Choi. On 14 January 1987, Seoul National University 
student activist, Pak was tortured to death during a police interrogation.157 Pak’s death 
vividly demonstrated the immoral, illegitimate and violent nature of the regime. ' This 
abuse of state power repulsed the middle classes -  many joined the democratic coalition 
which spilled out into the streets in record numbers.
Mass mobilisation intensified after 13 April, 1987, when Chun publicly declared that 
constitutional reform would be postponed.159 Immediately, university professors initiated a 
public statement, criticising and opposing Chun’s decision. One of the main demands of the 
movement was for direct presidential elections. Artists, novelists, writers and actors 
followed suit, while religious leaders and priests staged a series of hunger strikes. Violent 
anti-government protests by students, labour unions and other civil society groups spread
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across the country and tens of thousands of South Koreans in major cities demonstrated 
against the decision. In May 1987, the National Movement Headquarter for Democratic 
Constitution (NMHDC) was formed. It consisted of the PMCDR and 25 other major civil 
society groups and covered all major sectoral groups and geographical areas. The PMCDR 
and the NKDP set up the National Coalition for Democracy Movement and coordinated, 
organised, mobilised and led mass rallies in major cities of the country throughout April 
and May. The number of participants in these mass rallies exceeded 700,000 in total.160 
People from all walks of life were mobilised under the banner of ‘Down with the military 
regime and up with a democratic government’.161
Popular frustration exploded on an unprecedented scale on 10 June. Roh Tae Woo, a former 
general, was nominated at the national convention of the DJP to succeed Chun as the 
presidential candidate in an indirect election. Only hours after the selection of Roh, Seoul 
and more than 30 other cities across South Korea were hit by the outbreak of violent anti­
government protests.162 On the same day, the NMHDC organised an ‘Uprising rally to 
defeat the April 13 decision and to end dictatorship’.163 Korea’s universities and colleges 
went into summer vacation ahead of schedule -  in the first two days of protests, 738 
policemen were injured.164 By 15 June, some 6,094 people had been detained and by 18 
June, downtown Seoul looked like a war zone.165 According to national police 
headquarters, police officers fired 351,200 tear gas canisters from 10 to 26 June -  an 
average of 20,660 per day.166 In the same period, 164 police vehicles were damaged and 
262 police stations and substations attacked.167
For nearly three weeks, pro-democracy demonstrators clashed with police on the streets and 
riots rocked the nation. Particularly disturbing for the regime was the presence of many 
middle-class Koreans.168 White collar workers, professionals, small and medium-sized 
factory managers, technicians, independent business people and public servants all joined
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the struggle.164 Housewives, lawyers and many Catholic and Protestant church leaders and 
their congregations also rushed into the streets to express their support for democratic 
change.170 In Myung-dong (a busy downtown office and commercial district in Seoul) 
white-collar office workers demonstrated daily during their lunch hours.171
The use of force to crush these protests was a problem for the Chun regime because such 
action would tarnish its reputation ahead of the Seoul Olympic Games in 1988. Mass 
upheaval sent a message that was so loud and clear that even the hardliners within the 
government were reluctant to call the military from the barracks. " It is estimated that over 
three weeks, four to five million people were involved in demonstrations. ' The National 
Coalition for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC) was activated and clashed with the 
government -  it consisted of a loose coalition of religious figures, journalists, students and 
opposition politicians.174 Organising and coordinating local branches throughout the 
country, the NMHDC was also responsible for mobilising huge pro-democracy 
demonstrations.175 Not since the 1960 April student revolution had South Korea 
experienced such upheaval. Many shopkeepers also supported student demonstrators by 
delivering food and money to sit-in protestors and providing shelter to student 
demonstrators chased by the police.176 On 26 June, the NMHDC held the ‘Peace Parade’ in
177which one million people participated nationwide.
Accumulation of immense pressure on the regime eventually forced it to accept popular 
demands for democratisation. Known as the 29lh June declaration, Roh officially agreed to 
the opposition’s demands for direct presidential elections in December 1987 and reform of 
the constitution. An eight-point proposal was put forward which included the guarantee of 
fair presidential elections, freedom of the press, release of political prisoners and the
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relaxation of restrictive labour controls.178 Roh’s declaration was a major breakthrough for 
the democratic opposition. It was the direct result of grassroots mobilisation and a classic 
example of ‘people power’. The enormous pressure placed on the regime by ordinary South 
Koreans outweighed government attempts to crush the democracy movement. Although 
elite-led transitology acknowledges a ‘resurrection of civil society’179 it does not recognise 
the intensity or the tremendous impact of the popular sector’s protests, as well as their 
wide-ranging nature. South Korea is an irrefutable example of civil society’s capacity to 
make a collective stand and initiate a transition to democracy.
CONCLUSION
From Japanese colonialism to Chun Doo Hwan, governments in South Korea were 
routinely faced with a restless and rebellious population. Although each government relied 
on force to deal with the threat from below, in various periods, the popular classes were 
able to disrupt authoritarian government by demanding democracy. The most repressive 
period however, occurred under General Park and the developmental state. Park’s policies 
not only created a large, militant working class, also laid the groundwork for the mass 
discontent which emerged at the end of the 1970s with the Y.H. Company incident. The 
continuation of authoritarianism under Chun temporarily placed the brakes on popular 
protest against the regime. Widespread disillusionment set in with the Kwangju massacre, 
an incident which delivered a crushing blow to the faltering legitimacy of Chun’s rule. The 
excesses of authoritarianism (the sexual assault of In-Sook Kwon and the torture death of 
Pal Chong Choi) were also a contributing factor which led the middle classes to join the 
broad, pro-democracy movement, leading to Chun’s ‘democracy declaration’.
South Korea’s transition was not the sole result of elite actions -  Chun’s decision to initiate 
liberalisation measures was the outcome of popular pressure and frustration that had been 
building for years and peaked in the ‘Peace Parade’ in which one million South Koreans 
participated. The pro-democracy movement had grown so large by mid-1987 that wide- 
scale repression, like the Kwangju massacre, was impossible. Similarly to Mexico and
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Brazil, the South Korean transition was initiated because of the government’s desire to 
defuse social and political tensions while still retaining tight control -  the leadership was 
not genuinely committed to installing a democratic government. Nowhere is the strength of 
the popular sector more evident than in the labour movement offensive launched by in the 
summer of 1987 -  the ‘hot summer’ -  following the ‘democracy declaration’. Exploding 
onto the scene with unprecedented force, the organised working class dominated politics 
and society for the next several years.
178
CHAPTER 7: THE SOUTH KOREAN LABOUR MOVEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Roh Tae Woo’s democracy declaration in late June 1987 appeased middle-class demands 
for democratic change. By promising constitutional reform and direct presidential elections, 
the declaration ended the mass protests which had destabilised South Korea for over a 
month. This concession, however, failed to address the economic and political concerns of 
the labour movement. In response, workers initiated a nationwide series of strikes which 
placed them centre stage in the struggle for democratic change. Beginning in July 1987 and 
lasting for the next several months, the political opening which accompanied the 
declaration was followed by an unprecedented and spontaneous wave of strikes known as 
the ‘Great Workers’ Struggle’. The whole nation was taken by surprise at the scale and 
intensity of industrial action -  it alarmed the government and big business interests. 
Workers maintained the impetus behind the transition to democracy by calling for the 
introduction of democratic processes in the workplace.
The Great Workers’ Struggle was historically significant -  it represented a milestone for 
the South Korean labour movement because it brought workers to the forefront in the 
struggle for democracy. They collectively attacked a political and economic system which 
had sacrificed worker rights in order to achieve rapid development. Workers took the 
opportunity to express their long-held resentments by launching militant and destabilising 
protests. Under authoritarianism, labour was excluded rather than co-opted. There were no 
safety valves established by the state through which it could channel and direct worker 
grievances. Unlike the CTM and PRI in Mexico or the PT in Brazil, South Korean workers 
had no formal party representation. When worker activism emerged, the state lacked the 
means to direct labour discontent into officially sanctioned channels -  it was beyond 
government control and, therefore, highly threatening.
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THE SUMMER OE DISCONTENT (JULY-SEPT 1987) -  THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
BURSTS ON TO THE POLITICAL SCENE
Large strikes erupted immediately after the Democracy Declaration, spreading quickly 
throughout the country and shutting down production in all major industries. Within a year, 
as many as 4,000 new unions were established with an increase of 700,000 in union 
members.1 The number of labour disputes between July and September 1987 was more than 
the total number during the entire Park and Chun regimes.2 Much of the conflict occurred in 
the large factories of heavy industry. Strikes occurred in 221 out of the 342 firms with more 
than 1,000 employees.3 Close to 65 per cent of large industrial firms were hit by labour 
turmoil.4 The manufacturing sector experienced the highest level of industrial action -  it 
accounted for 52 per cent of strikes in 1987 and 42 per cent in 1988.5 Not limited to large 
enterprises, disputes also took place in small and medium-sized factories -  38.5 per cent of 
factories with fewer than one thousand employees were affected by the strike wave.6 7
Extensive mobilisation was not just a blue-collar phenomenon -  the ‘Great Workers’ 
Struggle’ also struck the white-collar sector. Various industries, including education, 
health, banking, finance, insurance, tourism and research (public and private) were affected 
by unionisation drives. Both white and blue collar efforts to establish genuine democratic 
unions were not only driven by economic factors, but also by political considerations. 
Emerging from decades of authoritarian control, employees demanded an extension of 
political democracy in the workplace, calling for a reduction in the level of state control and 
independence from the government. The aggressive unionisation struggles among media 
workers, teachers, researchers and printing-industry employees were reactions to the lack of 
democracy in Korean workplaces and to the state’s political and ideological control over 
intellectual production. Journalists, teachers and researchers had often been forced to
1 Koo, ‘Modernity in South Korea’, op.cit., p.62.
2 Koo, ‘The State, Minjung and the Working Class in South Korea’, in Koo, State and Society in 
Contemporary Korea, op.cit., p. 156.
3 Hyug Baeg, ‘State, Labour and Capital in the Consolidation of Democracy’ op.cit., p. 12.
4 ibid.
5 Kim, ‘The Korean Union Movement in Transition’, in Frenkel, op.cit., p. 151.
f’ Ogle, George E., South Korea: Dissent Within the Economic Miracle, London and New York: Zed Books, 
1990, p. 116.
7 Koo, Hagen, Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation, Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 2001, p. 177.
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produce state-dictated materials.8 Now, a new generation of intellectuals who had gone to 
university during the politicised decade of the 1980s began to refuse to do so.9
The ‘Great Workers’ Struggle’ began in an area which played a critical role in South 
Korea’s rapid economic development. Located on the southeast coast, Ulsan employed 
thousands of workers in the heavy and chemical industries which were the focus of the HCI 
drive which began in the early 1970s. One of the largest chaebols in the country and its 
subsidiary companies were located in Ulsan -  Hyundai. By the early 1980s, an industrial 
belt of heavy industry, including steel, machinery, shipbuilding, automobiles and industrial 
chemicals, stretched 40 miles along the Ulsan coast.10 Each year in the late summer and 
early autumn, the Ulsan coast was struck by a series of typhoons -  the sudden burst of 
labour strikes in the summer of 1987 came to be known as the Ulsan Typhoon.* 11 Strikes in 
other major industrial centres with large working class communities quickly followed -  
Pusan, Inchon, Changwon and Masan. " By mid-August, extensive worker mobilisation 
reached the Seoul-Kyungin region and spread to smaller cities in the southwest where the 
smaller light manufacturing industries were concentrated.13 The emergence of densely 
populated industrial towns such as Kuro, Ulsan, Kumi, Changwon and Okpo facilitated the 
development of working class communities and solidarities.14
A critical factor which distinguished the Great Workers’ Struggle from the labour conflicts 
of the 1970s and early 1980s was the fact that it occurred without the initiation, leadership 
or active support from the intellectual and religious communities that had played such a 
critical role in the pre-1987 labour movement.15 Although the middle class initially 
supported the strikes and students became involved in organisational efforts, it was a 
genuine workers’ movement. The FKTU played little role in the strikes -  labour actions 
were beyond government control or manipulation. Rank and file mobilisation was
s Koo, ‘Engendering Civil Society’, in Armstrong, op.cit., p.l 17.
9 ibid.
1(1 Vogel, Ezra F. and David L. Lindauer, ‘Toward a Social Compact for South Korean Labour’, in Lindauer, 
David L. et al (eds), The Strains of Economic Growth: Labour Unrest and Social Dissatisfaction in Korea, 
Harvard: Harvard Institute for International Development and Korea Development Institute, Harvard 
University Press, 1997, p .l06.
11 ibid.
12 Koo, Korean Workers, op.cit., p .l58.
13 ibid.
14 Koo, ‘From Farm to Factory’, op.cit., p.676.
15 Koo, ‘Engendering Civil Society’, in Armstrong, op.cit., p.l 16.
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important -  many workers who previously had little experience in unionisation efforts were 
able to voice their demands and take action. A common feature of many strikes was the 
militancy of the workers who adopted aggressive tactics in their struggle against 
management and the government. Workers’ ability to organise and shut down production 
instilled in them a sense of class consciousness. When workers rebelled, it was not only an 
expression of frustration but an effort to reclaim their dignity.
The importance of maintaining the struggle was reinforced by the government’s position 
towards the protestors. Although the state announced the adoption of a neutral stance 
towards labour conflict, this was contradicted by the fact that hundreds of labour activists 
were arrested during 1987. Seoul Police Headquarters announced on 18 September that 
more than 8,000 people, half of them in Seoul and the rest around South Korea, had been 
targeted for active investigation into the activities, statements and leadership of 24 
‘dissident’ organisations.'1' Towards the end of September 1987, more than 480 workers 
were in prison, accused mostly of leading violent strikes or indicted under illegal assembly 
laws.17 Throughout 1987, workers challenged the system of authoritarian industrial 
relations which had denied them their basic rights for decades, despite government attempts 
to break up the labour movement.
HYUNDAI: THE MAIN BATTLEGROUND
Labour conflict at Hyundai was politically and economically significant -  as one of the 
largest chaebol in South Korea with a substantial workforce, strikes went to the very heart 
of the developmental state. Not only did the labour unrest cause major economic disruption, 
but politically, it represented a fundamental challenge to the state. Violent confrontations 
with police highlighted the extent of worker resentment with authoritarian methods of 
labour control that had been in place for over three decades. By demanding that the whole 
repressive framework be dismantled and replaced with a democratic form of government, 
workers were on a collision course with a government which had little tolerance for 
political dissent. Therefore, the ramifications of the Hyundai conflict extended far beyond
16 Asia Monitor Resource Centre, op.cit., p.7().
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the factory gates. Hyundai experienced some of the most dramatic labour disputes. In 1987, 
the company had 45 subsidiaries.18 Primarily a heavy manufacturing conglomerate, it was 
active in auto-manufacturing, civil engineering, construction and shipbuilding.19 Hyundai 
had one of the most repressive labour regimes and its militaristic working conditions were 
well-known. There was a strict emphasis on discipline, hierarchy and obedience. Military- 
style management resulted in heavily regimented factories in which there were harsh rules
about appearance. Workers had to have short haircuts, wear company uniforms, participate
20in morning exercise and they were separate cafeterias for blue and white collar workers. 
Verbal abuse was common and insubordination often resulted in men being slapped and 
women being pulled by the hair.21 The founder’s philosophy, Chung Ju Yung, reflected the 
authoritarian style of management: “I will never allow a union until the earth covers my 
eyes”. But within two weeks of the democracy declaration, virtually all the Hyundai firms 
were involved in labour disputes.23
After the democracy declaration, the working class upsurge that took place changed forever 
the balance of forces in the conflict between the state and its growing number of 
opponents.24 Roh’s limited liberalisation opened the floodgates for an enormous wave of 
struggle. ~ Barely one week after the declaration, Hyundai’s first genuine union was 
established on 5 July 1987, by a group of 120 workers from Hyundai Engine -  within a 
week, it had 1,400 members and the other 13 companies within the group joined the 
struggle for democratic unions in the same month.26 Once unions had been successfully 
formed, workers presented a lengthy list of demands, including 25-30 per cent wage 
increases, the elimination of wage competition among workers, the abolition of the 
restriction on hair length and termination of compulsory morning exercise.27 Unionisation 
at other firms, however, proved much more difficult. On 16 July, as a group of workers 
from Hyundai Mipo Shipyard was on its way to the Ulsan District Labour Office to register
18 ibid., p.52.
19 ibid., p.53.
1 Vogel and Lindauer, ‘Toward a Social Compact for South Korean Labour’, in Lindauer et al, op.cit., p.106.
21 ibid.
22 Koo, Korean Workers, op.cit., p. 165.
23 ibid., p. 158.
"4 Minns, John, The Politics of Developmentalism: The Midas States of Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan, 
Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 158.
25 ibid.
26 Asia Monitor Resource Centre, op.cit., pps.53-54.
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the new union with the authorities, hired company thugs snatched the union documents, 
however, government pressure on Hyundai forced the company to return the documents to
90
the workers who then registered the new union.
Mobilisation continued unabated despite management attempts to block worker resistance. 
The unionisation movement at individual Hyundai firms quickly converged into a solidarity 
struggle at the group level. On 8 August 1987, union representatives from 12 Hyundai 
forms gathered and formed the Council of Unions of the Hyundai Group -  they wanted to 
take a coordinated approach in dealing with the highly centralised authority structure at the 
Hyundai Group. The Council of Unions immediately clashed with management over the 
demand for group-level wage negotiations and the recognition of the genuine union that 
had been formed at Hyundai Heavy Industries -  the stage was now set for one of the 
fiercest worker struggles.29
On 17 August, thousands of Hyundai workers gathered at the Hyundai Heavy Industries 
plant and marched toward the city. At the front of the march were dump trucks, forklifts, 
fire engines and sand-blasting machines. Accompanied by drums and gongs, the crowd 
sang newly learned songs and shouted ‘Down with Chung Ju Yung!’. They were met by the 
riot police and although the police fired tear gas at the protestors, they soon found 
themselves fleeing in panic from the angry crowd. The police chief offered to negotiate 
with the leader of the Hyundai Engine union, Kwon Yong-mok. With Kwon’s promise to 
maintain a peaceful demonstration, he allowed the demonstrators to walk to Namok Hill 
and back to Hyundai Heavy Industries.30
On the following day, the demonstration became bigger and better organised. Workers from 
various Hyundai companies in Ulsan rallied in the grounds of Hyundai Heavy Industries in 
the early morning of 18 August.'1 Some 40,000 workers were estimated to have gathered 
along with 30,000 of their wives and children.'2 Thousands at Hyundai Heavy Industries 
commandeered forklifts, bulldozers and heavy trucks form the company’s massive
2X Clifford, Mark, Troubled Tiger: Businessmen, Bureaucrats and Generals in South Korea, Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p.273.
The above account is from Koo, Korean Workers, op.cit., p. 167.
311 The above account is from Koo, Korean Workers, op.cit., p. 167.
31 ibid., p. 168.
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shipyards and many wore heavy protective clothing, including welding shields and gas 
masks.33 Workers marched out of the shipyard and toward the centre of Ulsan.'4 
Government forces withdrew after workers began their assault on the riot police. Mothers, 
wives and children marched alongside and the parade stretched for 2 miles -  it took 5 hours 
to complete the 10-mile journey to the stadium.35 To avert the danger of violent street
oz:
confrontations, riot police allowed workers to take over Ulsan Sports Stadium.
At the stadium, workers were greeted by a government representative but not by Hyundai 
managers.'7 In order to resolve the dispute, the deputy minister of labour, Han Jin Hee, 
intervened. He announced that the government would see that Hyundai cede to worker 
demands for independent unions at eight of the group companies.' The agreement, 
announced by the deputy minister himself, was the acceptance of practically all of the 
workers’ demands, including a significant wage increase and the recognition of the 
independent union at Hyundai Heavy Industries.39 Workers and their families cheered 
wildly -  it was the first victory Hyundai workers had achieved.40
In the long-run, however, it was only a symbolic victory and a short-lived one. Hyundai 
management decided to ignore what had been promised by the Deputy Minister of Labour 
and denied the legitimacy of the new union leadership at Hyundai Heavy Industries and the 
Council of Unions of Hyundai Group. Consequently, wage negotiations were stalled and 
labour unrest continued.41 Government intervention demonstrated the striking turnaround in 
the attitude towards the labour movement. Roh’s regime was on the defensive and seeking 
to minimise the political impact of worker protests. The power of the labour movement was 
on vivid display and its organisational strength was growing daily.
The significance of the strikes at Hyundai and indeed, in the other chaebol, was in their 
political aspects. Workers were not just defying their employers -  they mounted a direct
33 Clifford, op.cit., p.273.
34 ibid.
Koo, Korean Workers, op.cit., p. 168.
36 Clifford, op.cit., p.274.
37 Koo, Korean Workers, op.cit., p. 168.
35 Clifford, op.cit., p.274.
39 Koo, Korean Workers, op.cit., p. 169.
40 ibid.
41 The above account is from Koo, Korean Workers, op.cit., p. 169.
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attack on the repressive framework of labour control. In the process, strikes became violent 
clashes with the state. Government restrictions on union activity served to limit and 
postpone industrial action but they also made it more political and even insurrectionary 
when it happened.42 The key tools of political control which the state had used since 1961 
were being flouted by workers.43 With every militant strike, workers were routinely 
chipping away at the strength of state.
Over the next few weeks, industrial conflict continued unabated. Six of the Hyundai firms 
were closed down completely. A partial breakthrough came on 1 September when contracts 
were signed at Mipo Shipyards, Hyundai Heavy Electric and Hyundai Pipe Company. At 
other sites, however, negotiations made no headway -  the chaebol refused to disband the 
company unions and did not recognise the democratic unions. On 2 September, 20,000 
Ulsan workers again took to the streets and marched towards Ulsan City Hall -  the sound 
of drums and gongs filled the streets as workers shouted and chanted their demands.44 A 
breakaway group of 3,000 workers stormed the Hyundai shipyard and broke into company 
offices smashing furniture and windows.45 Riot police stormed the Hyundai shipyard at 
dawn on 4 September -  over 100 workers were arrested and on 5 September, thousands of 
workers staged sit-ins at the shipyard, demanding the release of their colleagues.46 An 
attempt by 8,000 workers to take their protest to the streets failed when they were 
confronted by a large force of riot police and they were dispersed with tear gas.47
Despite announcing that it would remain neutral in labour disputes, the government stepped 
in on behalf of management. On 12 September, the Ministry of Labour issued an 
emergency directive which instructed Ulsan City authorities to ‘reshuffle’ the staff of the 
Hyundai union. The Council of Unions at Hyundai Group was declared illegal -  unions 
were forbidden to organise across company lines and 20 leaders, including Kwon Yong- 
mok were sentenced to jail.49 Although management at Hyundai Heavy Industry agreed to a 
14 per cent wage increase, it refused to concede to any demands which went beyond wage
42 Minns, op.cit., p. 157.
43 ibid., p. 158.
44 The above account is from Ogle, op.cit., p.l 19.
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claims and stubbornly resisted a genuine democratic union in the company.50 Labour 
struggles continued at Hyundai over the next few years, but the government’s attitude 
toward worker mobilisation was decidedly anti-labour.
DAEWOO MOTOR COMPANY
Daewoo, one of South Korea’s largest conglomerates, was involved in 25 major areas of 
industry including motor vehicle manufacturing, electrical and electronic engineering, 
construction and textiles.51 The corporation employed over 100,000 Koreans and in 1987, 
accounted for around 10 per cent of South Korea’s GNP.52 The headquarters and assembly
CO
plant employing 6,000 workers were located in Pupyong. ' When the flood of union action 
took place in July and August of 1987, it included most of the workers of Inchon -  it is 
estimated that 400 or more workplaces in Inchon had strikes or some form of protest.M For 
more than 3 months, there was at least one protest demonstration every day and at times 
there were as many as 30.55 Around 100 new unions were formed and sustained after the 
Great Worker Struggle in 1987.56
An authoritarian work culture also pervaded Daewoo -  the only unions allowed to operate 
were oyong, or company unions. On 10 August 1987, workers at Daewoo Motors in 
Pupyong took action demanding an increase in wages, a reduction in working hours and the 
right to form democratic unions. The demands were read in the company cafeteria and the 
assembled workers sang songs and shouted slogans about democratic unionism. More than 
300 supporters moved out of the cafeteria and into each section of the plant where they read 
the demands -  by the end of the day, an estimated 4,000 workers took part in 
demonstrations. The company closed the plant down for two weeks during which time it
Sl) Asia Monitor Resource Centre, op.cit., p.57.
51 ibid., p.63.
52 ibid, 
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labeled the union members ‘outside agitators’ and ‘impure factions’ who did not represent 
the majority.57
More than 400 workers marched on the plant’s administration building, seizing the 
president and vice president of Daewoo Motors and forcing them to bow down. Almost 
immediately, Daewoo Motors became a war zone -  from 3 September onwards police and 
armed guards occupied the factory and company grounds while sit-down strikes and street 
demonstrations occurred daily. Police tried to control workers through the use of tear gas
co
and hundreds were detained.' The press reported that 100 Daewoo workers were arrested 
on 4 September, following a dawn raid by police on the factory compound, while on 6 
September, 87 were charged with various offences, accused of arson, assault and illegal 
confinement.59 On 24 September, elections for the oyong presidency were held and workers 
decided to accept a compromise candidate agreeable to themselves and the oyong, given 
that anxiety over job security was high and the leaders of the democratic union movement 
were in prison.60 The labour conflict at Daewoo, however continued into the following year 
as the compromise started to come apart.61 Thus, the dispute at Daewoo did not end in a 
decisive victory for the workers.
About 200 miles south, Daewoo was also having labour problems in its Okpo shipyards. 
Okpo had also been transformed into a large industrial town -  in 1987, it had a population 
of 200,000 and 15,000 were employed at Daewoo.62 When the union uprisings of 1987 hit, 
the Daewoo shipyard was in a vulnerable position, as it had a billion dollar debt. Conditions 
at the shipyard were particularly harsh -  workers could be arbitrarily dismissed or their 
wages reduced and the company kept written records of each employee detailing their 
private lives. On 8 August, a worker climbed to the highest point on a huge crane and using 
a portable loud speaker began calling for the formation of a democratic union and for 
worker solidarity. A union was formed, workers elected a president and called a strike. 
Management refused to negotiate for wage increases and 1,500 police and its special 
division, the baikgoldan (police trained in martial arts) were sent in to break the strike.
57 The above account is from Ogle, op.cit., pps.l31-132. 
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Hundreds of workers were assaulted, including onlookers and women. Demonstrations 
continued for days until 22 August, 1987, when a tear gas canister hit Lee Suk Kyu on the 
chest and killed him. No agreement was reached between the company and the union until 
April 1988, when workers gained a 24 per cent pay increase.63
Although worker gains were of mixed results, the political significance of the strikes can be 
found in the widespread support they received. A 1987 survey conducted shows that a 
majority of respondents believed employers (57 per cent) and the government (19 per cent) 
were more responsible for militant labour disputes than workers themselves (7 per cent).64 
Even white collar workers which were not directly involved in the labour conflict placed 
the responsibility for labour disputes with employers. For example, 58.8 per cent of clerical 
workers blamed employers, 17. 6 per cent blamed the government while only 8.8 per cent 
blamed radical movements.65 As industrial workers challenged the state in the streets and 
factories, they had support from most Koreans -  as these challenges mounted on a number 
of fronts, the effectiveness of state controls was undermined.66
GOLDSTAR
Goldstar had a long history of unions in their plants and when the 1987 spring offensive hit, 
16 of Goldstar Group’s 27 member companies already had union organisations. Although 
these were oyong, the structures were there and the process of union-company negotiation 
was well practiced. Goldstar produced chemicals and electronic equipment. In the latter 
half of 1987, all 27 companies and their 57 subsidiaries experienced worker uprisings and 
strikes.67 Workers at Goldstar Electronics, which employed 4,000 in three plants in 
Anyang, Kumi and Kunpo, had two main demands -  wage increases and recognition of 
democratic unions. Management agreed to a wage increase but it refused to allow genuine 
unions. At first, only one-third of the workers joined the strike action but soon the rest of 
them followed suit. They demonstrated mostly inside the plant walls but when they did go
w The above account is from Ogle, op.cit., pps.132-134.
64 Lim, Hy-Sop, ‘The Evolution of Social Classes and Changing Social Attitudes’, in Lindauer et al, op.cit., 
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into the streets, violent confrontations took place with the police. Many were injured and 91 
workers were arrested. Throughout the 11 days of protests, negotiations went on and an 
agreement was reached. The pay raise was officially granted and it was agreed that union 
officials would be elected by direct vote of the union members.68
FEMALE WORKERS & THE UNIONISATION DRIVE
Women’s involvement in labour activism was also visible, although the struggles were 
dominated by men for the most part. In demanding worker rights, women converted their 
traditionally submissive role into a political weapon.69 Women factory workers repressed 
their anger at their mistreatment and when it emerged, it resulted in intense and 
spontaneous action -  only in the context of the labour uprising did it become practical for 
workers to speak out on their own behalf.76 Female activism was illustrated in fierce labour 
strikes in the Masan Free Export Zone (MFEZ).71 Masan is a port city located on the 
southeastern coast of Korea and the MFEZ was established as part of the national program 
of export-oriented industrialisation, designed to attract foreign investors with tax incentives 
and waivers of trade union law. The main industries were electronics, metal, precision 
equipment and garment manufacturing.7’ Most of the workers in the zone were female, 
accounting for 77 per cent of the total 36,411 in 19 8 7.74 The sexual division of labour 
meant that male workers were concentrated in the heavy industries and females were 
disproportionately located in the light industries.
During the peak of the Great Workers’ Struggle, women workers in the MFEZ held public 
demonstrations nearly every day, resulting in 20 new democratic labour unions in a short 
period of time.7:1 Before the end of September, more than half of the companies (44 out of
6X The above account is from Ogle, op.cit., pps.137-139.
69 Kim, Seung-Kyung, Class Struggle or Family Struggle? The Lives of Women Factory Workers in South 
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73 ibid., p.20.
74 Nam, ‘Gender Politics in the Korean Transition to Democracy’, op.cit., p. 103.
73 ibid.
190
74) operating in the MFEZ had experienced sit-in strikes.76 The four main demands were 
wage and bonus increases, better treatment, improved working conditions and seniority 
allowances.77 It is estimated that wages in the Masan-Changwon area increased by 10-20 
per cent in the aftermath of the uprising.78 One of the strongest labour unions in the MFEZ 
was established in 1987 by the female workers of Sumida Electronics, a Japanese-owned 
company employing 2,000 workers.79
Female workers at Sumida had a reputation for activism even before the 1987 labour 
uprising and had already made several unsuccessful attempts to establish a democratic
on
union. On 11 August, in collaboration with female student activists, 66 workers started 
autonomous labour unions and recruited about 1,600 workers in a month. Workers 
declared a sit-down strike after the company closed the factory for several days. From 19 
August to 26 August, about 2,000 workers occupied the factory, demanding wage and 
bonus increases -  on 26 August, the company accepted several of the 16 demands 
submitted by the union. From 23 September, the union began publishing its newsletter, 
Hamsong (A Great Outcry) which contained information about labour laws, news items and 
reports about the union’s achievements as well as cartoons, poems and songs aimed at 
raising the consciousness of their members. It appealed to their members to be strong and
O ')
resist efforts of the company to persuade them to withdraw from the union. *
The Korean Women’s Associations United (KWAU) was formed in 1987, a national 
coalition of 28 worker, religious, research, housewife, peasant, human rights and 
environmental organisations designed to link various issues to the wider democratic 
agenda.84 Recognising the unions as an organisational basis for launching a mass-based 
women workers’ movement, the Korean Women Workers Associations (KWWA) adopted 
the strategy of expanding and revitalising women’s chapters and committees within the
76 Kim, Class Struggle or Family Struggle? op.cit., p.l 14.
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unions.88 KWWA officials offered leadership training and educational programs for new 
unions.8(1 These women-based organisations were conscious of the sexism which pervaded 
the ‘Great Workers’ Struggle’ and trade unionism in general and sought to organise 
women’s collective power. The labour disputes which originated in factories dominated by 
male workers activated a wide-based struggle which was not confined to just workplace 
issues. Women workers were also responsible for establishing links with other disaffected 
groups in the broader push for democracy. In the process of demanding improved working 
conditions and better treatment, women subverted traditional notions of female docility. In 
patriarchal South Korea, this was no small feat.
FORMATION OF SOLIDARITY AND LINKS BETWEEN UNIONS
In order to consolidate worker gains, linkages between factories were established along 
with labour federations and councils. Unlike the previous labour struggles of the 1970s and 
1980s, unionised workers sought to strengthen their activities by organising joint union 
councils within their region, industry and enterprise.87 These newly formed associations 
sought to coordinate efforts in pressuring the government for labour law reform and 
protecting the long-term interests of workers. The first regional labour federation was 
established in the Masan-Changwon region, one of the most highly developed industrial 
regions with many aggressive local unions led by militant activists. Masan was home to a 
free-trade zone with a high concentration of foreign capital, light manufacturing and low- 
paid female workers, while Changwon was dominated by chaebol, heavy industry and male 
industrial workers. As the July-August 1987 strike wave came to a close and a counter­
attack was launched by the state and companies, Masan became a major battle zone -  
kusadae (‘company rescue’ teams) were organised to assault women workers and break 
their strikes and unions.90
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In response, the workers of Changwon mobilised to oppose these attacks and they joined 
the workers of Masan in street battles to help the women defend their victories.91 When the 
explosion in union organising took place in 1987, women workers at Masan organised 100 
plants at the MFEZ. The end result of this common struggle was that 30 newly formed 
unions from both cities joined together in December 1987 to form the General Federation 
of Trade Unions in the Masan-Changwon Area. ' It was a loose organisation of democratic 
labour unions started in response to the need for an umbrella group to oversee the 
relationship among different enterprise unions -  by 1988, it had grown rapidly with a 
membership of 30,000 workers.94 The new federation immediately began a general 
education and outreach program to prepare for the struggles ahead -  they organised 
summer training camps for union leaders and year-round education programs on politics, 
labour laws, and the history of the labour movement.95
A national-level struggle by the democratic unions was organised during and after the 1987 
summer strikes in co-ordination with the regional and industrial councils -  by the end of 
1988, these councils had a membership of 105,576 and were affiliated with 392 unions 
throughout the country.9'1 By July 1989, 17 regional labour associations were established, 
incorporating 628 local unions and 246,000 union members.97 These associations were 
important in maintaining the democratic advances made in union formation and 
organisation -  they played key roles in collective bargaining and in labour disputes. 
Through the councils, local unions supported one another by exchanging information, 
sharing common training and public relations activities and coordinating strike action.98 By 
means of these joint activities, they sought to foster workers’ consciousness of labour 
problems beyond the factory gates.99 White-collar workers in the service sector also formed 
11 loosely organised occupational associations which consisted of 925 unions and 144,200
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members.100 Defying government prohibition against union formation, the National 
Teachers’ and Educational Workers’ Unions (NTEWU) was established in May 1989 and 
was instrumental in providing an outlet for teachers to criticise government policies and a 
forum in which to organise protests.
South Korea’s labour movement achieved a significant victory with the establishment of 
the National Congress of Trade Unions (NCTU or Chunnohyup) on 22 January 1990. Roh 
refused to allow the formation of a new national union that could compete with the FKTU 
and it was declared illegal.101 This, however, did not prevent the NCTU from emerging as a
serious challenger. At the time of its establishment, it included 456 unions (5.8 per cent of
102the nation’s total unions) and 160,000 members (8.6 per cent of total union members). 
Over the next few years however, the organisation faced several obstacles, in particular, 
government persecution. Despite government attempts to break the strength of the 
emerging independent labour movement, the formation of the General Federation of Trade 
Unions, nationwide labour councils and especially the NCTU showed how drastically 
things had changed -  workers were confident enough to establish links with other unions 
and organise on a broader scale. Only a few years previously under Chun, such attempts 
were rapidly crushed. Now, there was a sense that inter-union solidarity could be 
maintained and that continuous pressure could be placed on the government. There was 
also the feeling that the government was no longer the omnipotent Leviathan of earlier 
years -  the cracks in the developmental state were apparent and workers were no longer 
afraid to test the limits of government power. Although technically it was illegal, the NCTU 
continued to defy the government and undermine state control.
LABOUR AFTER THE GREAT WORKERS’ STRUGGLE -  GAINS & SETBACKS
Throughout the summer of 1987, the labour movement kept the issue of democracy on the 
national agenda through its actions. Strikes and demonstrations kept the workers in the
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national headlines and drew attention to their plight. Their vocal demands for increased 
autonomy from government interference was regularly reported in local and nationwide 
news. In spite of management and government collusion to crush the labour movement and 
emasculate its leadership, the ‘Great Workers’ Struggle’ achieved several goals. The 
greatest gain was the legalisation and institutionalisation of trade unionism.10' Labour 
legislation was amended on 28 November, 1987, granting workers basic rights to organise 
and to engage in collective bargaining.104 There was a significant shift in the balance of 
power on the shop-floor -  the ferocity of labour protests crippled managerial power at this 
level -  it left big business unprotected and as a result, several chaebols gave substantial 
concessions to aggressive labour demands.105 Workers secured 15-25 per cent wage 
increases along with improvements in working conditions and company welfare 
provisions.106
As a result of the extensive mobilisation and organisation which emerged out of the ‘Great 
Workers’ Struggle’, the total number of union members increased from 1,040,000 in 1986 
to 1,980,000 in 1989, with an increase in the unionisation rate from 15.5 per cent to 23.4 
per cent during this period.107 More unions were legally recognised by the government in 
the aftermath of the ‘Great Workers’ Struggle’. Worker gains in the long run, however, 
were of mixed results. The basic framework set up under authoritarianism remained. 
Formation of more than one union within a firm was prohibited, teachers and public sector 
workers were forbidden from forming unions, and union participation in political activities 
was legally barred. This last prohibition was significant because it sought to prevent the 
working class from forming a political party. Revision of labour laws over the next several 
years was limited -  the DJP and DLP steadfastly blocked attempts to institute more 
substantial reforms.
From early 1988, the government launched a systematic crackdown on labour, with a great 
deal of pressure emanating from the chaebol to adopt a hard-line stance. The public mood,
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particularly amongst the middle classes, turned hostile towards the workers’ plight. This 
change in attitude facilitated a crackdown on labour disputes -  Koreans wanted political 
and economic stability, therefore, many supported the government’s brutal response. 
Employers were able to gain the upper hand by using physical force and violence to 
discourage trade union organisation and to break labour’s strength. Large enterprises hired 
kuscidae to smash strikes and in some cases, hired gangsters to attack and kidnap union 
leaders. Police forces and private armies hired by management also co-operated in their 
attempts to end protests.109 On 28 December 1988, Roh Tae Woo made a ‘Special 
Announcement on Maintaining Civic Security and Law and Order’ which officially marked 
the end of the political opening following the Democracy Declaration. As a result of 
repression, the number of strikes declined after 1987. There were 3,749 labour disputes in 
1987, 1,833 in 1988 and 1,616 in 1989."° Close to 1.3 million workers participated in 
strikes during the hot summer of 1987. By 1989, however, the number was less than half, 
totaling 409,UOO.111
Although the number of strikes dropped after 1987, those which occurred were 
insurrectionary. Fierce worker resistance in the face of vicious state repression was 
disturbing for the regime -  by striking at the very core of the developmental state -  the 
chaebol -  they were an attack on the engines which had powered Korea’s remarkable 
economic growth. After 1987, the strikes which occurred in the largest chaebol were not 
only economically crippling, but politically, they constituted a massive threat to the system 
which emerged under Park in the 1960s. One of the most dramatic displays of government 
repression and worker defiance occurred at Hyundai. In March 1989, a massive military 
style operation at Hyundai Heavy Industries by 10,000 government troops ended a 109-day 
sit-down strike that had shut down the facility.112 An assault was launched from the air, sea 
and land -  a huge military operation called the Ulsan 30 Operation. When the police 
entered the compound factory, there were hardly any strikers because they had sneaked out 
of the compound at midnight and reassembled in front of the Hyundai dormitory building.
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At noon, the riot police, accompanied by a band of baikgoldan (police trained in martial 
arts), invaded the dormitory and hundreds of workers were arrested. That was not the end 
of the strike -  by the late afternoon, workers’ resistance had developed into a large-scale 
street battle. Some 1,500 fellow workers at nearby Hyundai Engine declared a one-day 
strike in sympathy and poured on to the streets. Hundreds of workers from Hyundai 
Motors, Hyundai Mipo Shipyards and Hyundai subsidiary firms also went into the streets 
and the eastern section of Ulsan turned into a battlefield.11 ’
Street battles grew larger and more violent on the following day -  a large number of 
residents joined the protests and many wives and children of Hyundai workers, enraged at 
the attacks of the baikgoldan, became direct participants in the street battles. They blocked 
the police from entering their alleys in pursuit of fleeing workers, collected money, hid 
students who had come to assist the workers in their homes and collected empty bottles for 
manufacturing Molotov cocktails. The street battle lasted for more than 10 days and ended 
on 18 April 1989, with the arrests of 52 union leaders and dismissal of 49 workers.114
The Hyundai conflict demonstrates that the government was determined at any cost to 
break the labour movement, for economic and political reasons. Roh needed to maintain the 
support of the middle classes who were growing tired of the economic and social upheaval 
caused by ongoing labour disputes, while also proving to the chaebol that the government 
could forcefully deal with the threat that continued strikes posed to economic production. 
Roh was aware that economic loss for the chaebol could have politically disastrous 
consequences for the government. Therefore, the regime’s policy was to systematically 
crush the increasingly powerful labour movement. The government narrowed the definition 
of the legality of strikes.115 After the formation of the NCTU in January 1990, the Home 
Affairs Ministry declared that it would place 337 additional intelligence agents in 71 major 
industrial complexes in order to follow and investigate “impure elements” in the 
workplace.116 These “impure elements” were a direct reference to left-wing activists, a 
legacy of the anti-communism which characterised the Rhee and Park era. The Ministry
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also announced plans to organise 63 riot police companied at key locations for operations 
“ against illegal labour conflicts” .117
Between January 1990 and July 1991, 848 trade unionists were arrested and kept in ja il for
periods ranging from a few weeks to a year or more. O f this total, 615 were leaders
associated with the NCTU and 19 out of the 22 members o f the NCTU central committee
were arrested several times.119 Roh declared the NCTU illegal because it was seen as
leading a conflict with an “ ideology o f class struggle for the liberation of labour” . The
government’ s response to the formation of the NCTU was a virtual declaration o f war and
as a result, it suffered losses in membership. Repression also extended into the white-collar
sector -  the government cracked down hard on the NTEWU and its supporters by firing all
teachers associated with the union. Over 1,600 teachers lost their jobs in the union’s first
120year and 100 teachers were imprisoned for demonstrating for the right to form a union. 
Between 1988 and 1989, the number of workers and union leaders arrested jumped six-fold 
from 147 to 946, totaling 1,736 between 1988 and 1991.121 This was all part o f a deliberate 
strategy to not only destroy the labour movement’ s strength but also to delegitimise worker 
actions by portraying them as subversive and dangerous. None of this would have been 
possible without at least the tacit support o f the middle classes and the chaebol. This 
support was instrumental in facilitating the emergence of a conservative, democratic 
government whose main concern was to prevent the organisation of workers into a political 
party.
COMPLETING THE TRANSITION
Presidential elections on 16 December, 1987 were the starting point in South Korea’ s 
transition to democracy. As president o f the DJP, Roh’s ties to the military tainted his 
democratic credentials. He played a key role in the first stage o f Chun’ s 1979 coup, leading 
an army division from the North Korean border in an attack on military headquarters in
117
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Seoul in December 1979.122 Handpicked by Chun, Roh was often pejoratively characterised 
as ‘Chun with a wig’, likening him to the bald former ruler. This led many South 
Koreans to assume that Roh’s prospects of winning the presidency were not assured. The 
parliamentary opposition, however, faced serious problems of its own. Since its formation, 
the NKDP had been torn apart by the two major factions led by Kim Young Sam and Kim 
Dae Jung -  the ‘two Kims’. Amidst differences, personal rivalry and deadlock on key party 
issues, Kim Young Sam created his own party, the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) 
which replaced the NKDP in May 1987. Only six months later, in October 1987, Kim Dae 
Jung established a new party of his own, the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD). This 
split led to the DJP’s victory -  Roh received 36.7 per cent of the total votes, Kim Young 
Sam (RDP) 28.1 and Kim Dae Jung (PPD) 27.1.124 A former right-hand man of Park Chung 
Hee, Kim Jong Pil, formed the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) and received 
8.1 per cent.125
Roh was immediately faced with the dilemma of how to deal with continuing labour strikes 
in a new, democratic setting. Anti-labour sentiment amongst big business and the middle 
classes, however, laid the basis for a harsh crackdown. The disappointing growth rate of 6.8 
per cent in 1989 brought home to the government and big business the economic dilemma 
posed by accelerating labour costs.126 According to the government, manufacturers suffered 
nearly $1 billion in production losses and almost $300 million in export losses during the 
first five months of 19 8 8.127 Overall estimates were that strikes during the first half of 1989 
cost South Korea $4.5 billion in production losses.12* The 100-day strike at Hyundai Heavy 
Industries in 1989 cost the company $30 million in profits, while South Korea’s three 
largest automobile companies claimed that strikes lowered their production by 75,000 cars 
worth $1 billion.129 As a result, the chaebol felt that the government was not being tough
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enough on workers -  big business felt that the state had lost its ability to maintain social 
and political stability by allowing strikes to disrupt economic production for weeks and 
months at a time. Roh could not afford to ignore the chaebol, who had become economic 
giants under Korea’s developmental state. Despite Roh’s assurances that strikes would not 
be tolerated, big business believed that the government had taken too long to respond 
adequately to labour militancy. The creation of the Unification National Party (UNP) in 
1991, led by chaebol owner Chung Ju Yung, demonstrated the extent of dissatisfaction that 
the bourgeoisie felt. For the first time, the military was facing the prospects of losing one of 
its most important allies -  the tide was rapidly turning.
It was not just the chaebol owners however, who were affected by continuing labour unrest. 
A sense of economic and social insecurity began to affect the middle class. Many felt their 
material interests were being threatened, especially when workers received wage increases. 
In 1988, blue-collar workers were able to obtain a 22.6 per cent wage increase, compared 
with a 11.9 per cent increase received by white-collar workers. ' The following year, blue- 
collar workers received an 18.8 per cent increase, in comparison with 15.3 per cent for 
white-collar workers.1’1 The considerable wage gaps that had existed between blue and 
white-collar workers narrowed significantly after 1987.132 Initially, the middle classes 
supported the worker struggle. Attitude surveys showed that the middle classes expressed 
sympathy towards the plight of factory workers.13'’ Workers were believed to have been 
compensated inadequately with low wage policies, while employers benefited 
disproportionately from the economic policies of the developmental state.134 But after 1989, 
sectors of the middle class most directly affected by the strikes turned against workers. 
Negative reactions to labour disputes were stronger amongst those who employed workers, 
such as small manufacturers and shopkeepers. Surveys conducted in 1989 indicate that 
most of the middle class respondents had critical attitudes towards strikes, especially about 
the violent aspects, and approved government interventions to end prolonged labour 
conflicts.135 Changing economic circumstances, therefore, resulted in a marked shift in
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middle class attitudes towards the labour movement -  they became increasingly 
conservative and concerned with political and social stability.
Mass media played a critical role in influencing middle-class attitudes by fostering negative 
opinions of the labour movement.136 Roh’s government launched an ideological attack in 
the media designed to discredit and reduce public support for the workers. Mainstream 
media had initially adopted a neutral stance toward the ‘Great Workers’ Struggle’, but it 
gradually shifted to a hostile position.1’7 Strikes were depicted as “violent”, “radical” or 
“irresponsible” and workers’ demands for wage increases were described as “selfish” in the 
midst of national economic troubles.1’8 The public was led to believe that the nation’s 
economic slump was primarily due to the continuous labour unrest and that Korea would 
lose its competitive edge if it continued.139 The uneasy alliance which had existed between 
the middle and working classes prior to the democracy declaration came undone -  prior to 
June 1987, the middle and working classes were united in their opposition to 
authoritarianism. However, the transition altered the political dynamic. While the middle 
classes were placated by Roh’s democratic concessions, ongoing labour conflict 
engendered the hostility of the former. Thus, the Great Workers Struggle hastened the 
rupturing of the class alliance of the period up to June 1987 -  as a result, the field was left 
open to conservative politicians.140
The split between the working and middle classes was not the only indication that the 
balance of forces was rapidly changing -  the military was also facing a crisis of its own. In 
the National Assembly elections on 26 April 1988, the DJP failed to capture a majority of 
the seats. It received 34 per cent of the popular vote, while the RDP garnered 23.8, the PPD 
19.3 and the NDRP 15.6.141 It led to the creation of yoso-yadae (small ruling party, big 
opposition) in the National Assembly.142 This hastened the formation of a conservative 
ruling bloc -  in order to rectify the imbalance, Roh made a secret deal to merge the DJP
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with the RDP and NDRP into the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). Formed in 1990, the 
DLP or ‘Grand Conservative Coalition’ was designed to consolidate the power of Roh’s 
party by effectively diminishing the influence of Kim Dae Jung, a powerful opposition 
leader whom the military did not trust.14' The split in the opposition forces proved 
advantageous for the military -  because it was fast losing the support of the chaebol, the 
military looked to Kim Young Sam as the most acceptable opposition candidate to make a 
deal with. This seemed to be the only way in which the military could hold onto power and 
dictate the terms under which South Korea would become a democracy. Weakened by 
constant strikes and popular pressure for democratic change, the military was no longer in a 
dominant position. The use of large-scale repression was not an option because opposition 
was too strong and widespread -  backed into a corner, the military had no choice but to 
become democratic. South Korea’s transition therefore, was completed with the election of 
Kim Young Sam in 1992, the first civilian president for more than four decades. In the 18 
December 1992 elections, Kim Young Sam (DLP) received 42 per cent and Kim Dae Jung 
(PPD) received 33.9, while the former Chair of Hyundai, Chung Joo Young received 16.2 
for his Unification National Party (UNP).144
In South Korea, the labour movement was more organised and powerful than in Mexico or 
Brazil. Nevertheless, the workers’ movement produced no political expression in the form 
of a party which could challenge state power.145 Labour was legally prohibited from 
organising collectively -  workers had demonstrated their potential as an organised force 
during the ‘Great Workers’ Struggle’ and the state was determined to prevent this power 
from being expressed in the electoral sphere. As a result, the new unions were unable to 
form an effective electoral bloc. There were, however, a few political experiments during 
the period of democratic transition -  a few months after the political liberalisation of 1987, 
intellectuals and labour and political activists formed the progressive Party of the Minjung 
and the Democratic Party of Hankyore.146 It was not a working class party, although it 
sought to appeal to urban workers as well as to the progressive segments of the middle 
class.147 It did not perform well in elections and eventually was disbanded. Workers were
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absorbed into the electoral process as individuals or as members of pre-established social 
ties based on regions, towns and schools.148 Thus, there was no party which represented the 
interests of workers, unlike the PT in Brazil.
CONCLUSION
The easing of political restrictions following the democracy declaration resulted in the 
explosion of the long suppressed frustrations of workers. Large, crippling strikes 
established the working class as a powerful social force. The importance of the ‘Great 
Workers’ Struggle’ was not only in its militancy, but also the widespread support it 
garnered. A majority of Koreans sympathised with the workers’ plight, particularly the 
middle classes. However, the most significant aspect of the ‘Great Workers’ Struggle’ was 
its political impact. Prohibited from striking and organising for decades, workers 
deliberately challenged the state by launching strikes which targeted the heart of Korea’s 
rapid economic growth -  the chaebol. Even when it was faced with large-scale repression, 
workers raised the political stakes by demanding an ongoing commitment to democratic 
change and an end to the government’s anti-labour clampdown.
However, when strikes began to affect the economy, the middle classes lost their sympathy 
for the workers’ cause. Economic downturn, therefore, turned public opinion against the 
workers. Additionally, the chaebol were distrustful of the government’s ability to deal 
more harshly with the labour movement. Labour was unable to produce an alternative 
which could vie for political power. As a result, Kim Young Sam was able to form a 
coalition with the government -  the DLP -  which came to power in 1992. Faced with 
losing one of its most powerful allies, the chaebol, the government was forced to look for 
allies elsewhere -  it capitalised on the rupture between the opposition forces by making a 
deal with Kim. Sidelined by the regime and the conservative wing of the opposition, the 
Korean labour movement was unable to translate its enormous physical and organisational 
strength into a bid for political office.
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION -  WORKERS & DEMOCRATIC 
CHANGE
This thesis has demonstrated that the mainstream understandings of democratisation 
processes have often neglected the important role that ordinary people have played in 
political change. Mexico, Brazil and South Korea all had labour movements that were 
active in the transition. Their militancy and pressure tactics destabilised authoritarian 
governments and, in the cases of Brazil and Korea, they played an important role in 
removing authoritarian regimes. The empirical evidence refutes elite-led transitology’s 
argument that less mobilisation is better. Instead, continued popular mobilisation 
(especially in South Korea) did not harm the transition to democracy, rather it carried the 
transition forward. That is, mobilisation continued the transition, which is the exact 
opposite of what transitology predicts and even fears:
Nothing is more destructive of democracy than frequent confrontations in the 
streets, the legislature, the state administration, and elsewhere between groups who 
view themselves as engaged in zero-sum conflict. The lifting of authoritarian 
repression and the return of democratic liberties to organise, petition, and 
demonstrate should not lead to widespread disorder and violence. 1
All three countries experienced rapid economic growth under the auspices of a 
developmental state. The changes evidenced by such rapid growth had extensive 
implications for the nature of the transition and the type of labour movements which 
emerged. Moreover, the differences between the labour movements is very important for 
analysing the distinct nature of the transitions to democracy. This exposes a major 
theoretical weakness in elite-led transitology -  it is not only that popular mobilisation and, 
in particular, labour movements are ignored by elite-led transitology, but that the nature of 
the labour movement (its origins, history, and whether it is excluded or co-opted) 
influences the type and the course of the transition so that each country is unique. Each of 
these transitions highlights some of elite-led transitology’s central flaws. The three
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Facilitating Conditions’, in Mainwaring, O’Donnell and Valenzuela, Issues in Democratic Consolidation, 
op.cit., p.82.
204
countries studied here also show that democratisation does not follow one path and that a 
multitude of actors are all involved in the process, despite their near invisibility in elite-led 
transitology.
There are several similarities between the three case studies. They were all developmental 
states in varying shapes and forms and all were authoritarian regimes. Also, each country 
enjoyed high levels of economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. In Mexico, Brazil and 
South Korea, powerful vested interests (including the business sector) supported the 
establishment of an authoritarian state in order to control popular forces. Elites backed 
authoritarian regimes (whether implicitly or explicitly) due to fear of popular rebellion. All 
of the case studies had popular classes that were historically combative, in particular, the 
organised labour movement presented the strongest challenge. The ways in which the threat 
from below was dealt with, however, differed in each.
Mexico’s solution emerged in the destructive aftermath of the Mexican revolution. 
Widespread mobilisation of peasants and workers during the revolution taught the post­
revolutionary elite an important lesson -  it needed to find effective means to control the 
working class. Although state repression was often employed, the regime preferred to 
incorporate the popular sector through the government party, the PRI. Institutional outlets 
were established that served as conduits for the expression of discontent. The CTM was 
crucial in co-opting and neutralising any threats to the political and economic system 
established in the decade following the revolution. Incorporation of labour leaders into the 
bureaucratic system -  charrismo -  precluded any real independence for the labour 
movement. If there was any rebellion, it was quickly repressed -  the Mexican state was 
able to co-opt (as well as pre-empt) any challenges and weaken or eliminate any potential 
rivals. The CTM, as well as the CNC and CNOP, were created to preserve the illusion of a 
democratic government. The need for labour docility was built into the stable functioning 
of the Mexican political system so that when it was challenged beginning in 1968 and 
continuing with the labour insurgency of the mid-1970s, it faced a crisis of immense 
proportions, the likes of which it had never experienced before.
Brazil and South Korea had similar methods of control. Organised labour was brutally 
suppressed from an early period. The system of labour control established under Vargas
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and the Estado Novo served as the basic framework until the late 1970s. Although the post- 
World War II democratic period appeared to signal a freer environment for labour to 
operate, this was not the case. Various presidents paid lip-service to the labour movement 
in order to build their own bases of support in the factional struggle for power between 
elites which characterised Brazilian politics. Shifting (and often tenuous) coalitions meant 
that workers were utilised as pawns -  populist rhetoric was used by President Goulart to 
appeal to workers, but it was only for self-serving purposes. The official labour movement 
was essentially a tool of the state, it was a bureaucratic instrument used to control the 
combative rank-and-file.
Under the Brazilian military dictatorship, labour was repressed and excluded. The divisions 
within the military leadership left their own rule rather brittle. The internal maneuverings 
inside the military were an indication of this -  the split between the hard-line and soft-line 
factions, and the resulting shifts between liberalisation and authoritarian crackdown is an 
important indication of the military’s internal fragility. Therefore, when an independent 
labour movement emerged, there was no way of trying to buy it off or split it. So, unlike 
Mexico, labour actually produced its own political alternative -  the PT -  which was not in 
any way connected with the old regime -  in contrast to the PRD in Mexico. When the novo 
sindicalismo appeared on the scene, it was explosive -  it protested against the 
developmental model and repression of labour. Most importantly, it was even more 
worrying for the regime because of its links with the broader pro-democracy movement -  
the middle and professional classes and grassroots social movements. The creation of the 
PT was a remarkable achievement, not only because it occurred outside the channels of 
state control but also because it provided a common ground for grassroots mobilisation, 
thereby defying the historical exclusion of the masses from Brazilian politics.
South Korea’s methods of control were just as brutal. Japanese colonialism dealt harshly 
with popular challenges but despite repression, popular movements thrived in the short 
period after World War II. The intervention of the US however, was a major setback for the 
labour movement -  the US collaborated with the corrupt regime of Syngman Rhee to 
prevent the emergence of a genuine democratic government. Any chance of a strong labour 
movement was further crushed with the military dictatorship of Park. The regime’s virulent 
anti-communism had a particularly negative impact on the labour movement, both
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ideologically and organisationally. Labour was brutally repressed and there was no attempt 
to incorporate it into the state structure apart from the weak and ineffective FKTU which 
was clearly a puppet of the state. There was no party which even nominally represented 
worker interests. Violently repressed for decades under a developmental state and forced to 
endure miserable working conditions, workers spilled out of the factories and into the 
streets during the ‘hot summer’ of 1987 with an extraordinary intensity.
A MODEL FOR ANALYSING DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
The theoretical model favoured by elite-led transitology is inadequate and too rigid to 
explain the complex nature of transitions to democracy. Chapter 1 outlined the four basic 
models of transition put forward by elite-led transitology. The first two models are 
considered the most successful because of the role ascribed to elites in determining the type 
of democracy that emerges -  ‘transition by pact’, where elites compromise among 
themselves and ‘transition by imposition’ where elites use force to bring about a regime 
change against the resistance of incumbents. The last two models are regarded by some 
transitologists as largely unsuccessful because they result in ‘too much’ popular 
participation in the democratisation process -  ‘transition through reform’ (non-violent 
mobilisation of the masses) and ‘transition by revolution’ (violent mass mobilisation).
A new, more inclusive model is necessary to rectify the imbalance between elite actors (the 
top-down approach) and the popular classes (the bottom-up approach). What is needed is a 
model in between these two extremes, one which acknowledges the input of elite political 
actors but more importantly, also incorporates the actions of the labour movement. Elite-led 
transitology’s focus on the upper echelons of government fails to account for the labour 
movement’s opposition and its role in contributing to the breakdown of authoritarian 
governments. The preoccupation with the negotiations and bargaining at the highest levels 
of government obscures the wealth of evidence which shows that democracy is also 
brought about by the actions of the popular classes -  in this case, the labour movement.
The model developed in this thesis moves beyond the static models adopted by elite-led 
transitologists which focuses on four main political actors -  the hard-liners and reformers
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(soft-liners) within the authoritarian government and the radicals and moderates in the 
opposition. For elite-led transitologists, the transition is essentially about the deliberations 
between these four actors. These deliberations are viewed as crucial because they result in a 
compromise -  as seen in chapter 1, elite-led transitologists argue that the threat of a coup 
from the hard-liners forces the moderates in the democratic opposition to compromise, thus 
leading to the installation of a conservative, democratic government.
The focus on the actions of elite actors, however, is deliberate. A ‘successful’ transition 
equals a moderate opposition and most importantly, it is considered successful because of 
the exclusion of the ‘radical’ left from the bargaining process -  that is, the popular classes. 
The role that is ascribed to the more militant sectors of the popular classes is largely seen in 
negative terms -  some mobilisation of civil society is acceptable, but too much is 
dangerous. This is because mass mobilisation is seen as potentially destabilising:
All attempts at revolutionary transformation have not merely failed; they have been 
a powerful factor leading to the emergence of authoritarian rule ... any such attempt 
in the foreseeable future will be much more likely to induce similar authoritarian 
reversals than to achieve whatever egalitarian goals may be claimed by 
revolutionary movements.2
The model constructed in this thesis argues the exact opposite -  the evidence from Mexico, 
Brazil and South Korea demonstrates that the mobilisation of the labour movement and 
broader pro-democratic social forces is desirable and necessary. Labour did not cause an 
authoritarian reversal, indeed, it pushed the transition to democracy forward in each case. 
Elite-led transitology’s definition of civil society includes professional and middle class 
associations, human rights groups, workers, intellectuals and church groups. None, 
however, are given particular prominence. Lumped together under a broad banner, the 
popular sector is not important in its own right for elite-led transitologists -  it does not 
cause the transition, nor is it responsible for maintaining the democratic momentum. Those 
classified as being part of the popular sector during the democratic transition are not 
regarded as important political players -  their only importance is in a minor role as
“ O’Donnell, ‘Introduction to the Latin American Cases’, in O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, Vol. 2, op.cit., p. 10.
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supporting actors. The main purpose of the popular classes, according to O’Donnell and 
Schmitter, is to strengthen the position of the democratic opposition in their bargaining 
with the elites of the authoritarian regime. There is no analysis of the opposition mounted 
by the popular classes because it is seen as temporary, destabilising and therefore 
ineffective in achieving any long-term political change. The argument presented here, 
however, shows that labour played a leadership role in the democratic transition -  its 
actions were not limited to merely strengthening the hand of the opposition in its dealings 
with the authoritarian regime. The labour movement was not at the margins of democratic 
politics. Moreover, this leadership role has a qualitative impact on the nature of the 
transition. In fact, workers are at the very centre of the political spotlight as pivotal actors. 
The transition in each country was not solely the result of decisions made at the top levels 
of government, as elite-led transitology would have us believe. Rather, it was a 
combination of actions from above, combined with pressures from below. This provides a 
better and more balanced model for understanding democratic transitions.
Elite-led transitology overlooks the context in which the labour movement emerges to 
challenge authoritarian regimes -  while it may acknowledge a role for popular resistance, it 
neglects to explain why labour revolts in different ways and how it interacts with other 
social forces to bring down authoritarian governments. This is an important analytical 
aspect that is missing in elite-led transitology -  all of these factors are not only vital to the 
transition, but they determine the qualitative nature of the transition. Therefore, what is 
needed is a model which incorporates decisions from above (the role of elites) with actions 
from below (popular resistance). Such a model provides a better explain for how popular 
protest emerges and the impact it has on democratisation processes. These aspects will be 
analysed in the following sections.
HISTORICAL FACTORS
In each country, the labour movement’s form of opposition was the result of historical 
factors. This, in turn, influenced the nature of the government’s response. The context in 
which labour emerged on a massive scale to openly defy authoritarian regimes has not 
received any attention by elite-led transitologists who prefer to focus on short-term factors
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in explaining authoritarian breakdowns. However, by taking into account the long-term 
factors, we can shed light on why transitions to democracy followed different paths in all 
three countries.
Labour in Mexico was incorporated into the ruling structure -  albeit a subordinate role -  
from early on. The Mexican revolution highlighted the need to construct a state where 
rebellious workers and peasants would not only be tamed, but also tightly controlled. In 
particular, the relationship between the Mexican state and workers emerged during the 
revolution. Carranza’s deal with the COM workers in order to gain their support against the 
peasant armies of Villa and Zapata set the precedent for future state-labour relations. In 
return, workers received state support. It was the leaders of the mass organisations, 
however, who received the benefits associated with state support, not the rank-and-file. 
Incorporation hid an undemocratic reality -  labour independence was an illusion. The 
bureaucratic organisations of labour, particularly the CTM, were necessary for controlling 
the combative rank-and-file and maintaining the hegemony of the PRI. The CTM, as well 
as the CNC and the CNOP, were organised to serve the interests of the PRI and to ensure 
that the authoritarian system ran smoothly based on a combination of repression and co­
optation. Mass mobilisation was tolerated as long as it did not fundamentally threaten the 
foundations of PRI rule. The ‘perfect dictatorship’ was thus created, but it was a system 
with an inherent flaw -  continued economic growth was necessary in order to maintain 
stability and keep dissenters at bay.
Throughout the decades leading up the 1976 insurgencia obrem , independent worker 
mobilisation presented an ongoing threat for the PRI and its undisputed control over the 
unions. This represented the PRI’s worst fear -  given labour’s strategic position in the PRI 
state, it could potentially inflict massive damage on the state. This potential was 
particularly evident in the railroad disputes of 1947 and 1958-59. Both were driven by 
worker opposition to the authoritarian system of charro control over the unions. Although 
these disputes were crushed by the government, they were part of a broader movement 
beginning to openly call for democratic change -  in short, they were a sign of things to 
come.
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The labour insurgency was a concerted attempt to break free from within the structures of 
PRI control and to break out from decades of stifling charrismo -  no small feat. Lack of 
union democracy and charro control over workers was a source of resentment within the 
labour movement. When the labour insurgency exploded onto the scene, it received wide 
support within a short space of time, not only from other unions (blue and white-collar), but 
also from the middle and popular classes. This was because the insurgencia obrem 
campaigned for broader democratic reform, rather than just workplace issues. Its protests 
and demonstrations mirrored the same demands made at Tlatelolco in 1968. Labour was 
able to tap into the frustrations of the hundreds of thousands of Mexicans who had joined 
the pro-democracy movement in 1968. Almost ten years later, these frustrations were still 
visible despite Echeverna’s attempts to defuse the tense political situation with his 
‘apertura democratica’ following the Tlatelolco massacre in the early 1970s.
The PRI, however, could not be brought down in the short-term. Labour was unable to 
directly unseat the PRI because it was a government which reached into all corners of 
society. It was a vast system of control which was able to weather the storm because of an 
extensive network of bureaucratic organisations and institutions that were able to withstand 
labour’s onslaught. Moreover, the PRI system could also count on co-opting potentially 
rebellious workers, one of the government’s main methods of counter-acting dissent. 
Nevertheless, the labour insurgency was able to inflict a crippling blow on the regime -  it 
destabilised and largely weakened the PRI. The labour insurgency contributed to the 
transition because it initiated a crisis of faith in the PRI amongst large sectors of the 
bourgeoisie. In their view, the government allowed the labour insurgency to go on for too 
long. It was seen as a sign of weakness -  the PRI was slipping and had lost its legitimacy. 
Unable to maintain its tight grip on workers, the PRI could no longer guarantee that the 
private sector’s material interests would not be threatened as a result of ongoing industrial 
strikes. They had lost their faith in the ability of the PRI to control a historically rebellious 
labour movement -  they withdrew their support and turned to the PAN as the party that 
represented their interests. The actions of labour, therefore, set in motion the sequence of 
events that eventually forced the PRI from power in 2000.
The labour movement in Brazil was historically excluded from the ruling alliance and 
violently repressed. Unlike the Mexican case, the Brazilian state did not create bureaucratic
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organisations in an attempt to present itself as a champion of the workers. Just like Mexico, 
however, it also relied on crude force to subdue the labour movement. This was more 
necessary in Brazil because of the tenuous nature of state power. Even though the Mexican 
state was regularly faced with working class opposition, its foundations were much more 
solid. Under the Old Republic, the alliance which ruled Brazil was by no means stable. 
What kept it together, however, was an agreement that the popular classes, particularly the 
labour movement, would be repressed and excluded from politics. This agreement 
continued after Vargas came to power in the 1930 ‘revolution’ -  he was able to 
successfully juggle the different class interests that made up the new regime. At first, 
Vargas did not need to cater to the working class because unlike the Mexican state, the 
Brazilian state at this time had not come to power as a result of deals struck with the 
working class. It was not beholden to labour and therefore, there was no need to utilise the 
labour movement as a political resource in coming to power, which was the opposite in 
Mexico.
The Estado Novo set a precedent for the military dictatorship -  it was one of the most 
tightly controlled systems of corporatist labour relations in Latin America. The regime 
relied on pliant labour leaders, pelegos, to enforce government directives and to keep the 
rank-and-file in line. The Brazilian state focused on demobilising labour while the Mexican 
state allowed mobilisation so long as it could be regulated and controlled by the PRI -  a far 
cry from an independent labour movement. Labour’s fortunes did not improve during the 
democratic period -  they were viewed primarily as a source of votes and were often 
manipulated by politicians for self-serving purposes. Almost four decades later, the labour 
movement reversed its historical exclusion from the political stage with the emergence of 
the PT. It was a party formed by workers outside of the military dictatorship’s control -  
indeed, the labour movement was breaking in from the outside. This was a major 
breakthrough in Brazilian politics -  the popular classes had been ruthlessly prevented from 
forming any genuine political party throughout Brazilian history. Now, a party which 
genuinely represented worker interests had not only been formed, but it was contesting 
elections in a bid for the presidency.
The military, however, would not step down until it had found a moderate politician to 
replace it -  there was no question of permitting a left-wing labour party to rule Brazil. The
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elite agreement which had emerged out of the 1930 revolution was still in place -  the 
labour movement was excluded from vying for the top position. The outcome was a 
government dominated by conservative political elites -  the military maneuvered to install 
a civilian president who it found suitable. Tancredo Neves guaranteed the military that it 
would be immune from future prosecution for its abuses of human rights. Although Neves 
died not long after, this set the wheels in motion for the 1989 direct presidential elections in 
which another member of the civilian elite, Fernando Collor de Mello was elected. The PT, 
nevertheless, was able to build its electoral strength over the next two decades and 
eventually came to power in 2002.
The labour movement was brutally repressed in South Korea and suffered devastating 
setbacks from an early period. Similarly to Mexico and Brazil, it was forced to contend 
with a state which was determined to crush the threat posed by an organised working class. 
The Japanese ruthlessly persecuted labour because it was the most organised form of 
popular opposition under colonialism. There was brief respite for labour, however, after the 
end of World War II. In the period of widespread mobilisation that followed, workers 
openly formed a genuine leftist labour union -  Chun Pyung -  and organised grassroots 
people committees which declared the Korean People’s Republic (KPR) in September 
1945. This open environment was intense, but brief. The US geo-political strategy of 
communist containment, coupled with the Korean War, severely weakened the newly 
revitalised labour movement. With US backing, Syngman Rhee systematically destroyed 
what was left of the labour movement. Unlike Mexico (or Brazil during its democratic 
period), there was never any attempt to manipulate labour interests in order to serve the 
interests of the political elite.
Although labour briefly emerged again in 1960 during the student revolution, the 
emergence of Park’s dictatorship barely a year later was the beginning of a dark era for the 
working class. Park wasted little time in establishing a network of fear, terror and 
intimidation in order to prevent the formation of a powerful labour movement. Trade 
unions were placed under close supervision and any form of political activity, such as 
strikes and demonstrations, was strictly prohibited. The only labour organisation allowed to 
exist under Park’s dictatorship -  the FKTU -  was a bureaucratic puppet of the state with no 
autonomy. Forced to endure miserable working conditions for the sake of rapid
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development, labour protest began to emerge in the 1970s. This was a huge risk -  opposing 
Park’s dictatorship almost certainly meant arrest, torture and even death. Even in a climate 
of harsh repression, workers criticised the regime and its policies of rapid industrialisation. 
Park’s assassination in 1979 gave the labour movement some breathing space and once 
again it sprang into action, organising and striking on a large scale. Chun’s rule, however, 
represented another temporary setback for the labour movement. But the major difference 
now was that the labour movement was larger and stronger than in previous decades -  it 
also had the support of broad sectors of society. Mass pressure for democratic change 
resulted in the ‘democracy declaration’ in June 1987. Massive labour strikes came hot on 
the heels of this declaration and followed with heightened intensity in the following year.
Even though the labour movement was more powerful in South Korea than in the other two 
case studies, the outcome was a government which excluded labour. As a result, labour did 
not produce an independent political expression of its own. Labour’s militancy, however, 
bulldozed the path for middle class opposition to take centre stage -  via various 
compromises with Roh Tae Woo and the military (the old regime), Kim Young Sam 
emerged as a candidate who had his political base of support in the middle class. The 
beneficiaries of the transition, therefore, were the opposition forces who made their peace 
with both elements of the old regime -  Kim Young-Sam and the Grand Coalition and the 
middle classes, who sought an end to ongoing worker mobilisation and supported the 
formation of a civilian government which repressed and excluded labour.
ELITE SPLITS
Elite-led transitology fails to explain how three different factors are interrelated -  the way 
in which elite splits occur, the reasons behind the split and how the labour movement and 
mass pressure influence the splits. The model put forward by elite-led transitology requires 
substantial revision is in the role it ascribes to internal factors. The breakdown of an 
authoritarian regime is the result of an elite split, according to elite-led transitology. Once 
this split occurs, the transition to democracy is then negotiated by the four main political 
actors and usually follows one of the more common paths -  ‘transition through pact’ or 
‘transition through imposition’. This thesis has shown that none of the three case studies
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follow a similar path in their transition to democracy. Instead of viewing the transition as a 
process which is caused by elite dissension, this thesis has argued that it was other factors 
which were responsible for the split, namely, the opposition mounted by the labour 
movement. Furthermore, elite-led transitology views the transition as a series of 
negotiations under pressure through which the authoritarian government shifts towards 
cooperation with the moderate elements of the opposition.3 But it does not explain 
adequately why the authoritarian government cooperated to install a democracy in the first 
place. It cooperated because it was forced to negotiate with the opposition as a result of 
mass pressure from below. This pressure from below was so widespread and intense, 
particularly in Brazil and South Korea, that the costs of staying in power were calculated as 
too high.
Although elite-led transitology provides a brief account of how the popular classes mount 
their opposition to authoritarian regimes, it does not analyse how pressure from below 
influences both liberalisation and democratisation. All of the case studies demonstrate that 
liberalisation and democratisation are not straightforward processes of deliberation between 
elites, rather, it is an ongoing struggle that is constantly being pushed forward by the 
actions of the popular classes, in particular, the labour movement. O’Donnell and Schmitter 
recognise the importance of mass mobilisation but it is only after there has been a split 
within the authoritarian government and after the soft-liners have instituted steps towards 
liberalisation:
...Once the soft-liners have prevailed over the hard-liners, begun to extend 
guarantees for individuals and some rights of contestation ... a generalised 
mobilisation is likely to occur, which we choose to describe as the ‘resurrection of 
civil society’ .4
But the labour movement is active before the split and indeed, its pressure tactics 
complicate the seemingly natural progression from authoritarianism to democracy. In each 
country, controlled liberalisation was enacted as way of defusing social discontent with 
repressive and unpopular policies. Governments resisted democratisation until they had no
3 Whitehead, ‘Democratic Transitions’, in Krieger, op.cit.
4 O’Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Vol. 4, op.cit., p.48.
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choice but to respond to increasing mobilisation. Liberalisation acquired a momentum that 
could not be contained. Popular pressure was first applied by the actions of the labour 
movement. It started a chain reaction eventually leading to a democratic transition. 
Especially in Brazil and South Korea, massive demonstrations made it impossible to ignore 
demands for democracy.
In Mexico, the PRI started to feel the effects of mass pressure for change following the 
Tlatelolco massacre in 1968. Indeed, the pro-democracy movement of 1968 shattered the 
myth of the PRI’s undisputed hegemony and shook the PRI to its core. Shocked at the 
widespread nature of discontent, the PRI was forced to initiate liberalisation measures 
under Echeverria in order to placate those who demanded democratic reform. 
Liberalisation, therefore, was brought about under the pressure of a volatile population -  it 
was not a premeditated move carefully arranged and negotiated between elites. 
Echeverria’s ‘democratic opening’, however, was not intended to democratise the system -  
the regime sought to placate the more moderate elements of the opposition and in the 
process, to cause a split between those who were satisfied with such limited measures and 
those who demanded much more. It was a classic PRI tactic designed to weaken the 
opposition by causing dissension within the ranks of the democratic opposition. What 
Echeverria did not count on was that the labour movement would mount the largest and 
most militant opposition in Mexican history during the ‘apertura clemocratica'. The labour 
insurgency tested the limits of the democratic opening and represented a turning point in 
PRI history -  it seized this opportunity to launch huge protests and voice its demands.
Although the government eventually crushed the labour threat, the damage had been done. 
The labour insurgency cost the PRI the presidency in the long-term. It contributed to the 
private sector’s increasing skepticism about the PRI’s ability to contain mass discontent -  
elites reacted to the labour insurgency by withdrawing their support and thus, the popular 
upsurge set the wheels in motion for the party’s demise. Echevema’s populist policies and 
Lopez Portillo’s bank nationalisation led to a rupture in the relations between the state and 
the private sector -  business deserted the PRI and entered politics by supporting the PAN, 
the party which won the 2000 elections. The demise of the old regime however, did not 
occur within a short time after the upsurge as it did in Brazil and South Korea. The reasons 
for this were unique to the Mexican case -  the PRI was a monolithic structure that could
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not be brought down overnight. It was a lengthy, complicated process that occurred over 
the space of several decades. The important point is that the labour insurgency initiated a 
steady loosening of the PRI’s stranglehold and laid the foundations for its eventual 
downfall.
There were two splits within the elite which followed the PRI’s loss of support -  the 
business sector’s split from the ruling party and the split within the PRI. The demise of the 
PRI was not only evident in the abandonment of it by business, but also in the elite split 
from within its own ranks and the loss of its traditional bases of support. Dissatisfaction 
with the regime was brewing for several years from within the PRI ranks. Cardenas 
abandoned the PRI and formed the PRD with other political elites because they were 
critical of the PRI’s neo-liberal turn. They felt that the party has discarded its roots and 
demanded democratic reform. This split was years in the making -  mass pressure on the 
government to initiate a democratic transition resonated with disgruntled elites within the 
PRI. This pressure intensified during the economic crisis of the early 1980s, the effects of 
which were still being felt when Cardenas and the PRD ran for the presidency in 1988. The 
amount of popular support that Cardenas received is indicative of the frustration that 
millions of Mexicans felt towards the PRI. The formation of the PRD was a major threat to 
the Mexican political system, given that this opposition fundamentally undermined the 
PRI’s support base. Large numbers of the urban poor, students, peasants, workers and 
sectors of the middle class supported the PRD because they were unhappy with the neo­
liberalism of the PRI and felt abandoned in the wake of extensive economic restructuring. 
Many supported the Cardenas campaign as a protest. Economic downturn resulted in a loss 
of legitimacy for the party which was responsible for maintaining the ‘perfect dictatorship’. 
The popular classes were attracted to the PRD because of its pro-democracy and social 
welfare platform. The split in Mexico, therefore, was the culmination of a process of 
political change which was sparked off by Tlatelolco and gained momentum with the 
labour insurgency. The actions of labour were a catalyst in the political ferment which 
created the necessary conditions for the defeat of the PRI in 2000.
The military’s decision to liberalise in Brazil was not only motivated by the need to defuse 
increasing social dissent, but also to deal with the threat posed by the hard-liners within the 
regime. The distensäo was intended to strengthen the position of the soft-liners vis-ä-vis the
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hard-liners who controlled the security forces and were keen on instituting even further 
repressive measures. In order to consolidate his own position within the government, Geisel 
sought to neutralise the hard-liners through liberalisation. It was also an attempt to curb the 
hard-liner excesses of the Medici regime -  Geisel was fully aware that the harsh repression 
of the Medici period had damaged the military’s credibility.
Just like the Mexican case, liberalisation was seen as a way of counteracting dissent while 
maintaining a tight grip on the reins -  it was never intended to genuinely lead to 
democracy. This, however, is exactly what happened. Similarly to Mexico, once 
liberalisation got under way, the regime soon found itself faced with opposition on several 
fronts and the most dangerous challenge came from the labour movement. Opposition 
to the regime was troubling for the military because it was not limited to a small part of the 
population. Important sectors of business led an ‘anti-statism’ campaign against the 
government, ‘desestatizasäo\ calling for an end to state interference in the private sector. 
Segments of the Catholic Church, along with students, also voiced their opposition to the 
dictatorship and its economic policies. Popular and grassroots forms of political and 
community mobilisation also emerged in the poor, urban areas of Brazil.
When the new unionism emerged, the military faced internal tensions of its own between 
the soft-line and hard-line factions -  tensions which had existed since the beginning of the 
military dictatorship. The difference, however, was that the split became politically salient 
with the new unionism and the popular protests which erupted from the late 1970s and 
onwards. The novo sindicalismo complicated the already existing split between the 
hardliners and the softliners who were now divided over how to deal with the threat from 
below. The new unionism exploited this split with strikes and demanded democratic reform 
while it continued to form more alliances with other anti-authoritarian social forces. The 
build up of mass pressure, in conjunction with the economic crisis, eventually forced the 
military to retreat. There was overwhelming pressure from below and the military had no 
choice but to allow direct, presidential elections in 1988. The elite split in Brazil, therefore, 
occurred as a result of internal tensions which, in turn, were exacerbated by differences in 
opinion over how to respond to popular protests. The novo sindicalismo used this 
opportunity to press for an end to the system of worker control and more importantly, to 
lead the pro-democracy movement and the transition. It was the working class, rather than
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the middle class which was the main force for democratic change in Brazil. This contrasts 
with South Korea where the middle classes played a large role in the transition -  despite 
worker mobilisation, the middle classes benefited the most from the South Korean 
transition.
In South Korea, liberalisation was driven by the need to prevent mass insurrection. The 
Y.H. incident in 1979 sparked a popular upsurge against the regime. Widespread protests 
against the regime split the elite and resulted in liberalisation. Chun, however, quickly 
moved to reassert authoritarian control in the period following Park’s death. But by the 
early 1980s, harsh repression could no longer keep a lid on the opposition to 
authoritarianism. It had become so intense and so extensive that Chun was forced to initiate 
liberalisation. Similarly to Mexico and Brazil, the purpose of liberalisation was to prolong 
authoritarian rule indefinitely -  there was never any intention of relinquishing control. The 
result, nevertheless, was unintended. Liberalisation opened the floodgates for mass pressure 
to democratise the Korean system. Beginning in 1984, mass mobilisation dominated the 
national scene. Student organisations, labour unions, church and womens’ groups, as well 
as opposition politicians mounted a relentless campaign in favour of direct, democratic 
elections.
Nationwide alliances between the newly formed opposition party, the NKDP and student 
groups, youth, labour unions and religious organisations resulted in the formation of the 
People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR). The PMCDR 
was typical of the various pro-democracy coalitions that emerged in this highly politicised 
climate. The reactivation of civil society on such an unprecedented scale dealt a severe 
blow to the regime. By 1987, it could no longer contain the millions of South Koreans who 
were taking to the streets. The possibility of revolution split the elite and resulted in a major 
concession -  the 'democracy declaration’ of June 1987. Immediately after the democracy 
declaration, the labour movement sprang into action. In the months that followed, Korean 
workers launched militant strikes during the ‘hot summer’ of 1987. The elite split gave 
labour the opportunity to test the limits of the regime’s commitment to democratisation.
The worker offensive, paradoxically however, led to the emergence of a conservative, 
democratic government. When strikes continued into 1988 and 1989, the middle classes’
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initial support for the workers waned -  the continuation of labour unrest threatened their 
material interests. Combined with the government’s propaganda blitz against the unions, 
the middle classes now backed government repression of the workers. On the other hand, 
the chaebol became deeply distrustful of the government -  they felt that the crackdown on 
labour did not go far enough. The loss of chaebol support meant that the government was 
forced to seek allies elsewhere -  the most suitable option was Kim Young Sam. Taking 
advantage of the factional split in the opposition forces, the government formed an alliance 
with Kim -  the ‘Grand Conservative Coalition’. This not only assured them a stake in the 
future democratic government, it was also designed to neutralise Kim Dae Jung, who was 
perceived as the more radical in the democratic opposition. For the middle classes, this 
offered a more stable option than the radical alternatives posed by the worker mobilisation.
Each country, therefore, represents a different model for the interaction between elite splits 
and popular pressure. In all three countries, intense mass pressure provided a crucial 
opportunity for the labour movement to push for a transition to democracy. This challenges 
the model developed by elite-led transitology -  the transition to democracy began in each 
country not because of a calculated, elite decision to carry out a democratic transition, nor 
was it the result of negotiations at the highest levels of government, at least not in the initial 
stages. What sparked off the transition was widespread popular dissent spearheaded by the 
labour movement -  it was able to capitalise on elite splits and place constant pressure on 
governments to democratise once liberalisation was under way.
LABOUR & OTHER SOCIAL FORCES
The strength of the labour movement in each country was also in its links to other sectors in 
society. Unhappy with the lack of political freedoms and authoritarian controls in general, 
sections of the middle classes joined powerful, anti-dictatorship movements. Particularly in 
Brazil and South Korea, the middle classes were repulsed by the actions of authoritarian 
governments -  arbitrary arrests, torture, imprisonment and the lack of civil liberties 
motivated many to protest against the regime. Economic development also had unforeseen 
consequences in the private sector. Chafing under authoritarian restrictions and the 
perceived economic failings of the state, the bourgeoisie in Mexico and Brazil took active
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Steps to promote democratic change. In Mexico, the result was that an important section of 
business threw its weight behind the PAN. In Brazil, important sectors of business joined 
the pro-democracy campaign made up of blue and white-collar workers, the middle class, 
white collar professionals and students.
The emergence of a powerful labour movement in direct opposition to a repressive regime 
was the most important result of rapid industrialisation. Economic development brought 
about by an authoritarian state resulted in changes in the class and economic structure. In 
each case study, millions migrated from the countryside to urban centres, seeking 
employment in the industries targeted for economic expansion. As economic growth took 
off and each country experienced a 'miracle’ of its own, not only did the working class 
grow in numbers, it also developed class consciousness. Concentrated in factories where 
conditions were harsh and miserable, workers sought to end the broader system of 
authoritarian control and to demand democratic change. Common to all three case studies is 
the paradox at the heart of the developmental state -  it created the conditions for its 
eventual downfall. As economic development continued, the working and middle classes, 
as well as the private sector (particularly those elements which are integral to 
industrialisation) were strengthened.
Labour’s alliances with other classes, however, varied from case to case. In every case, the 
middle class played an important role in the pro-democracy movement, although it was the 
strongest in South Korea. At Tlatelolco, middle class protests resulted in a monumental 
clash with the state. It was the labour insurgency, however, that tapped into the frustrations 
of other social groups -  frustrations which were apparent even almost a decade after the 
Tlatelolco massacre -  students, middle classes, urban poor, white-collar workers. These, 
however, were different times -  the PRI could no longer control pressure from below the 
way it had previously been able to control it. The insurgencia obrera badly shook the 
structures of the PRI state -  uncontrolled mass mobilisation struck at the heart of the PRI. 
As a result, it scrambled to maintain its hegemonic position by struggling to keep various 
social groups appeased with economic policies that were geared towards meeting short­
term political ends. Labour, however, was ultimately unable to bring down the PRI, but it 
caused irreversible cracks in the system -  the PRI was no longer the impenetrable structure 
of the past. The outcome of the labour insurgency and popular resistance was typical of the
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Mexican case -  the government allowed worker mobilisation to go only so far before it 
used repression and intimidation to crush the threat from below.
In Brazil, it was largely the labour movement that spearheaded the pro-democracy 
movement. The new unionism immediately began building extensive links with other 
opposition forces, such as the urban poor and sections of the Catholic Church. Workers 
demanded an end to authoritarianism and repression while calling for democratic change. 
This placed the issue of democratic change in the public spotlight. When more and more 
people protested against the regime and workers became more vocal in their attacks on the 
regime, the middle class, professional groups such as lawyers and journalists, as well as 
significant sectors of business also joined the call for democracy. Middle class forces were 
active in the anti-dictatorship struggle but it was primarily labour that led the opposition to 
the military regime. Labour’s efforts to bring down authoritarian government extended into 
the electoral arena with the formation of the PT -  a powerful political expression of the 
organised working class.
The middle class element was the strongest in South Korea. They played an active role in 
the 1960 student revolution and in the anti-dictatorship struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. It 
was the middle class that led the moderate democratic opposition especially during the 
1970s and again in the 1980s. Middle class support in South Korea helped build the labour 
movement during the period of rapid development. Just like Tlateololco in Mexico, the 
Kwangju massacre in South Korea also resulted in a major clash with the state. Labour 
initially enjoyed the support of the middle classes who were sympathetic to the workers’ 
plight. The working class emerged on a large scale after the June ‘democracy declaration’. 
Insurrectionary strikes garnered widespread support against the regime. This case study in 
particular demonstrates how the working class was able to keep the momentum going in the 
democratic transition -  it was not satisfied with the government’s assertions that South 
Korea was on its way to becoming a democracy. The gap between reality and rhetoric was 
painfully clear in the factories where crackdowns and brutal repression were still the norm, 
even after 1988. By striking and taking militant action, workers placed pressure on the 
government to maintain its commitment to genuine democratic change. In the end, 
however, the middle classes turned against the labour offensive because it threatened their 
material interests. The political outcome was disastrous for labour -  it was unable to form
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its own political expression, a labour party. The ‘Grand Conservative Coalition’ excluded 
labour completely and marginalised the more radical sectors of the labour movement.
Elite-led transitology, therefore, does not accord this pressure from below the importance it 
deserves -  by focusing on elite actors, it provides a one-sided picture. Yet, the empirical 
evidence in all three case studies demonstrates that the labour movements were combative 
and actively resisted state power even when the risks of doing so were immense. They 
challenged the very basis upon which the state was constructed and this is why they were so 
dangerous. If we were to uncritically accept elite-led transitology, we would not have a 
balanced model for analysing the various forces at work which influence democratic 
change. By looking at labour movements, we can develop a model which shows the 
complex array of actors and actions -  the nature of elite splits, how labour movements 
influence the split, the constraints under which the labour movement operates, how they 
interact with other social forces, and how they can bring down authoritarian governments.
Politics has never been, nor will it ever be solely about the decisions made at the higher 
levels of government. Ordinary people -  workers, students, the poor -  are also a vital 
element in the transition story. To ignore the overwhelming evidence which demonstrates 
this is not only an oversight, it also obscures the broader historical picture. The political 
economy of rapid development is also an important part of the transition story overlooked 
by elite-led transitologists. It demonstrates how development affects different classes and 
how they form alliances or fail to do so. Focusing on political economy yields insights into 
democratic transitions by providing the context in which labour movements emerge to 
challenge authoritarian governments. The political story of transitions, however, does not 
end with the installation of democratic regimes. Consolidation of democracy is the next 
step and this is an ongoing challenge in each country. Transitions to democracy are still 
occurring throughout the world today. It is imperative that we understand they are not just 
the domain of the political elite. Only once popular struggle is incorporated into the 
analysis, can we have a model which provides a more nuanced perspective.
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